women's studies journal 10:

1994

Hilary Lapsley

Women's Studies Journal

Volume 10 Number 1

March 1994

Contents

Editorial

This issue of the *Women's Studies Journal* introduces the first electronic discussion lists for women's studies in New Zealand. As outlined by Sarah Williams <sarah.williams@stonebow.otago. ac.nz> and Lynne Alice <alice@csuvax1.murdoch.edu.au> the two lists available will enable free-floating discussions and networking, an opportunity to create a 'virtual community' of feminist scholars.

There is obviously some tension in announcing this technology within a print medium like the *Women's Studies Journal*. Print production requires that each word, sentence, image is edited, reedited and then frozen into text at an arbitrary final point to be thereafter consumed and reconsumed in that form. The journal is an inherently one-way form of communication, designed to deliver a finished seamless product. The very real frustrations of such a medium are overcome (in part) by email; we can begin conversations which can go on forever; we can again and again revise our positions. This indeed seems to be, as @punnet describes it, a form of communication which is 'more interactive, more egalitarian, more decentralised, and less hierarchical' (p. 139) — a form especially suited to feminist politics. And one that is most appropriate environmentally as sources of wood for paper diminish rapidly.

Those of us who teach are aware that if we have not got on to the information superhighway, our students certainly have. The women's studies student who contributes her reflections on the politics of internet is wary not of computer technology but of contributing to an 'academic journal that is so deeply rooted in the notions of value of information' (p. 136).

If 'the net' seems to provide a medium that overcomes the limitations of print and challenges the printed word's place as the primary means of academic validation, it yet brings its own tensions for feminists, the most obvious being that a lot of women can't afford food, let alone a computer. As an intrinsically 'disembodied' form of communication email allows people to communicate without physical limitations: '. . . what really counts is what you say and think and feel . . .' (p. 139). Notwithstanding that

computer technology has facilitated communication for people with disabilities, feminists have good reason to distrust such disembodiment; we've heard such claims of equality before.

The very availability of this technology at this point in history is due to its development to serve the needs of the US military-industrial system. In the early 1970s ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency) net was created to allow military computers to transfer data. The first infiltrators of the system were US military contractors and consultants who wanted inside information about weapons. As computer and satellite technology continued to proliferate, other groups such as corporations and academic institutions have made use of it. The official, 'legitimate' control and continuing development of the technology remain with the military-industrial system that produced it. Anne Friedberg points to the sorts of complexities that arise around these new communications technologies:

> The momentous shifts in global politics in the late 1980s were, I would argue, produced as much by these new technologies as by political or ideological shifts. What could provide more vivid proof of the spatial and temporal changes produced by new communications technologies than the global political arena of 1988-1992? Consider: the fax-machine-fuelled 'prodemocracy movement' in China; the 'CNN war' in the Persian Gulf; microwave TV signals carrying images of comfortable lifestyles and abundant consumer goods into the meagerly stocked households of East Germany and the Eastern bloc; satellite beams bringing MTV and the vivid boons of the capitalist West into the fraying economy of the Soviet Union. The boundaries of space and time which were so dramatically challenged by 'modernity' have been, again, radically transformed.[1]

The tension that arises here — between the technology and what we want to use it for — reflects those that feminists working in institutions face daily. An awareness of such contradictions informs the work of author, filmmaker, teacher, composer, Trinh T. Minh-ha who speaks in an interview in this issue. Trinh points out here that we should look to making use of such moments as they appear, rather than be trapped into a purity that closes us off from possibilities. Such openness will often

bring us up against the limits of our institutions and their practices. But Trinh suggests that we engage with the contradictions and allow ourselves to be confused rather than to oversimplify:

> Students often find it very difficult to assume freedom; when you give them freedom they experience it as chaos. It is very hard for many of them to accept that we can be confused together and because of that strain of being confused together, we can move somewhere else, with and beyond the place in which we have been confined. The difficulty lies in accepting this moment of so-called confusion, the moment of blankness and of emptiness through which one necessarily passes in order to have insight. In other words confusion can be a mode of receptivity if one does not simply try to bypass it. (p. 18)

Concerns with electronic media are further explored in Lynne Star's <LStar@mailserver.massey.ac.nz> piece, which builds on her earlier work on women looking at men in tele-sport. She uses her discussion of women's viewing pleasures to challenge much film theory that is premised on the notion of binary sexual difference. Selene Mize <smize@gandalf.otago.ac.nz> also writes about television, taking a lawyerly look at the apparatus set up to monitor and censor television content and assessing its usefulness as a feminist tool to counter negative and degrading images of women in advertising.

Anna Yeatman is also questioning the efficacy of feminist uses of the apparatus of the democratic state and claims that feminists need to interrogate their assumptions about power and how it is used. Yeatman argues that feminists cannot use state power for their own ends and at the same time claim powerlessness; we have to look more closely at our relationship to systems of power.

The visual work of Christine Webster is concerned, too, with power relationships; her photographs are refashionings of familiar imagery which cause us to reflect on how we take on identities and how we use them. Robyn Notman talks about *Black Carnival* from the point of view of a model, the object of the viewer's gaze, who in Webster's photographs is also a subject challenging those who look. Judith Collard's <judith.collard@stonebow.otago.ac.nz>

4

essay comments on some of the exhibitions staged around the suffrage centenary last year. This celebration forced art institutions to reassess their commitment to work by New Zealand women, but Collard suggests that the shows expose the tensions between historical or chronological representations and the political implications of this kind of reassessment.

This issue began because the editorial collective perceived a need to provide a forum for feminist issues around visual representation. This project sparked much work which is not far enough developed to appear in this issue but will surface later. Engaging with visual media can be seen as part of a wider agenda to extend the journal's subject areas and challenge notions of what counts as valid subject matter for academic discussion. Computer networks challenge these notions in other ways. I hope that the reflections that 'alternative' information technologies cast on journal procedure can enable more interactive practices. The inclusion of email addresses here means that it's possible to answer back directly. We can not be innocent but we can play in serious ways with translations and technologies of power.

Maud Cahill <maud.cahill@stonebow.otago.ac.nz>

*   *   *

The content, flavour and organisation of this issue developed from the seriously playful discussions I shared with Sarah Williams, Elizabeth Kerr and Mark McGuire.

Note:

1. Anne Friedberg, *Window Shopping: Cinema and the Postmodern* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993) p. xii.

Strategies of Displacement for Women, Natives and Their Others: Intra-views with Trinh T. Minh-ha

Transcribed and Edited by Tessa Barringer

These discussions with Trinh T. Minh-ha were recorded when she visited Dunedin in August 1993 to screen her latest film *Shoot For the Contents*. Minh-ha's other documentary films are *Reassemblage* (1982), *Naked Spaces: Living is Round* (1985) and *Surname Viet Given Name Nam* (1989). Her books include *Woman, Native, Other* (1989), *When The Moon Waxes Red* (1991), and *Framer Framed* (1992). Minh-ha currently teaches Women's Studies and Film at the University of California, Berkeley.

Participants in these intraviews include: Linda Tyler, Art History, School of Art, Otago Polytechnic; Sarah Williams, Women's Studies; Toroa Pohatu, Maori Studies; Tessa Barringer, English; all at the University of Otago.

With each of us arriving literally and metaphorically from a different place and with a different perspective, Minh-ha herself became the centre, the focal point that anchored and integrated our diversity. As the discussion developed, we explored a wide variety of issues ranging from art and architecture to pedagogy, the politics of discourse, the politics of difference, questions of biculturalism, multiculturalism and the problematics of anthropology. This movement made of the discussion the kind of shifting, productive and 'impure' space that Minh-ha advocates in her work and which itself describes her work.

Since her work is not widely known in New Zealand, we began by asking Minh-ha to describe some of the background to her current work. She replied:

Minh-ha: I don't know how far back I should go but perhaps I can

start from 1970, when I left Vietnam. Coming to the United States was for me like being a bottle thrown into the sea; I was trying to work while studying at the same time. I had written from Vietnam to at least a dozen American universities asking for work (most of the time of course this was not available for foreign students).

Eventually I ended up at Wilmington College, a very small school of about 1000 students in Ohio, where I was accepted partly because the school wanted a representative from Vietnam. I was given a clerical job at a hospital as well as a number of other part-time odd jobs. At that time because I didn't want to specialise entirely in one field, I chose to work in two disciplines at the same time — music and literature. After my time at Wilmington I was awarded a scholarship at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign and I was subsequently also sent as an exchange student to Paris where I taught English in a Lycee and studied ethnomusicology at the Sorbonne. It was one of those twists of colonialism: I was sent to Paris to teach English to French students and I went to Paris to study, not with French theorists whose works interested me at the time, but with a Vietnamese scholar in ethnomusicology who was directing the CNRS (Centre National de Recherche Scientifique). As well as being trained as a musical composer and working in comparative literature, I have also been involved since then in the visual arts, anthropology and ethnomusicology.

I came to film quite recently and probably it was as a result of rejecting everything that I had studied. As a composer I was attracted to percussive instruments rather than the conventional ensembles of music so it was difficult for me to have the music I wrote performed. To summarise a long story, during these years I met a number of film makers and we exchanged our talents. I went to their classes and talked about music or I served as a translator when a film-maker from abroad came and in exchange I asked whether I could stay to learn about film-making; that's how I came to film production myself. Since then I have been focusing more on film than on other activities. I am still writing but for me composing music has become a little bit less urgent since film actually does allow me to pull together all my interests in the visual arts, poetry and music.

Linda: You seem also to be very interested in architecture. In particular, I've noticed in your work that there's a lot of attention paid to interior spaces. Also you've worked with Jean-Paul Bourdier on various collaborative projects on architecture. Is this a continuing interest of yours?

Minh-ha: Yes, that work was very much inspired by Jean-Paul because we work as a team on many projects, but I would say it also corresponds with my other interests as well. The word 'dwelling', if one understands it as a verb and not a noun, involves everything in life; it's a mode of living. The house in which and with which one lives for example, or the house that one has built, tells us a lot about the cultural practices of the individual inhabitants as well as of their society. A writer from Switzerland [F. Jotterand] once told me that the best way to learn about a culture or a society was to look at its architecture. However rather than focusing on monumental architecture we are more interested in what is known as 'vernacular architecture' or in the houses built outside of the market by the people for their own use.

Linda: And is it also of interest to you how women create interior spaces, women as being more associated with houses or homes?

Minh-ha: It is dangerous to look at the home as mainly a concept associated with women. This is an issue the feminist struggle has clearly pointed out and we are still working with it critically. The question is not simply to reject it but perhaps to change the way we think about home. Home has always been opposed to abroad and to travelling. It is the site of dwelling, the fixed or safe place to which one can always return. Because of such an opposition, cultural experts, for example, often conveniently treat the native cultures they study as dwelling sites; while the travelling knower's subjectivity is considered to be shifting and mobile, those of the people studied tend to remain stable, therefore naturally retrievable and knowable. But the notion of home in itself involves the notion of travelling; because, existing only in relation to what has been defined as its opposites, 'home' can never be the same. When those who leave — like myself — come back home, things have changed and so have I. Home is a site that is constantly

shifting; it is only when it is opposed to everything outside, foreign and abroad within a male economy of movement that it appears as something fixed or stable. When not subjected to such a dualism home can be said to be also a site of change whose movement often reflects a different pace and a different sense of time.

This being said, in the places we went to in Africa for example the houses and their interiors were usually considered to be the women's domain. They were the ones who created the living spaces and kept them alive. The men were active outside the house in the domain of public relations. Here again without careful negotiation we may fall back into the public-and-private, home-and-abroad dichotomies. So the challenge is to deal with women and home not in terms that oppose female to male but in terms that suggest different modes of dwelling and travelling. In all of the films I've made I have stayed away from such dichotomies and in *Naked Spaces — Living Is Round* for example I have dealt simultaneously with architecture, music and film by looking at the way light determines or organises women's daily activities as well as how these activities themselves structure the organisation of space.

Linda: In certain commentaries people have used the metaphor of weaving to describe your work and have referred to elements within the work as being 'interwoven'. Do you in your films for example consciously strive for an effect where visual and audial information are interwoven? I'm particularly interested in this in relation to weaving when it is seen as a domestic art, an art associated with women and an art which has traditionally been considered inferior to the fine arts. I wondered whether this was a deliberate strategy on your part?

Minh-ha: That is a nice way to approach it; I haven't thought of it in quite that way before. However I can certainly make the connection here between the notion of weaving and that of impurity (which is another notion associated with women), or more generally that of relationship. For example a couple of readers have responded to *Woman, Native, Other* by arguing that such-and-such an idea advanced here was not new, that it has already been put to use by others in the field challenged. But what is new? There are no new objects so to speak; rather there

Peter Hannken

Peter Hannken

Peter Hannken

are new relationships that one can draw from things, from the way people relate to one another, the way things communicate among themselves and the way language reflects back on itself even when it is used to point to a reality outside itself.

What one has to work on is not simply the objects but the relationships generated by the coexistence of these objects in the very process of the work — in other words the intervals between things, people, moments, events and so on. For me what is important is how one works on these relationships in order to bring out new forms of subjectivity or new relationships between otherwise familiar things. My music, films and books have all been explorations of subjectivities, or of relationships in their differences and multiplicities. There are many ways to discuss this question but if I could focus on one example for the moment, it would be that of language (in the larger sense of the term). When I write a book or when I work on the text of a film I am always looking for different ways of presenting 'information', different ways of speaking and writing, even though these would have to be generated by the subject and the material themselves and cannot be imposed for the sake of new 'forms'.

One can use for example the kind of poetical, elliptical language that belongs to many cultures of marginalised peoples or one can use a language that is very logical and rational as promoted by the mainstream media — in other words a language subjected to linear reasoning and its classificatory power. It is this kind of explanatory language that I tend to reject strongly in *Reassemblage*, for example. Such a rejection was necessary for me at the time since this was one of the first films I made in an attempt to unsay what has been said or to say that one can communicate otherwise than through the language of linear reasoning and literal meaning. The issue is not however just one of opposing reason; if that was the case, then one would merely fall back into this dichotomy where reason belongs to the dominant culture — and to men — while intuition continues to be attributed to women and to other cultures.

What is at stake here is the problem of established power relationships. When this explanatory language becomes dominant, when it becomes so pervasive that the only way people can think about something is to think about it literally, then for me that

language also becomes dangerous because its cultural centralisa-
tion constitutes a form of impoverishment — the ways in which
we think are reduced and homogenized — as it excludes or inval-
idates all other ways of communicating. So I had to say 'no' to it
in *Reassemblage* but in the other films I've made since then I 've
been using both kinds of language and more in order to open up
a different critical space. This leads us to a point I made earlier:
if one does not censor oneself, if one fearlessly crosses bound-
aries — even those that one has made up for oneself on one's
own terms — then one is bound to remain radically impure. But
if one becomes too rigid in carrying out one's own rules in an
attempt to be pure then one tends to close oneself off to other
forms and other possibilities.

And of course this question of purity can be linked back to the
notion of culture. Home as we discussed earlier has conventionally
been considered to be the place of purity — you always return to
Mother or to the site of authentic culture and language. The
example of Native Americans in the States seems to be very rele-
vant here. Historically there has been an ongoing attempt to
destroy the people and to erase their cultures; we have now come
to a point where both the descendants of those who have
destroyed and those who have been the victims mourn the loss of
an entire heritage. It's not just a question of losing a particular
language or a particular set of cultural practices, but of losing a
whole way of thinking and of living differently. However even
though I realise acutely how crucial the problem is I also think
that it's misleading to think of it only in terms of loss. What
about all the Native Americans who are now living in 'impurity'
having to bridge several cultures to survive? When perceived as
such the place of impurity can become extremely enabling since
one can draw from it unthought of relationships and what one
has then is a new, fresh reality that is not defined by a dualist
shuttling between native and non-native, but that is being creat-
ed in the fearless crossing of the home-and-abroad or overhere-
and-overthere boundaries.

Sarah: It seems to me that in this particular context the tensions
between bicultural and multicultural perspectives are very much
in the foreground in ways that are perhaps different to that

photo courtesy of Toroa Pohatu

which we might experience in the United States. In terms of my own thinking I've got to the point where I prefer to talk about post-culturalism and I'm beginning to suspect that perhaps the problem is with the very notion of culture itself as an organising principle. It appears to create a form of categorisation that leaves us only able to go back and forth between home and abroad and as a consequence we remain trapped in the kinds of binaries of which you've been so critical in your writing. In terms of a pedagogy if minds aren't engaging in that kind of critical movement, if they are rejecting that potentially productive 'impurity', what kind of languages are you finding most useful in your work for addressing questions of difference, and in particular, the tensions that arise between bicultural and multicultural perspectives?

Minh-ha: At first hearing, it may sound as if the problems here are unlike those in the States, but the more you speak about them, the more I realise that there are many similarities and there are many points common to both contexts. For me, it's not a question of choosing between biculturalism and multiculturalism, but rather, of dealing with what can be seen as the continuing inability to work with difference. If we talk about difference, then we are not talking about bi- or multi-; we are neither trying to polarise nor to add up safely without effecting change on the prevailing state of things.

In the United States, multiculturalism is a word that many people of color strongly reject. The only place where it appears as a positive catchword is in the mainstream media and that is a clear indication of how the word is being re-appropriated. The reason it is being rejected, in my view, is because it has become so unthreatening and depoliticised in its use; multiculturalism has almost the same liberal connotations as the word 'pluralism'. As you know, this has created a lot of problems for the struggles of marginalised people because it tends to obscure the issue of differences — ethnic, racial, sexual, gender, class and others. Multi-culturalism, understood as a bland melting-pot, points back to the time in the States when the first European immigrants came to settle down and to appropriate the land. It was necessary for them then to form a White coalition and to promote unity of lifestyle and of values and in order to achieve such a standardisation all differences were leveled out. 'Multi-' here ultimately meant 'uni-' or one-dimensional and the way that had come to prevail in this multicultural advocacy was no other than the white man's way.

This perception of multiculturalism hasn't gone away yet; it is very much alive especially in the mainstream media. That's why I think the use of such a word is dangerous. Coopted in the context of liberal pluralism, it tends to dilute, suppress and obscure a lot of issues; and in the end what it denotes is a very uncommitted stance. Other terms have been put to use in today's context of cultural activity such as 'diversity' but even this word has become indicative of a form of safe appropriation and reductiveness — diversity for diversity's sake — since it tends to uphold culture as a commodifiable object of knowledge. Perhaps so far the more effective term remains 'cultural difference', a very old term but one whose simplicity can lead to very complex forms of subjectivities (as seen in contemporary critical theories and practices); it implies the possibility of numerous processes of differentiation in dealing with the problem of cultural supremacy and cultural centralisation.

The situation in New Zealand may be one in which the question of multiculturalism serves as a means of escape for those who deny the urgency of the Maori struggle. So on the one hand you have people who try to dilute the issues of cultural difference by arguing that there are many cultures involved and not just two and on the other hand you have other people who it seems,

reactively or strategically push for biculturalism in order to prevent the liberal dispersal and dismissal of their cause. Multiculturalism has been used in many Western contexts to set marginalised people against each other and to avoid the specific issues of each group. But each situation has its own set of questions and rather than trying to homogenise them these have to be dealt with in their specificities and differences. The challenge is how to really deal with the difficulties and complexities of difference, not just the difference between cultures but the difference that questions a whole system of truth and representation and allows each case of marginalisation to be dealt with as a unique case without losing sight of what it may share with other cases.

Tessa: There's also the implication of difference within a culture, that no culture is in itself stable; it's a shifting space as well, isn't it, always moving always changing?

Minh-ha: The boundaries we are setting up are boundaries that are strategically important for political struggle. However one should always remain open to the possible modification and trans-formation of these boundaries; otherwise we are unable to form any new alliances.

Tessa: You talk frequently in your work about the 'strategies of displacement' that you use in order to prevent such boundaries from becoming fixed. In your films you seem often to be entering other people's places. When you're approaching another's space (whether it be literal or metaphoric) with the intention of exploring it, what strategies of displacement do you find most useful in attempting to represent or theorise that space while at the same time respecting its difference and keeping it open and alive?

Minh-ha: The image I probably would have for such a process is the image of two spirals. As mentioned earlier, the place of the observer is always considered to be mobile and flexible while the place of the observed is often thought of as unproblematically identifiable and hence static. Whereas in the process of displacement you've just described there are at least two spiralling movements happening in the same space of exploration. You as the onlooker

position yourself differently according to different contexts and circumstances but so does the 'other' at whom you are looking. Each constitutes a site of subjectivities whose movement is neither simply linear nor circular. In the spiralling movement you never come back to the same and when two spirals move together in a space there are moments when they meet and others when they do not. Trying to find a trajectory that allows the two movements to meet as much as possible without subsuming one to the other is how I also see the process of translation.

Many of the cultural translation works are carried out on the terms of the translator's culture and so very little remains of that cultural encounter full of blanks — the spiralling movements where things come in contact with one another in ways that cannot entirely be measured. Often all that you have is the translation in your own terms of what the other is. For me that is where the danger lies because we are not dealing with that double or multiple spiralling movement in which sometimes things meet and other times they don't. To bring that movement out is of course the challenge we constantly have to face with every single work we come up with.

Tessa: You talk of the gaps created by that kind of spiralling movement as being gifts in that they give the signal for departure.

It seems to me that these gifts are the challenge and that the challenge lies in addressing your own process in its relation to the other subject, in recognising that you are both moving, that you are both subjects in process. I'm interested in the way you deal with this in your work, in the way that you foreground your process rather than yourself as subject. And of course that then raises the question of who's in the frame. In framing the other are you not also framed yourself? Do you find it difficult to keep that movement going without getting caught up in a kind of endless self reference, watching yourself watching yourself watching the other?

Minh-ha: I think that if that were the case I would not be able to finalise any work; but I believe, and I think you put it very nicely, that what you encounter is the process itself or the processes in which subject and object are inseparable. The linearity and circularity of movement implied in 'watching yourself watching yourself watching the other' is precisely what I have stayed away from when I chose the image of the two spirals. Here the point of reference is no longer 'the self' but rather something more like the 'interself'. I also believe that the work in progress is not a work that awaits a better stage but rather something that is constantly on the move. Every work must have a beginning and an ending just as every storyteller has a beginning and ending (and there is a beginning and an ending to every storyteller). And every work you come up with is a finished work because it is what you can do best at that moment in a specific situation and circumstance. However it is also a work in progress because it partakes in a life process that links what you have done to what you will be doing and each work materialised is simply a moment in the process or a process within processes.

This notion of the moment is also very appropriate when applied to film. People often think that the film begins only when you start shooting but shooting is just a moment in the process, a moment among many other moments. It is the moment in which the image takes shape but what about all the other moments that make the moment of shooting what it is? What about everything that goes on before and after? If we see a film only in terms of that consecrated moment then we are closing it off. How should I say this . . . It's like reducing filmmaking to a question of finding

solutions for a specific work even though these solutions are unique to that work and cannot be repeated formulaically in any other. What is finalised in the film belongs to that very moment and circumstance. I consider my work to be radically inefficient when it comes to prescriptions. I cannot offer a model to follow. What I can offer lies not necessarily in the work itself but rather in what one can find (or not find) in that place of filmmaking.

Toroa: This notion of a moment in time — a moment in a continuum in which the past and the future are happening in the present — that is very much the way in which a Maori mind works. I wondered if in coming to New Zealand you had some specific interest in Maori culture or is your interest more in terms of the difference of other people here?

Minh-ha: I do not wish to come in with a preconceived idea of what Maori culture is and so I don't have any locked-in area of interest. I am however very interested in what you've just said about the concept of time as the Maori people live it. For me — to discuss that continuum — one can look at the way education is being carried out. In the context of Western education the process of learning and of transmitting knowledge is very much based on a linear notion of time.

For example let's take a well-known philosopher like Jacques Derrida. I have been told that one cannot teach Derrida without also teaching the classical texts of Kant and Heidegger. But in order to understand Derrida one does not necessarily need to go back to Kant and Heidegger (even when their texts are directly at stake) because in reading the latter two, one has to go further back yet to other classical and ancient works, and the process can go on forever. Not only is the ideology of tracing the primary influences and returning to the so-called original texts questionable because it is dependent on the more explicitly named and easily located references, but it also proves to be illusory in its claim to 'deeper understanding'. In other words, it has its own limits and is no more valid than any other approach. This being said, if one wishes to go back to Kant and Heidegger in order to read Derrida, that's fine; but when this linear approach is legitimised as the only valid way to teach or to learn then we are again dealing with cultural authority and established power relationships.

   Instead of going back to Kant and Heidegger why not explore
for example how Derrida's theories can meet Merce
Cunningham's dances or intersect with certain trends in contem-
porary performance arts? Why follow only the vertical and its
hierarchies when the oblique and the horizontal in their multi-
plicities are no less relevant and no less fascinating for the quest
of truth and knowledge? Why not explore first and foremost how
any theory or any writing speaks specifically to us — to our situated
social and individual selves — from where we are in our actualities,
our cultural differences, our circumstancial positionings and
diversely mediated background? It has always been personally
very important for me as a reader to inquire carefully into how a
text engages and strikes me in a certain way and what layers in
the investigation of self and other it has opened up in me as I
interact with it in my reading journey. In this continuum where
the past and the future happen in the present one should be
able to come in at any point and reverberate accordingly. This is
something that has always awakened my deepest curiosity when
dealing with visual works. And I am very interested here in how
Maori artists live and materialise this reverberation across time
and space in the continuum .

Tessa: That notion of time also suggests the image you used earlier
of the spirals that are interlaced with each other in a structure
that collapses the notion of linearity. As they rotate the spirals
touch at different places setting up different relationships,
perhaps unexpected relationships. I think that's one of the
things I enjoy most about your work, the unexpected relationships,
relationships that couldn't and wouldn't happen in a traditional
context where those kind of connections simply aren't made.

Sarah: These ideas of plurality, of non-essentialist and multiple
selves, obviously resonate for each of us here. Certainly within
the teaching situation I've experienced a deep willingness on the
part of students to question traditional and canonical values and
practices. In your work it seems to me that you are attempting to
tap into another consciousness, another way of looking that by its
very existence unsettles those academic values and practices. Do
you find that there is a deep hostility to other ways of knowing,
an intense power structure (particularly in academia) that keeps

and has kept the linear, rational way of knowing of the disembodied self in the dominant position for a number of years? Historically how and why do you think that particular way of knowing has acquired such power?

Minh-ha: The question is a vast one and there are many ways to approach it but perhaps I can suggest one here. One clearly recognises the problem you describe in the prevailing systems of education as discussed and it is not only limited to the present nor to the Western world. Students often find it very difficult to assume freedom; when you give them freedom they experience it as chaos. It is very hard for many of them to accept that we can be confused together and because of that strain of being confused together, we can move somewhere else, with and beyond the place in which we have been confined. The difficulty lies in accepting this moment of so-called confusion, the moment of blankness and of emptiness through which one necessarily passes in order to have insight. In other words confusion can be a mode of receptivity if one does not simply try to bypass it.

In considering the system of power to which you refer one can go back to the sixteenth century; as you know many theories

have shown that the work done in the middle ages and those carried out today bear many similarities in the way they approach certain issues and certain questions. Looking at the history of Western thought one can say that the period from the Renaissance to the beginning of the twentieth century is marked by a move constantly to affirm light over darkness, reason over intuition. In its attempt to overcome and suppress moments of confusion and darkness, this movement contributed to creating and establishing a situation in which light became opposed to dark.

A Japanese novelist [Jun'ichiro Tanizaki] writing on the perils of 'excessive illumination' says that one cannot really appreciate the different qualities of light unless one understands how it is defined and revealed in its complexities by darkness. In other words light is the inevitable product of darkness, and darkness, with its own range of colors and of visibility is the indispensable element of life — the place of peace and repose without whose recognition light becomes oppressive and self-destructive. However during the period of Western thought mentioned the drive for progress — progress viewed exclusively in terms of light and unity — could only deal with the coexistence of these two elements by setting them up against each other until all that matters today for many people of this civilisation is that which is most tangible and visible to them.

I think this privileging of the visible or the setting up of a mutually exclusive relationship between light and darkness or between the civilized and the primitive has certainly participated in the process that has brought us to endorsing the comfortable, linear notion of history and linear mode of knowing to the detriment of other ways of thinking and exploring. But as you've noted once these different ways are brought out in practice one really pays dearly for it; at least that has always been my experience in the academic world whether this occasional, deep hostility is directed to my written or filmic work. But such a task has to be carried on anyway; it's a way of surviving. If I did not take up the challenge and persist in the struggle I would be closing myself up in places that were pre-assigned for me. The only way to get out or rather to resist such ready-made slots is to keep on doing this kind of critical and creative work. Hopefully it will open up doors for other people but first of all it opens doors for yourself.

Sarah: There has been a suggestion recently in anthropological circles that indigenous film making is nothing more than a fad, that cultural studies needs an other and that you happen to be a very convenient other for us at this moment. The implication being that the fad will pass and then real anthropologists will get back to doing real ethnographies about how we see real other peoples. I wonder if you have any response to that?

Minh-ha: Any one of us working in a struggle knows that we adapt our positions to the circumstances and use certain terms for tactical and strategical reasons but this does not mean we're submitted to any of them. I have discussed elsewhere the necessity for marginalised people to say two or three things at a time. This does not imply the absence of a position or the incapacity to take up a position; instead it suggests that positioning oneself is always tactical and political. For example I may if I am in Vietnam, be very hostile toward China because in its historical relation to Vietnam, China represents the imperialist force and the centralised culture. But if I am outside of Vietnam in the States for example, I would generally speak on the side of China because from this position China represents a certain Third World 'visibility'. It is the site for possible Third World alliances. From each place then I would speak differently about China but that does not mean that my position in the States is contradictory to the one I take on in Vietnam. They are both based on the same principle, on whether we are going to let ourselves be subjected to the dominant culture without challenging it while problematising our own involvement in it.

The suggestion that such positionings are in fashion right now and that they will eventually die away, denotes an inability to recognise the strategical nature of their adoption. The critical stances at work won't just die away; instead they will take on other forms and other names and other people will carry on the struggle. What one can never escape is the way relationships as I discussed earlier define you and your activities. In any encounter with the 'other', what you face is also yourself and your set of practices and as long as you continue to indulge in a position where you can point at someone else and speak safely then you are simply buying time, trying to bypass the very issue of subject and power or of cultural supremacy whose negation has precisely contributed to the instability of anthropology as a discipline. If one does not critically address one's relation to knowledge then one constantly finds oneself in a position of having to re-confirm one's authority through the setting up of fences and of all kinds of disciplinary rules.

Sarah: Some of your work has been very critical of anthropology. Do you feel that it is the discipline itself which creates a way of knowing that should not be, or is not, tenable? What is your reaction to the individual transformations of the discipline into something like cultural studies, Maori studies, women's studies? Is this a cultural phenomenon that you find to be hopeful?

Minh-ha: The criticism I made of anthropology does not only concern anthropology although as a discipline that seeks to "reveal" one culture to another it has certainly been discussed at length in my work. But I have carried out critical work in other areas as well. My first published book, *Un Art Sans Oeuvre* (loosely translated as 'An Art Without Masterpiece') already problematised the notion of 'art,' of philosophy and literature. So anthropology is not the only field in trouble as contemporary theories have amply shown.

I wouldn't say for example that anthropology has to disappear and that in place of it we should have something like cultural studies because as I 've suggested earlier cultural studies is now also being colonised. In its attempts to open up the notion of 'culture' it rarely asks the question of whose culture and which culture (on the international map) is being studied. Its rise in the academic world can work against other marginalised fields such as women's studies, ethnic studies, for example. In other words cultural studies tends to subsume all other studies-programs into one. So while I think it is extremely stimulating to have such a thing as cultural studies — a field or a project that remains open-ended and has the potential to politicise our everyday, mundane activities — I also think that one should challenge it in its ethno-historical perspective and prevent its recuperation in the academic world. The problem of ethnocentrism is still very much present here and to further what I said earlier it may take on new forms and new names but it has not died away and the fight will have to go on.

The fight must be carried on simultaneously in at least two directions. Women's studies for example, has had to struggle in the past with its being stabilised as a program or a department of its own in academic institutions. As such it became a women's thing in the midst of the university. But without having a 'home'

of its own, it's difficult for it to effect change on university curricula and hence, at the same time as texts written by women or focusing on gender issues should be taught in all fields, it is also necessary that women's studies has a base from which it can make its demands and to which it can return to refocus its energy. The same may apply to cultural studies. We have to open the notion of cultural studies so that the emphasis is not merely laid on a contestation of the opposition between low and high cultures in the UK and the US, but also on the different existing cultures in the world whether low or high. Cultural studies should then meet intercultural studies, acknowledging that there are many contexts, many cultures involved in such a project.

Toroa: Isn't it the notion then of keeping an insider's and an outsider's view? It seems to me that what you're saying is, let us keep the position of insider, be it of anthropology or whatever because that position offers a perspective that has value. For native persons or for people of difference, it is as if you have a mirror image of yourself as well as a window looking out on the world. In Maori studies we try to teach our students that you must look through that window at society but at the same time you must look also at your own reflection so that you are moving backwards and forwards aware of both the insider's and the outsider's view. And that it is important to keep both views because each offers something that the other cannot see.

Minh-ha: That's a wonderful image. And one that is most relevant to my work because I would say that all my films are about this positioning of outsider and insider and each one of them is a different attempt to address the multiple degrees of insideness and outsideness involved. It has been very important for marginalised people to claim the right to self-representation; needless to say this is an absolutely necessary fight. But what we need now is to carry out work that offers at least two movements at the same time: one claiming the right to self-representation and the other dealing with the politics of representation thereby refusing the boundaries or the limits that are being imposed on our activities. For example let's consider the idea that Maori people must do work on Maori people, that you must mind your own business, stay in your own territory and not try to move out of it. The people

who are marked by their skin color, their gender, their class, their sexuality are conveniently supposed to limit their activities to areas pre-marked for them whereas the non-marked, the white people, the dominant self or the flexible-I can deploy its activities across all boundaries and document the world. We should be careful not to contribute to such a confining state of things and be prepared to fight on both fronts at the same time.

*   *   *

Editorial Note

As I transcribed the text of this discussion I became aware that even the apparently simple act of transcription is also an act of translation (from spoken into written language). As Minh-ha herself says, 'when you translate you automatically rationalise what people say according to the logic and habits of your own language or mode of speaking'.[1] I have therefore tried to keep my intervention to the minimum, to respect and preserve as much as possible the difference of the five voices on the tapes.

*   *   *

Graphics selected and arranged by Sarah Williams.

*   *   *

Notes

1. Trinh, T. Minh-ha, *Framer Framed* (New York, Routledge, 1992) pp. 127–8.

Wild Pleasures: Watching Men On Television

Lynne Star

> ... even today, the notion of a structure lacking any center represents the unthinkable itself. (Derrida) [1]

I have begun with this fragment from Derrida because it expresses my thinking on the myth of the biological binary which underlies a great deal of feminist theorising and which needs challenging. What I want to do here is to develop my work to date on female viewing pleasures in watching male team sport on television, namely New Zealand rugby, as was outlined in 'Undying Love, Resisting Pleasures: Women Watch Telerugby' to which I refer readers.[2] The piece is neither a comprehensive historical review nor an introduction to work on difference-based theories of spectatorship, but is intentionally partial, fragmentary and idiosyncratic. I foreground my reflexive processes in reconsidering the earlier work and draw on my own wild pleasures in reviewing the potential gratifications of these texts.

In the past decade two singular things have happened to representations of male bodies in western popular culture. Firstly, the range of arenas where 'masculine bodies' and 'masculinity' may be legitimately displayed has expanded, and with it, the opportunities for looking. Secondly a steady tide of male nudity, including the formerly tabooed genitals, is rolling in. I say these are 'singular' trends because, for a period of approximately one hundred years before the mid-1970s, male genitalia were depicted only in 'dirty' postcards, porno mags, underground films and the like.[3] Popular culture was officially coded 'masculine-no-penis'. The penis was the tabooed and repressed, which, applying Foucault, was therefore constantly produced as a centre of attention by a particular regime of phallic power/knowledge/pleasure.

Given the over-exposure of women's bodies, such obsessive insinuation, coupled with an excessive and false 'modesty', amounted to a manic camp of Sontagesque proportions. During this period, sport, movies and popular music were the major and virtually exclusive official arenas for the parading of masculinity.[4] Even then, each move in rock music and in male sport to briefer and more flamboyant, body-hugging clothes was at first met with staunch resistance in some quarters.[5] This week Australian television announced that a nude image of surf marathoner Guy Leech had just appeared on a billboard (which didn't seem much of an advance on the close-ups of him running around television screens in Ironman contests). The previous week *HQ Magazine* won back on appeal part of the A\$385,000 damages they had been ordered to pay Aussie League star, Andrew Ettinghausen, for publishing a photo which showed his penis without his permission. That such a sum in damages could be awarded, or that a naked man on a hoarding rated as television news in Australia in 1993, underlines the relative novelty of the male nude. In 1988 Suzanne Moore noted an uproar at the BBC 'at the hint of a Derek Jarman film' and a BBC spokesman announcing that 'there will never be an erection at the BBC . . .'.[6]

The growing slice of the television cake devoted to male sport is a major contributor to these developments.[7] Others are: music television; beefcake calendars of semi-clad firemen; footie players etc.; bodybuilding competitions on video and television; bodybuilding magazines routinely available at dairies, delis and newsagents; and male strip shows on primetime television. Gay magazines and videos have become more freely available. This month, a Robert Mapplethorpe Calendar is selling well at my local bookshop in Fremantle and London's Whitechapel Art Gallery has a show in which Lucien Freud (grandson of Sigmund) exhibits three giant 'magnificently and overwhelmingly naked' canvases of gay performance artist Leigh Bowery (who has made nudity a career) with titles like 'Parts of Leigh Bowery'.[8] Suddenly, penises are chic. The trend continues in popular films where, from a daring start in Ken Russell's *Women in Love* in 1968,[9] the inclination to show male actors naked is intensifying in both Art Cinema and mainstream films. Only a few years ago it would have been difficult to imagine even an

avant-garde show like Monty Python including male nudity. Now, ex-Python Terry Gwillam had Robin Williams strip in *The Fisher King* and Jane Campion's otherwise physically circumspect *The Piano* features badman Harvey Keitel in full-frontal. Harvey also appeared nude in his previous film *Bad Lieutenant*.[10] By the late 1980s Australian women's magazines were reportedly clamouring for 'women's men' as centrefolds and features.[11]

A heterocentric reading might assume that this material is for the delectation of 'respectable' heterosexual women and the odd 'queer'. In the case of televised sport it is equally reasonable to suggest that the intention is to present male bodies for the eyes of 'respectable' heterosexual men.[12] My doctoral thesis argued that sport may be usefully conceptualised as a contemporary cult of male physicality which gives boys and men clear, socially affirmed ideals about how a male body should look and work. Here, the male is encouraged to gaze to his heart's content on his narcissistic likeness, either 'in the flesh' or in mass media images. No other domain has enjoyed the broad, long-term and unquestioned encouragement of the male gaze on male bodies that sport allows.[13] In telesport, the camera's efforts to satisfy the desires of male viewers has made the close-up gaze on male bodies thoroughly public. Enhanced by every video technique, the erotic subtext is made available to be freeze-framed and replayed as often as the viewer desires.[14] The encouragement given to men to watch is clear in the use of androcentric and sexist forms of address, the virtual absence of women, the lionising of male heroes, the exclusive use of male presenters, commentators and telexperts, specialist terminologies, and a rough, dirty discourse which only those close to the game (mainly players) would understand. Games are screened in 'male' leisure times and exhibit a complex intertextuality with other culturally dominant discourses of 'masculine' identity and 'normalcy', such as 'health', 'sexuality', 'family' and 'national pride'. Thus, I argued, rugby and league remained important to feminists because their continuing popularity provides significant cultural sites for the parade and maintenance of phallocratic discourses and institutions.[15]

In 'Undying Love, Resisting Pleasures ...' I noted that, despite an intense training to be supporters and spectators, women made outstanding contributions to the challenges which toppled

rugby from cultural supremacy in Aotearoa.[16] At the time of the first World Cup in 1987, rugby expanded its links with television as part of an urgent campaign to provide the game with a 'new image'. My reading of telerugby in that context revealed the failure of attempts to launder ingrained dirt and stains out of 'New Image Rugby'.[17] The game's subordination of women, gays and peoples of colour was reflected in Television New Zealand's versions of World Cup and reinforced by Television One's adoption of a 'neutral', professional stance and an assumption of naturalism. Nevertheless, telerugby attracted a strong female following for World Cup. The tension between critiques of rugby as racist, misogynist, homophobic, militaristic, dangerous and so on, and the continuing pleasures of many New Zealand women (including some feminists) in the televised game seemed difficult to resolve and I wrote about this (partly tongue in cheek) as an issue of potential 'concern' in order to stimulate debate. These first reflections suggested a need for feminists to move away from a simple rejection of rugby (which meant beyond moralism and biologistic theorising) into a better understanding of female viewer pleasures.

The inclination of women to watch male telesport seems unabated. In Auckland during the early winter of 1993 I observed that some of these women were now also watching league — such as Australian Winfield Cup and transTasman internationals.[18] League has recently made inroads on rugby's traditional fiefdoms of players, spectators, television audiences and sponsorship. The two games are gradually becoming the province of different ethnic and class mixes as Maori, Pacific Islander and working class youth migrate to league and to touch rugby.[19] Yet in many ways the old brother codes are so similar that their rivalries seem like family squabbles.

How do women look at men from within popular cultural texts made by, for and about men? For feminist film theorists the obvious place to begin is to attempt a reversal of Laura Mulvey's hypothesis on visual pleasure in mainstream Hollywood cinema.[20] The sorts of questions which arise include: Are women's looks at men (by analogy with men looking at women) about objectification, or is identification a possibility? If identification occurs is this a matter of oedipal switches which are ultimately negative for

women, or, to quote a popular text on the female gaze, 'do the dynamics of fascination and difference have other, more progressive resonances'?[21] In what follows, telerugby can stand as an heuristic device with which to approach the topic of women watching men. The essence of the argument is that women's wild and erotic pleasures, untamed here, can act as a spur to more daring theorising.

Sociological Arguments For Viewer Gratifications: Fans and Feminists

The phallocentrism of telesport discourses makes it difficult to comprehend any possible appeal of the genre to women. My first attempt to argue the subject of female viewing pleasures distinguished at a first level of explanation between 'undying lovers' and 'resisting viewers' (the 'fans' and the 'feminists') — groups which were not mutually exclusive. The first group are those trained to know and love rugby, who take pleasure in strategy, physical skills and the brilliant move, coupled with what kudos may be gained from conforming to phallocratic expectations. The second group, regardless of whether they understand the game, critically reflect on the sexism, racism, violence and homophobia of telerugby, while enjoying the approval of their own communities. These latter I termed 'oppositional' or 'resisting pleasures'.[22] As well as distinguishing between incorporated and resisting pleasures I identified subgroups of viewers: feminist and non-feminist; Maori and Pakeha; sporting and non-sporting; heterosexual and lesbian women; those who know the game intimately; and those who know little about rugby except that it is part of their role to criticise it.

Implicit in the 1992 paper were two fundamental arguments which together constituted a second level of explanation: that rugby and television are 'master discourses',[23] and that, in filming and broadcasting World Cup, television personnel assumed an 'ideal' viewer whose subject positionings conformed broadly (with adjustments to accomodate then current criticisms) to phallocratic 'dominant specularity'.[24] By offering dominant cultural codes in the form of stories and identities which seem familiar and certain, master discourses produce pleasure for those who

allow themselves to be interpellated. According to the second
part of the argument, which derives from hegemony theory,
social and televisual codes are deeply imbedded in ideologies. In
the case of telerugby, viewers were encouraged to enter the
power of twin male-audience master discourses, rugby and televi-
sion. They were asked to adopt 'commonsense' (dominant group
defined) identities such as 'rugby supporter', 'New Zealander',
'mother', rugby expert', 'family man'. Thus, according to a
strand of theory begun by Althusser, watching a programme nec-
essarily involves viewers in ideological practice:

> ...we are maintaining and legitimating the dominant ideol-
> ogy and our reward for this is the easy pleasure of the
> recognition of the familiar and its adequacy. We have
> already become a "reading subject" constructed by the text,
> and according to Althusser (1971), the construction of
> subjects-in-ideology is the major ideological practice in
> capitalist societies.[25]

The adoption of a 'hierarchy of discourses' privileges one, usually
unrecognised, metadiscourse as the source of 'truth'.[26] In sport-
stelevision this is the text composed by camera operators and
director/editors from the visuals, the soundtracks and the adver-
tisements. Televised sport in general is a genre with strong pre-
tensions to realism, the metadiscourse also employed by news
programmes, documentaries, and other genres which assume the
stance of impartiality, innocence and of 'telling it as it is'.
Realism offers the viewer a position of all-knowing privilege from
which the world makes perfect 'sense' as defined by dominant
group messages. To create World Cup for instance, TVNZ per-
sonnel chose realist codes of shots, colour, editing, sound and
music straight out of classical Hollywood, a rhetoric in which seeing
is believing, the camera cannot lie, and reality is unmediated and
seamless. Along with the Hollywood style, telerugby viewers were,
and still are, expected to swallow rugby's new image, including
the official pro-women, anti-violence and anti-racism messages.
Telerugby was embedded in a seductive ideology of naturalism
and pure entertainment.[27] Within a framework which also argued
that telesport is a partial, constructed, simulated and hyperreal
media spectacle[28] realism is an effective ideological style because

it presents conventional 'reality' as 'intuitively obvious'. In this sense it shares many of the characteristics which Barthes ascribed to 'myth'.[29]

A little reflection readily finds shortcomings in these arguments. If we accept Althusser's account, there would be little room for dissent and difference. But in the 1992 paper I had argued that some women viewers (feminists, wahine Maori, lesbians etc) did not conform to dominant group backgrounds and assumptions. The idea of diverse viewing communities was an attempt to skirt the problem. Those members of physical, ethnic, gender, sexual and political out-groups (who are inadequately incorporated into dominant discourses) could gain pleasure through identifying and responding to cracks and contradictions in the smooth surface of telerugby's master discourse. At such points there is potentially a sense of 'Otherness' and loss of 'control'.

However I felt dissatisfied with this stratagem. Using differences in experience of a game and in socio-economic, ethnic or sexual backgrounds to categorise women viewers failed to predict what pleasures and pains would be experienced by whom and under what conditions. For example, although I mostly fitted categories which were productive of resisting pleasures I was sometimes as excited as any 'fan' while viewing World Cup. And watching the videos again I often had quite different responses to the same sequence according to my mood, dreams, who was in the room, what I had been reading and so on. My structuralist account now appeared clumsily static and overly rational. It was evident that, where media pleasures were concerned, features other than the social were involved, and a more processual account was needed. And anyway, had I really slipped so far down the treacherous slope of empiricism that 'prediction' was an aim (even an implied one)?

I also decided that another sort of damage had been done by collectivising all 'Maori', all 'lesbians', all 'non-sportswomen' and so on. It is well-known among feminists in Aotearoa that the struggles in which women are involved typically produce conflicting and unequally empowered interests within groups, conflicts which derive from diversity. In activist circles few women would dare collectivise these groups carelessly or without qualification.

Something similar has occurred in media theory. For example,
when Elizabeth Ellsworth asked,

> [H]ow do the conditions of lived experience and the recep-
> tion of film and television make it possible for resisting
> groups such as anti-racism activists and feminists [in
> England] to negotiate oppositional interpretative activities
> to determine which social subjectivities will count as the basis
> for concrete political action?[30]

she was unable to provide the definitive answers required by the
logic of her question. Jacqueline Bobo and Alile Sharon Larkin,
who concentrated on African-American women audiences and
black women filmmakers, likewise found conflicting responses with-
in feminist and black women's communities to films supposedly
positive towards black women.[31] Just as many feminists have argued
for years that there is no such thing as a unitary 'femaleness', so the
'unities' of subgroup identity and identity-based politics (although
ostensibly strategically effective in the short-term) elide and conceal
dramatic differences between group members and, equally impor-
tantly here, represent analytic blind-alleys for media theorists. This
is in part because the meanings of signs are slippery, resisting defin-
itive interpretation and rewriting.[32] Poststructuralists argue that the
same problems apply to notions of the unified subject, identity and
truth. It is also due to the problem Audre Lorde dubbed 'using the
master's tools to dismantle the master's house', whereby those who
seek to criticise and to be heard in their own 'different' voices feel
drawn into dominant discourses and forced to speak in the very
language of oppression. As Lynne Alice has noted 'the conflating
of differences is a colonising habit that denies the plurality of
women's identities and thus obscures the "irreconcilable contradic-
tions" of the subject of feminism which is produced by the "mas-
ter's tools"'.[33] Feminists often fear that 'difference' will lead
inevitably to divisiveness and a lack of political will:

> Any shift in understanding 'identity' will also influence the
> application of 'difference' in feminist theorising and politics.
> The displacement of traditional views of 'identity' as stable
> and unitary has opened up the possibility of viewing identity
> as difference, in the sense that one's identity is being contin-
> ually contested or displaced by what it is not.[34]

Arguments against essentialising tendencies and ethnocentric globalisms in western theory by feminist philosophers and post-colonial critics have been gaining credibility through the 1980's. Many such moves are responses to a crisis precipitated by the challenges of postcolonial and other ignored women writers and filmmakers.[35]

There were other problems in my initial arguments. Missing was an idea which later became important: diverse and competing masculinities. As Australian sociologists Tim Carrigan, Bob Connell, and John Lee first observed, so-called [Australian or New Zealand] 'masculinity' is not monolithic, not all-of-a-piece, whether one looks at behaviour or representation. It is more useful to talk about 'multiple masculinities': 'hegemonic masculinity' and 'various subordinated masculinities', namely young, effeminate, gay and working class.[36] There is a play of 'masculinities', with faultlines and changing emphases. Beverley Poynton and John Hartley made the point in relation to Australian Rules football:

> ... the simulacra of masculinity in electronic culture ... are
> not just different members of the same male body. They
> represent different, incommensurable maledoms; a contesting
> play of identifications on the field of masculinity. Just as
> there is a power struggle on the footy field between competing
> teams, one of which always wins, so there are contending
> masculinities, not reducable to a single essentialised 'maleness'
> and here too it is not a matter of free choice but of winners
> and losers.[37]

Subsequently I extended this thesis, at first arguing for discourses of hegemonic, hyper- and transgressive masculinities, and later using a discursive analysis of 'the anatamo-politics of biopower' (see below). Exposing the myth of unitary masculinity had serious implications for theorising women's viewing because there was no telling what meanings viewers would draw from such polysemy.

If these are convincing arguments, then there can be neither a unitary audience of 'women viewers' for the electronic simulacra nor unitary subgroups of viewers. Not only this, but television texts are themselves partial, diverse and contradictory. Another problem for unitary theories of audience reception is that television

executives know that each programme must appeal to as wide a range of audiences as possible. Ien Ang has argued that these people are almost paranoid in their conceptualisation of audiences as 'wild' (erratic, untamable, dangerous). Thus broadcasts include efforts to 'stalk' and 'capture' (a change from the older, more confident 'kill' metaphor of the 'target audience') groups of 'wild viewers'.[38] Like Lucien Freud's 'Parts of Leigh Bowery' the trap is baited with ambiguous messages. Tensions inherent in 'new image' rugby provided rich fare.

Further, it is only possible to argue that women are 'symbolically annihilated' in patriarchal media[39] by forgetting those women who do not consistently identify within western phallocratic assumptions about women (such as sporting lesbians, anti-racism activists and Maori feminists). I could agree with Margaret Morse's assertion about American sport and telesport in the 1970s and 1980s that 'sport remains a male preserve, a place of "autonomous masculinity", freed even from dependence on woman-as-other to anchor identity'[40] only by ignoring her second point. The discourses of hypermasculinity may be vividly expressed in telesport, and the obvious social and psychic roles provided are overtly for men, but 'freedom from a female other' in the boys-own nature of the discourse is only convincing if readers adhere to a modernist, Freudian-derived repressive hypothesis. If on the other hand we take Foucault's approach, arguing that the apparently repressed is that to which attention and desire is actually directed, then women and femaleness, effeminacy, blackness, disability, and so on are, on the contrary, thoroughly built into telerugby discourse. Thus, I argued that 'transgressive' masculinities are an important feature of rugby discourse.[41]

Unstated, and needing discussion, were questions of identificatory pleasures. Were women watching like conventional men and responding like men for parts of the discourse, and watching and responding like conventional women in other parts, a process requiring constant oedipal switches? And what of those with uncomfortable mixes of so-called 'incorporated' and 'resisting' identities? The whole notion of unitary identities which were 'conventional' or 'unconventional' began to swim and dissolve. I had arrived at the point where, in order to construct a theory of

women's pleasures in watching men, I needed to encounter Mulvey and feminist psychoanalytic theory and also theories of the cinematic apparatus with which they have affinities.

There was another, philosophical, problem. In the effort to overcome the deficiencies of hegemony theory I had reached towards discourse analysis. But the problems of ethnocentrism, racism and gender blindness which I found there seemed to require aspects of hegemony theory for their rehabilitation. My argument had coalesced hegemony theory and discursive analysis without theorising the differences and intersections between the poststructuralist and structuralist frames, which are, according to both groups, technically incompatible.[43] For the purposes of this paper it may be provisionally sorted out as follows. Rather than attempting to coalesce hegemony and discursive theory as such, one solution is to ensure that discursive analysis takes into account each of Foucault's indivisible technologies of power/knowledge/pleasure. In the case of women's pleasures, for instance, beginning from pleasure, and arguing back into the more traditional masculine social science realms of 'knowledge' and 'power' introduces the 'wild' element of the title. In this manner, taking account of psychoanalytic and technical theories of viewer pleasure transforms my first attempts at explanation.

Foucault named as 'bio-power' the massive discursive disciplinary formation he saw as characteristic of (post-Enlightenment) modernity. He argued that 'productive' power takes the form of the creation of new kinds of identities, desires and behaviours which are as much self-imposed as socially trained through schooling, workplaces, psychiatry, the family and medicine etc. This new form of power involves in part the interiorisation of certain disciplines and the creation of the 'inscribed body'. At the material level, Foucault talks about disciplinary apparatuses and technologies which 'inscribe' the body. Technique, be it sporting, schooling, judicial, medical, scientific, writing or televisual, is a bearer of power/knowledge/pleasure which 'inscribes' or 'writes on' the body.

In Foucault's terms team games can be explained as 'a strategy or technology of "anatamo-politics" for the inculcation of habits of bodily and mental control and morality, within the massive modernist formation of "bio-power"'.[44] The body becomes a key

signifier of 'sexual difference' which 'holds together — or tries to — a range of discourses and meanings centering on biological sex, social gender, gender identity and sexual object choice'.[45]

Rather than seeing these, as Kuhn does, as ideologically inspired, the 'anatamo-politics' of bio-power approaches the body as a battleground in which individuals and discourses compete to tell convincing and ever-changing stories. An identity such as 'female', or 'male', operating at micro-levels, forms a cluster of inherently unstable discursive relations which help to make human beings into consenting or dissenting and desiring subjects of power/knowledge/pleasure. Such identities serve the overarching framework of bio-power by making the body a 'site of difference'.

Psychoanalytic And Technical Theories Of Viewer Pleasure

Psychoanalytic and technical theories of viewer pleasure have exerted such influence on one another that it is useful to treat them intertextually. In telesport there are three socio-technical sources of pleasurable looking: the technology (or the pleasures offered by close-ups, slow-motion, replays etc); the televisual discourse or content; and the social context or practice within which both construction of the spectacle and viewing occur. My first attempts at explanation had dealt with only some aspects of the second and third of these.

In the 1970s Christian Metz and Laura Mulvey argued that unconscious, psychological processes inscribe the basically patriarchal form of classical Hollywood cinema.[46] Concerned with the ways in which sexual difference is constructed, Mulvey went on to suggest that spectatorship is organised along lines of 'the male gaze', cinema audiences being addressed as masculine or feminine. The women's image is the object at which male protagonists within the narrative, and in turn, the camera's eye and male viewers, gaze. Representations of women exist only to be looked at and desired by male spectator/consumers who possess the gaze.

Like much contemporary writing in film and television pleasure Mulvey draws on the work of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan.[47] It is important to note, with Robert Stam et al., that she argues from within a basic 'acceptance of, and an argument for

psychoanalytic method'.[48] For this reason I also agree with Jackie Byars that Mulvey's work, and that of a number of feminist film theorists who followed her, is basically 'recuperative' in that they attempt to salvage a 'women's point-of-view' and 'women's power' from within patriarchal texts.[49] Freudian-derived Lacanian film theory is thoroughly phallocentric. Both men described female personality development from a position which favoured the masculine and defined women as 'lacking' and 'deviant'. In addition, Lacan denied the importance of social influences in order to argue that sexuality is produced in and through language, and that language constructs women as 'not-man'. His theory of the 'mirror stage' of child development surmised that, as infants grow, they reach the stage of 'delightedly' detecting their own reflection in a mirror. This discovery allows the child to conceptualise h/h self as a 'unified whole'. Lacan concluded that these experiences were roughly similar to Freud's 'pre-oedipal' and 'oedipal' phases and that the experience of looking was therefore foundational for the self-concept of the adult.[50] Accordingly, Metz, Augst, and Baudry argued that one of the chief pleasures of cinema is the 'artificial regression' to the mirror phase. Held, like the infant, in a relatively immobilised state in a darkened theatre, the movie-goer views a 'dense and varied spectacle'.[51] One source of pleasure in viewing the spectacular images of the electronic mass media is that they duplicate this important and pleasurable stage of development. According to psychoanalytic film theory then

> . . . the cinema is a fantasmatic production which mobilises primary processes in the circulation of desire . . . the cinematic apparatus constructs its spectator and then structures the screen relationship around psychoanalytic modalities of fantasy, the scopic drive, fetishism, narcissism and identification.[52]

Such arguments suggest that the two main gratifications of looking are 'scopophilia' or deriving enjoyment from that which is looked at, and 'narcissism', looking that elicits identification by imagining the self in the image. Scopophilia is further divided into voyeurism and fetishism. Voyeurism occurs when the spectator obtains pleasure from illicitly looking at something (often another person); fetishism is the fascinated looking at some

fetishised object experienced as pleasurable in itself (for example, penises or breasts).

Voyeurism is the pleasure that a secret viewer has from observing a person/behaviour they are not supposed to. The male 'peeping tom' is the paradigm.[53] The pleasure is that of power over, in this instance the power to visually 'possess' a body at a time and place, and in candid postures usually forbidden except to intimates. In classic phallocratic narrative cinema, to look is to desire:

> The relay of looks within the film . . . duplicates the voyeuristic pleasure of the cinematic apparatus itself — a pleasure that Christian Metz and Laura Mulvey have suggested to be one of the primary pleasures of film viewing: the impression of looking in on a world unaware of the spectator's own existence.[54]

The dark of the theatre recreates the illusion of secrecy. It is a tenet of Hollywood cinematic realism that the actors behave as if the cameras were absent, thus recreating the 'spying' pleasure. Television audiences too, are always hidden from and inaccessible to the protaganists. Cinema is therefore, according to Freudian theory, primarily voyeuristic and 'masculine'.

Many television theorists have borrowed substantially from psychoanalytic film theory. The main arguments centre on the possibilities for voyeurism and fetishism. Unlike film, television is easy to disengage from, to look away, and some theorists argue that the distracted glance rather than the fascinated gaze is a defining feature of television. There are arguments that television prevents voyeurism, because it is viewed in open, usually domestic circumstances,[55] because its swiftly changing perspectives allow no consistent position from which to be a voyeur,[56] and because the viewer is constantly invited to view the image.[57] Altman agrees, arguing that television discourse explicitly invites the viewer to stare in fascination at the spectacle, which suggests a primary fetishism.[58] In my opinion, although the glance is a constant possibility with television, when it comes to televised sports there are equally strong arguments for fascination with the spectacle, the potential for the gaze, and therefore, fetishism. Televised sports either mean nothing — the sort of chaos of disconnected glances experienced by someone who does not

understand the game being played — or they are an intensely exciting spectacle unified by the spectator who knows how to connect those glances into a gaze:

> Spectator sports viewing is a unified activity that transcends the thousands of quick glances offered by the camera at plays, replays, spectators, commentators and so forth, and unifies them into the extended visual pleasure of — The Game.[59]

I contend that telesport viewing provides possibilities for all three forms of viewer pleasure: voyeurism, fetishism and narcissism, that these are achieved by technical, discursive and social means and that there is no obvious reason why these features of telerugby are inherently available only to male viewers.

Sources Of Voyeurism In Telesport

Although television is primarily invited spectacle, there are also abundant possibilities for voyeurism. 'Slice-of-life' programmes like Sylvania Waters, the news and telerugby create the impression that one is seeing the lives of real people, including things not intended to be seen and heard. The television audience is hidden and inaccessible to the protaganists (who are assumed to be real people playing real games). As in cinematic and documentary realism telerugby players on-field behave as if the cameras are absent, thus recreating the 'spying' pleasure. There is also the thrill of the unexpected and the uninvited associated with 'live' broadcasts. Televised sport typically lingers on accidents with a voyeuristic gaze. Motor racing crashes, and collisions in rugby and league are played and replayed as are scenes of athletes in advanced stages of exhaustion and pain. In the case of the 1987 Rugby World Cup viewers were treated to captains' instructions full of graphically violent language, cultural insults, injury and pain, ugly aggression and men in tears.[60] The strong focus on incidents and accidents in telerugby is one of the contradictions between the official 'clean' and 'dirty' discourses of rugby noted earlier.

As in British and North American television styles, New Zealand commentary teams for rugby and league are invisible except for the odd pre-match appearance and the very rare time

when a camera is trained on the commentary box. This has the effect of making the viewer experience the commentators' patter as originating from what Morse calls 'the phantom crowd', all around but invisible. She also suggests that the viewer has the impression of eavesdropping on 'two magnificently informed experts and fellow fans, just outside his [sic] field of view'.[61]

Duncan and Brummett argue that sexually explicit viewing is hardly ever encouraged in telesport. I think this 'silence' in fact encourages surreptitious, voyeuristic pleasure. Illicit sexual viewing is certainly possible given the camera angles and the big close-ups. The low angle medium shot and the big close-up (BCU) both allow for sexually explicit viewing. Many hours are spent viewing tight shorts, from front and back, moving and standing still, from many different angles and distances. World Cup viewers were treated to pans up and down male bodies, often reduced to parts: for example, BCUs of thighs and buttocks, straining muscles, sweaty faces and naked torsos.[62] Metz's notion that the voyeur must maintain a certain distance to create the possibility of desire is easy to apply to telerugby, as is Mary Ann Doane's argument that 'the cinema is characterised by an illusory sensory plenitude (there is 'so much to see') and yet haunted by the absence of those very objects that are there to be seen. Absence is an absolute and irrecoverable distance'.[63] The changing jerseys ritual at the end of games allows a sexual buzz from viewing men helping each other disrobe and walking around semi-naked. This ritual in which on-field aggression turns to affection seems to awaken the taste of the cameras for prolonged takes. There are also teasing shots in the victors' changing rooms after the game, carefully monitored so as not to be 'too' revealing.

Sources Of Fetishism In Telesport

In fetishism the object of the look is 'satisfying in itself'.[64] A fetish requires an already fetishised object to be looked at and examined intently. Theoretical and empirical work from the late 1970s called attention to fetishised aspects of telesport.[65] In the case of World Cup and the New Zealand viewer I think there are strong arguments that the All Black (national rugby representative) was a fetishised object before his images were commodified by the

television discourse,[66] and that commodification represents additional pleasures.

Commentator discourses help to fetishise players as commodities. Duncan and Brummett suggest that game statistics and telexperts' evaluations of performances '. . . encourage us to think about rugby players as athletes whose movements and skills have specific, measurable, and desirable values; the look this discourse encourages is . . . appreciative, evaluative, and covetous'.[67] Here are some examples from World Cup all taken from one exciting match, <u>Canada v Ireland</u>. The commentator was Grant Nisbett and the colourman Earle Kirton:

1: G.N: There's big Phil Orr, Number 1, today playing his fifty-seventh international, he's the fourth most capped player in rugby history...

2: G.N: Hugo McNeill, inside his twenty-two, Hugo McNeill, the business consultant with degrees from Oxford University and Trinity College . Made his debut against France in 1982 ...

3: G.N: And Michael Kiernan is lining up this kick, which, should it go over, will make it level.

E.K: Yes very important kick ... very important kick now.

G.N: You mentioned earlier that Gareth Rees had good rugby breeding Well, Michael Kiernan has quite outstanding rugby breeding, he's a nephew of the former internationals Tom Kiernan and Mick Lane, Tom Kiernan of course a former British Isles and Irish Captain ...

Trivia, biodata and statistics are a major traditional source of fetishistic pleasure in New Zealand rugby, becoming more so in the last few years as new types of statistics have been devised. With telerugby they have become part of a thoroughgoing commodification of the players, the game and everything around it. World Cup commentaries invited viewers to experience the game as a unified and fascinating spectacle by calling attention to plays and by talking about the players using a traditional discourse of appreciation (height, weight, beauty, strength, points scored, caps, value to the team, to the nation). As Duncan and

Brummett note, such commentaries in effect treat people as commodities: 'Televised sport creates fetishes by commodifying athletes and their actions, that is, by creating the materials of sports as goods to be closely examined, appraised and assessed'.[68] Three other features of TVNZ's telerugby broadcasts suggestive of fetishism were the abuse heaped on sports commentators by fans, the fears of 'abject humiliation' experienced by commentators [69] and the clear overtones of nostalgia and loss.[70]

The technological dimensions of televised sports help create the spectacle and enhance our inclination to be fascinated. The quick succession of glances at fast movement is unified through the devices of instant replay, close-ups, split screens, information displays, slow motion etc. Although by comparison with Morse's famous descriptions of televised gridiron's technical dimensions, TVNZ's telerugby showed a desire to produce a relatively 'unmediated' spectacle, in general telerugby exerts the technical and discursive fascination of the kaleidoscopic. The ever-changing patterns of gear, bands, dancers, skydivers, officials' uniforms, national flags, spectator banners and regalia, stadia, sideline advertisements, team tracksuits, and the motley colours of the crowd are visually and psychically enhanced by the technical means of action replays, constantly changing angles, framing, pans, zooms and so on.

Sources Of Narcissism In Telesport

Narcissism, the third pleasure of looking, is an obvious source of indulgence for men watching telerugby. The cameras make it easy for men to identify as they single out conventional 'masculine' markers in close-up (muscular forearms and thighs, sweat-streaked faces, taped down ears, tight shorts displaying buttocks and genitals, and so on). Mainstream telerugby narrative also presents its stars as heroic characters performing hypermasculine feats. But, where does this leave women viewers? Laura Mulvey attempted to show how female viewers gain pleasure from phallocratic texts through identification with the active, 'masculine' point-of-view. According to feminist film theory which follows Mulvey:

> ... the options on offer to spectators in cinema are basically either to take up a masculine subject position as, so the

argument goes, is proposed by the huge number of films in which the enunciating instance is male/masculine; or to submit to a masochism of over-identification, as is evoked, for example, by the Hollywood 'women's picture'; or to adopt the narcissistic position of taking the screen as a mirror and becoming one's own object of desire.[71]

Mulvey's position was that when a woman views a masculinist text she is able to temporarily regain contact with her 'lost' masculine active sexual self, an identity repressed but never entirely obliterated, through a 'trans-sex identification', or, if you like, oedipal switches.

Nancy Chodorow, Dorothy Dinnerstein and others[72] attempted to move beyond Freudian theory to a 'female-centred' account of personality development which argued that 'women' see the world differently from 'men'. In the 'pre-oedipal' stage the infant first identifies with the nurturing mother. This sets up different developmental goals for the two genders. Whereas the boy must reject his primary identity with the female and distance himself, the girl remains close to her mother and thus has the potential to be comfortably close to other women throughout her life. The argument suggests that males and females develop different sorts of ego boundaries in which women are not separated from 'nature', the earth and other people, and remain in touch with their emotions. The implication for film theory is that women are not, by 'nature' of their deep psychology, inclined to voyeurism or fetishism, both of which reduce the person to an object. This notion was built on by E. Ann Kaplan who noted a mutuality of the child-mother gaze which did not reduce either party to a submissive position. Such submission, she argued, was set in motion by masculinist subject-object relations (such as the male gaze) characteristic of western capitalism which posit dominance and submission as essential to eroticism.[73] There are many problems with these theories which I cannot engage with here.[74] Despite the complexity of feminist psychoanalytic arguments to date they all pivot on assumed biological sexual difference focused in the body. Using my experience of the delights of viewing rugby as an example, I suggest that not only is such pleasure not concomitant with 'sexual difference' but also that psychoanalytic theories need augmenting.

Women Viewers and Voyeurism

Women watching telerugby do not, in my experience, cover their eyes and hide from the voyeuristic and 'unintended' horrors of rugby. Although resisting pleasure-seekers are likely to complain about violence or illegality, they, like the male in the conventional horror movie, make it a point of honour to watch — even the replays. Maybe this is part of the pleasure. The only group who do not gaze would be the kind of resister who never watches rugby, and if accidentally exposed quickly turns off the set or moves away.

The kaleidoscopic effects of the colourful everchanging television spectacle likely attract women as much as men. However, without undertaking explicit studies, I would predict that the subject matter would make a difference here, such that women who feel antagonistic to rugby are less likely to be seduced simply by television's techno-kaleidoscopic effects. I agree with Morse's cautious suggestion that the sexual division of labour in relation to looking is changing. In the 1990s the evidence is clearer than it was in the early 1980s that some female viewers eroticise male bodies. Likewise at least some women are able to experience all the other voyeuristic pleasures outlined above, including the kinds of illicit sexual looking noted by Morse, and Poynton and Hartley, and in the introduction.[75]

Women And Fetishistic Pleasures

Arguments for heterosexually motivated eroticism easily translate into fetishism. A discourse of 'female' fetishism is encouraged in some quarters. For instance, earlier this year I heard Australian vox pop interviewers in the lead-up to the first game of the Winfield Cup State of Origin Series (New South Wales v Queensland) ask women arriving at the game which players they 'fancied' and then press them to elaborate: Interviewer: 'What is it about Darryl that you particularly like?' Answer: 'His buns'. In my experience women are no less prone to nostalgia for 'the good old days' (experienced as 'lost' in part through the effects of hyperreal media spectacles) than men.

Women Viewers and Narcissism

Narcissism looks like the toughest one to make an argument for women's viewing pleasures. How could a female possibly identify with those hairy, muscled, sweaty bodies? Well I think we can: certainly I can. In my view women who play sport and/or who do not have a heavy investment in a gendered identity are able to cross 'gender' boundaries very easily. In watching male sport, at the moment when I narcissistically identify with a superb piece of skill it matters emotionally not at all whether the body of the player is male or female. It may matter intellectually, but that is another, later reaction. Thus a hypermasculine body which is conventionally 'unattractive'- an enormous meaty forward for example — may provide me with wild pleasure when he demonstrates skill and power. Nature does not discriminate beauty or bodies, society does — or rather powerful discourses, technologies of power/knowledge/pleasure into which we are inserted but which fail to describe us. The myth of 'male' embodiment is technically, psychically and socially a myth. When I react narcissistically to pictures of a male rugby player I react as if his body is my own. I do not think that this is a matter of oedipal switches or 'trans-sex identification', or of temporarily regaining contact with my 'lost' masculine active sexual self. I do not 'switch' to identification with a 'male' body as such and neither do I 'return' to a 'female' identification.The truth is, like many 'women' I have failed to thoroughly learn how to be conventionally 'female'. I have retained a longstanding experience and trust in my own power, strength, grace, skill, intelligence and libido. I have failed to convince myself about (or be inscribed by) stable stories of sexual, gender, psychic, and individual identity.

As Annette Kuhn and Gay Mason have observed, there is something of a crisis in the male-stream world of bodybuilding at the moment.[76] *Pumping Iron II* a semi-documentary[77] film about a 1984 Women's Bodybuilding Championship held in Los Vegas, shows the challenges mounted by top bodybuilders like Bev Francis to the binary model of 'male' and 'female' biology. Male judges (and some contestants) desperately cling to the idea of 'the feminine body' in the face of some apparently glaring 'gender discrepancies':

... the competition and its outcome turn upon the question of what sort of body a female bodybuilder ought to have. Before the 1984 championship, women bodybuilders had produced lithe and sinewy as opposed to overtly muscular physiques ... But in the film, Bev Francis's entry into competition challenges this order of things. For hers is a body so extremely muscular that it can only be seen as masculine' by judges and contestants accustomed to previous competition 'form'.[78]

Believe me, girl, lifting weights won't make you any more butch than you want to be.

How many women do you know who are well-muscled, sweaty and hairy? I know a lot. The thesis that women cannot generally (as a rule) rival male muscularity is a phallocratic norm,[79] a construct reinforced by (in)activities designated appropriately 'feminine'. Some New Zealand women, (for instance some lesbians, feminists and anorexic women) desire and aspire to bodies which are not obviously gender-marked. Conversely

according to some feminist theorists, many heterosexual women fall into the trap of desiring real intimacy and nurturing from men (which according to psychoanalytic theory is technically impossible) and try to resolve this impass by going for delicate, 'sensitive' types. Meanwhile, feminist biologists like Ann Fausto-Stirling, philosophers like Julia Epstein and Lynne Alice, and film theorists like Tania Modleski are tackling the task of dismantling the cultural myth of binary sex-biology.[80] Maybe these onslaughts are in part responsible for what I have argued elsewhere may be conceptualised as 'panicked masculinity' or 'penis panic',[81] — and what Berkeley Kaite calls 'penis burnout'.[82]

Wild Pleasures

I have argued that pleasure is not concomitant with 'sexual difference' as feminist film theorists like Mulvey explain it. Feminist theorists have been too timid in exploring the implications of this. Rugby in its televised and on-field forms provides an example of the complexities of competitive interpellation of the subject. The situation is far more diverse and contradictory than the simple identity 'male' or 'female' might suggest. As we have seen, at least some of us who are conventionally designated 'women' viewers probably exhibit similar responses to telerugby to some of those conventionally designated 'men'. This may be because our pleasures are constituted by similar discourses in relation to this particular television text. So-called 'sexual difference' is only one axis of 'difference'.[83]

A more daring conclusion is that the incorporation of many (all?) those designated 'women' into 'female' discourses has never been as successful as mainstream masculinist and feminist theories suggest. What may occur with women's pleasures in viewing telerugby is not the exclusive engagement of one or other of the many gendered psychoanalytic, technical, discursive and social sources of pleasure, but a complex mixture with little or no relationship to binary 'gender/biology'. The significance of women's wild pleasures is that they take us back to the nature of so-called 'sexual difference' and to interrogating its assumed 'irreducibility'.

*   *   *

I am grateful to Lynne Alice for lively exchanges around themes in this paper and for sustenance while I wrote it.

*   *   *

Lynne Star is working on inventing a feminist salute for the graduation ceremony in Auckland this May (any suggestions to email <LStar@massey.ac.nz>). She is also interested in men (sorry — new masculinities) and panic body theory (what's new?). Watches rugby mostly by accident and missed the Hong Kong Sevens entirely.

Notes

1. Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference* (Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1978) p. 279.
2. The paper reflects principally on Lynne Star, 'Undying Love, Resisting Pleasures: Women Watch Telerugby', in Rosemary Du Plessis, et al. (eds.), *Feminist Voices: Women's Studies Texts for Aotearoa/New Zealand* (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992) pp. 124 – 40. In what follows, 'rugby' refers to rugby union and 'league' to rugby league. Several examples are drawn from my study of the televising of the first Rugby World cup in 1987: Lynne Star, 'The Language of Televised Sport — World Cup Rugby: A Case Study' (Ph.D. Thesis in Film and Television/English, Auckland University,1993).
3. In the film world, examples include Ken Russell's hot leather *Scorpio Rising* (USA, 1963) and Frank Ripplo's *Taxi zum Klo* (*Taxi to the Toilet*) (W. Germany, 1981) both gay films.
4. Others included advertising, the 'fitness' cult, gymnasiums, male models, beach and poolside behaviour and, for working class and gay men especially, the cult of the bare labourer's body.
5. For example, the scandals around Elvis, Little Richard, Liberace, Jaggar, Bowie, Tom Jones and the like, Kerry Packer's cricket uniforms, and surf lifesaving.
6. Jarman is a well-known gay director and playwright; see Suzanne Moore 'Here's Looking at You, Kid!', in Lorraine Gamman and Margaret Marshment (eds.), *The Female Gaze* (The Women's Press, London, 1988) p. 59.
7. A dramatic shift in the percentages of broadcast time given to televised

sport in Aotearoa in the late 1980s and 1990 is documented in Geoff Lealand, *Local Content Research New Zealand Television 1990* (Unpublished, NZ On Air/Irirangi Te Motu, 1990) p. 9.

8. When the show opened in New York in December 1993 the Metropolitan Museum of Art opted to exclude the 'provocative' *Parts of Leigh Bowery*; Juliet Herd, 'A living work of art', in 'The Weekend Review: Arts Section', *The Australian*, November 27–28, 1993, p. 12.

9. *Women in Love* featured nude wrestling and frolics between Oliver Reed and Alan Bates; see Vito Russo, *The Celluloid Closet* (Harper and Row, New York, 1981) p. 259.

10. Abel Ferrara's film received an R18 censorship rating in Australia, for 'Adult themes, high level violence and drug use'. Nudity was not mentioned.

11. See Beverley Poynton and John Hartley, 'Male Gazing: Australian Rules Football, Gender and Television', in Mary Ellen Brown (ed.), *Television and Women's Culture.: The Politics of the Popular* (Currency Press, Sydney, 1990) p. 156; Deirdre Macken, 'Selling By Male', *The West Australian*, Big Weekend Section 1, May 15, 1993.

12. The implications in relation to New Zealand telerugby are outlined in Lynne Star, 'Macho And His Brothers: Passion And Resistance In Sports Discourse', *Sites: A Journal For South Pacific Cultural Studies*, 26 (1993), and Star, 'The Language of Televised Sport'.

13. Some commentators give this accolade to movies, see Star, 'Macho And His Brothers'.

14. Star, 'The Language of Televised Sport', Ch. 6, examines the techniques adopted to contain the dangers raised by this overt eroticism.

15. In Star, 'The Language of Televised Sport', I amalgamated aspects of hegemony theory and discourse analysis because of the limitations of both. However, 'patriarchy' in my 1992 paper is not equivalent to phallocracy here.

16. Star, 'Undying Love, Resisting Pleasures: Women Watch Telerugby'; women's leading roles in procuring rugby's disastrous 'fall' during the 1981 Springbok Tour are also documented in Sandra Coney, 'Women Against the Tour', *Broadsheet*, 92, (1981) pp. 8–11; Christine Dann, 'The Game is Over', *Broadsheet*, 97 (1981) pp. 26–28; Shona M. Thompson, 'Challenging the Hegemony: New Zealand Women's Opposition to Rugby and the Reproduction of Capitalist Patriarchy' (Paper presented at the Congress on Movement and Sport in Women's Life, University of Jyvaskyla, Finland, August, 1987). The strength of this resistance

derived importantly from the leadership of Maori women and coalitions between Maori and Pakeha feminists.

17. The arguments are elaborated in Star, 'The Language of Televised Sport'.

18. In 1993 rugby continued to be among the highest rating programmes on television and league regularly drew large audiences. The top-ranking show in 1992 according to AGB McNair ratings was the Bledisloe Cup (rugby) Second Test, and Grandstand rugby ranked third (*New Zealand Herald*, 23 April 1993). In June 1993 TVNZ signed its most extensive deal ever with the NZRFU. For the week June 20 – 26 the two most highly rated programmes were league games. Sky (pay) television, in topping 100,000 subscribers, reported that its strongest drawcard was the sports channel where Winfield Cup was featuring (*Networks*, 93. 1 July 1993).

19. Such movement may be a response to the attractions of iwi support and the chance to earn a living at league. It is also due to league's success as a television spectacle and of the players as media stars. Correspondingly, rugby (except for touch rugby which is a very different game) is coming to have a stronger middle class and Pakeha flavour more in keeping with the code's class and ethnic mixes (or lack of them) in other colonial countries like Zimbabwe, South Africa, Australia and England.

20. Laura Mulvey, 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', *Screen*, 16:3 (1975) pp. 6 – 18. See Annette Kuhn, *Women's Pictures: Feminism And The Cinema* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Boston, 1982) on the 'women's picture'; Judith Mayne, 'Feminist Film Theory and Criticism', *Signs*, 11:1 (1985) pp. 81 – 100; Robert Stam, Robert Burgoyne and Sandy Flitterman-Lewis, *New Vocabularies in Film Semiotics: Structuralism, Poststructuralism and Beyond* (Routledge, London, 1992) for accessible explanations of feminist film theory.

21. Lorraine Gamman and Margaret Marshment (eds.), *The Female Gaze: Women as Viewers of Popular Culture* (The Women's Press, London, 1988) p. 4.

22. Jacqueline Bobo employs the idea of 'oppositional readings' of films which she describes as: 'An oppositional response to a cultural product is one in which the recipient of the text understands that the system that produced the text is one with which she/he is fundamentally at odds', Jacqueline Bobo, 'The Color Purple: Black Women as Cultural Readers', in E. Deirdre Pribram (ed.), *Female Spectators: Looking at Film and Television* (London, Verso, 1988) pp. 95 – 96. In this she follows Lawrence Grossberg, 'Strategies of Marxist Cultural Interpretation', *Critical Studies in Mass*

Communication, 1 (1984) p. 403. For me this raises the issue of the overly rational model employed by many neo-Marxist hegemony theorists.

23. This usage follows that of postmodern critics like Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1984) and Hal Foster, *Recodings: Art, Spectacle, Cultural Politics* (Bay Press, Washington, 1988). The intention is to explain the grip of modernist certainties on the contemporary consciousness. The concept has been used to critique logocentrism, phallocentrism and ethnocentrism, and the fixation on a visual epistemology characteristic of English language texts.

24. Colin MacCabe, 'Realism and Cinema: Notes on Brechtian Theses' in Tony Bennett, Susan Boyd-Bowman, Colin Mercer and Janet Woollacott (eds.), *Popular Television and Film* (BFI/Open University Press, London, 1981).

25. John Fiske, *Television Culture* (Methuen, New York, 1987) p. 12. Fiske is referring to Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (New Left Books, London, 1971).

26. See MacCabe.

27. See Lynne Star, 'Telesport As Masquerade: "Live Rugby" The Realist Assumption' (Paper presented to Staff Seminar, Media Studies Programme, Massey University, Palmerston North, May, 1993) and 'The Language of Televised Sport', Ch. 3.

28. After Guy Debord, *Society of The Spectacle* (Black and Red/Practical Paradise Publications, Detroit, 1967); Michael R. Real, 'The Super Bowl: Mythic Spectacle' in Michael R. Real (ed.), *Mass Mediated Culture* (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1977); Jean Baudrillard, *In The Shadow of the Silent Majorities* (Semiotext(e), New York, 1983); J. Baudrillard, *Simulations* (Semiotext(e), New York, 1983); Margaret Morse, 'Sport on Television: Replay and Display', in E. Ann Kaplan (ed.), *Regarding Television: Critical Approaches — An Anthology* (A.F.I./University Publications of America Inc., Los Angeles, 1983).

29. Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* , translated by A. Lavers (Paladin, Hertfordshire, 1972).

30. Elizabeth Ellsworth 'Illicit Pleasures: Feminist Spectators' and Personal Best', in Leslie Roman, Linda Christian-Smith and Elizabeth Ellsworth (eds.), *Becoming Feminine: The Politics of Popular Culture* (Falmer Press, London/New York, 1984) p. 102.

31. Alile Sharon Larkin, 'Black Women Film-Makers Defining

Ourselves: Feminism in Our Own Voice', in Pribram (ed.); also see Bobo.

32. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*.

33. Lynne Alice, 'Unlearning our privilege as our loss: postcolonial writing and textual production', *Women's Studies Journal New Zealand*, 9:1 (1993) pp. 26–46.

34. Lynne Alice, 'She Knows Who She Is: Getting Beyond "Gender In Contemporary Feminist Theory"' (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Murdoch University, Western Australia, 1994) p.57.

35. See for instance, bell hooks, *Feminist theory: From Margin to Centre* (South End Press, Boston, 1984); Trinh T. Minh-Ha, *Woman, Native, Other* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1989); Julie Dash with Toni Cade Bambara and bell hooks, *Daughters of the Dust: The Making of an Afro-American Women's Film* (New Press, New York, 1992).

36. Tim Carrigan, R. W. Connell and John Lee, 'Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity', *Theory and Society* 14 (1985); T. Carrigan, R. W. Connell and J. Lee, 'Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity', in Harry Brod (ed.), *The Making of Masculinities: The New Men's Studies* (Allen and Unwin, Boston, 1987).

37. Poynton andHartley give as examples Warwick Capper of the Sydney Swans whose masculinity has been 'leered and laughed at' and 'feminised by television mediators as less a man's man than a "woman's man"'; and All-Aboriginal Football which 'to outsiders, [has] more to do with the politics of aboriginal advancement than with the gender of the players' (pp. 156–157). In the latter case Poynton and Hartley might have usefully elaborated the masculinities exhibited by aboriginal footballers.

38. Ien Ang, 'Stalking the Wild Viewer', *Continuum: An Australian Journal of the Media*, 4:2 (1991) pp. 19–35. The proliferation of audience meters is an example of surrogate 'capture' attempts; see Toby Syfret, 'Television People Meters in Europe', *Admap* (September, 1993).

39. I had begun this argument in Lynne Gifford, 'Sportsopera' (Paper presented at the Australian Teachers of Media Conference, Brisbane, Queensland Institute of Technology, 1988), following Gaye Tuchman et al. (eds.), *Hearth and Home* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1978).

40. Morse, p. 44.

41. A forthcoming paper considers the mechanisms used by TVNZ's telerugby producers to dispute and reincorporate the criticisms of rugby machismo offered by feminists and new masculinity theorists,

whilst simultaneously broadcasting the old violent messages; Lynne Star, 'Glossing Violence: Double-coding and the cooption of oppositional gender challenges in televised rugby', *New Zealand Journal of Media Studies*, 1:1 (forthcoming).

42. See Star, 'The Language of Televised Sport', Chs 5 & 6, for a consideration.

43. I explore this last issue in Star, ibid.

44. ibid., p. 91.

45. Annette Kuhn, 'The Body and Cinema: Some Problems for Feminism', in Susan Sheridan (ed.), *Grafts: Feminist Cultural Criticism* (Verso, London, 1988) p. 16.

46. Christian Metz, *The Imaginary Signifier* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1975); Laura Mulvey, 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', *Screen*, 16:3 (1975) pp. 6–18.

47. Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits*, translated by Alan Sheridan (Tavistock, London, 1977).

48. Stam et al., p. 174.

49. Jackie Byars, 'Gazes/Voices/Power: Expanding Psychoanalysis for Feminist Film and Television Theory' in Pribram (ed.), p. 111. Those influenced include E. Ann Kaplan, Mary Ann Doane, Patricia Mellencamp, Linda Williams and Kaja Silverman.

50. Obviously, such an explanation cannot have universal applicability. Children in oral and dancing cultures, which do not have mirrors, must find other ways of self-conceptualisation. In fact the very idea of the individual as Lacan et al. write about it is a profoundly western concept and rather recent at that. For instance, before contact with western Europeans Maori children, and Australian Aboriginal children very likely did not have any sense of a disconnected individual self recognisable to an Anglo. One counter argument is that technologies of the 'self' specific to western nations are responsible for this seemingly indisputable idea foundational to Lacan's argument.

51. C. Metz; R. Augst, 'The Lure Of Psychoanalysis In Film Theory', in T. H. K. Cha, (ed.) pp. 415 – 437; Jean-Louis Baudrey, 'The Apparatus' and 'Ideological effects of the basic cinematographic apparatus' both in T.H.K. Cha (ed.).

52. Stam et al., p. 174.

53. Metz and Nichols called it 'keyhole seeing'; see Christian Metz, 'The Fiction Film And Its Spectator: A Metapsychological Study' in T.H.K. Cha (ed.), *Apparatus* (Tanam Press, New York, 1980); Bill Nichols, *Ideology and the Image* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1981).

54. Linda Williams, 'When the Woman Looks' in Patricia Mellencamp and Linda Williams (eds.), *Re-vision: Essays in Feminist Film Criticism* (University Publications of America/AFI, 1984) p. 83.

55. Roland Barthes, *S/Z* (Hill and Wang, New York, 1980); Sandy Flitterman-Lewis, 'Psychoanalysis, Film and Television', in R.C. Allen (ed.), *Channels of Discourse: Television and Contemporary Criticism.* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1987).

56. See Flitterman-Lewis.

57. See Fiske.

58. R. Altman, 'Television/Sound', in Tania Modleski (ed.), *Studies in Entertainment: Critical Approaches to Mass Culture* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1986). These theories were all unreflectively modelled on the male viewer. It was the work of feminists like Mulvey, Kuhn, and Kaplan which led to this phallocentrism being noticed.

59. Margaret Carlisle Duncan and Barry Brummett, 'Types and Sources of Spectating Pleasure in Televised Sports', *Sociology of Sport Journal,* 6 (1989) p. 199.

60. When for example Marzio Innocenti, the Italian Captain, was in tears after his team's humiliating defeat by New Zealand, the roving camera stayed focused on him, zooming in and moving around for a better angle on his face, for an almost unprecedented four minutes. The 'excuse' was the teams filing off the paddock.

61. Morse, p. 53.

62. Star, 'The Language of Televised Sport'.

63. Mary Ann Doane, 'Film and the Masquerade: Theorising the Female Spectator', *Screen*, 23:3–4, (1982) p. 78.

64. Mulvey, p. 14.

65. For example, Real; Morse; and Eco's account of 'sports chatter': Umberto Eco, *Travels in Hyperreality* (Picador, London, 1987).

66. See Star, 'Macho And His Brothers', and 'The Language of Televised Sport'.

67. Duncan and Brummett, pp. 199–200.

68. ibid., p 197.

69. Steven O'Meagher, 'Smile, You're on Candid Camera. The Slings and Arrows of Television Sports Broadcasting', *North and South*, (Auckland, July 1988) p. 79.

70. Star, 'Macho And His Brothers'.

71. Kuhn, p. 15.

72. See Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978); Dorothy Dinnerstein, *The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual*

Arrangements and the Human Malaise (Harper and Row, New York, 1978); Jane Flax, 'Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A Psychoanalytical Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics', in Sandra Harding and M.B. Hintikka (eds.), *Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology and Philosophy of Science* (D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983) pp. 245 – 281; Evelyn Fox Keller, *Reflections on Gender and Science* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985).

73. See Kaplan.
74. See Elizabeth Fee 'Critiques of Science: The Relationship of Feminism to Other Radical Epistemologies', in Ruth Bleier (ed.), *Feminist Approaches to Science* (Pergamon, New York, 1986) pp. 48 – 50 for a summary.
75. Morse; Poynton and Hartley.
76. Kuhn; Gay Mason, 'Looking into Masculinity: Sport, Media and the Construction of the Male Body Beautiful', *Social Alternatives*, 11:1(1992).
77. Kuhn explains that although the contestants play themselves, the situations they are in are set up for the camera and the contest itself was suggested by film director George Butler; Kuhn, p. 12.
78. Kuhn, pp. 13–14.
79. See Mason.
80. Anne Fausto-Sterling, *Myths of Gender: Biological Theories About Women and Men* (Basic Books, New York, 1985); Julia Epstein, 'Either/Or — Neither/Both: Sexual Ambiguity and the Ideology of Gender', *Genders*, 7 (1990) pp. 99 –142; Alice, 'She Knows Who She Is'; Tania Modleski, 'The Incredible Shrinking He(r)man : Male Regression, The Male Body and Film', *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, 2:2 (1990) pp. 5–75.
81. Star, 'Macho And His Brothers'.
82. Berkeley Kaite, 'The Fetish in Sex, Lies and Vidotape', Arthur Kroker and Marilouise Kroker (eds.), *The Hysterical Male. New Feminist Theory* (Macmillan, London, 1991) pp. 170–186.
83. Star, 'The Language of Televised Sport'.

Challenging Sexism on Television: Limits of and Alternatives to the Present Regulatory Approach

Selene Mize

Broadcasting is pervasive and influential. Silverstone argues that 'television, supremely among the other media of mass communication, is coherently, systematically and centrally at work in the articulation of culture and in the mediation of alien bodies of knowledge and experience'.[1] It is therefore a field which demands feminist investigation on many levels. My aim here is to address one issue among the complex questions raised by the pervasiveness of the media: that of the role of government regulation in challenging sexism on television.

The Canadian Task Force on Sex-Role Stereotyping in the Broadcast Media has stated that 'in study after study, the same conclusion is reached, that the media do not portray women and men as equal, and equally capable, human beings'.[2] It is likely that thorough content analysis of New Zealand television would present a similar picture. Despite some recent changes, my perception is that women frequently are underrepresented and shown in narrow roles which do not reflect the diversity of their roles in real life, that their sex appeal is over-emphasised, and that programme content often reinforces inaccurate and discriminatory stereotypes about them and their abilities. 'Sexism' is a fluid concept which will mean different things to different people. It will be used in this paper to refer to differential treatment of men and women, where the differential portrayals relate not to genuine physical differences (such as the ability to bear children), but to perceived differences in abilities and roles which limit women and cast them into inferior positions. Women are not the only targets of broadcast stereotypes — other disadvantaged

groups often fare even worse — but the focus of this paper will be on gender.

This paper will look at what can be done about sexist television. Part one looks at three types of broadcast sexism, and explains why complaining to the Broadcasting Standards Authority and the Advertising Standards Complaints Board under the existing regulatory scheme is useful in certain cases, but very ineffective in others. Part two considers whether more regulation to empower feminists legally is the answer. Rejecting that option, it looks at other approaches which might be pursued, perhaps with greater success, to combat the problem. While acknowledging the biased nature of the medium, I argue that the dangers of increasing regulatory control outweigh any perceived benefits, and suggest that it would be better to address the problem on a social level rather than a legal one.

The Limitations of the Present Regulatory Approach in Dealing with Sexism on Television

The current government's basic approach to broadcasting has been to encourage diversity with the introduction of new channels and pay television options, and the funding of programmes through the Broadcasting Commission. According to this approach, diversity allows viewers to select programming according to their individual preferences. Regulation provides for minimum standards. There are separate paths for challenging broadcast advertisements and other programming under the present system. Viewer complaint is effectively the sole mechanism for the enforcement of standards under each regime. Complaints about sexism in programming must be made to the broadcaster in the first instance. It is only if the broadcaster fails to deal with the problem adequately that a complaint may be laid with the Broadcasting Standards Authority ('the Authority'). The Authority was established by statute and its members are appointed by the government. It has jurisdiction over all broadcasting, including radio, free-to-air television, and pay television. Grounds for complaint are set forth in the Broadcasting Standards Act 1989 and in codes of broadcasting practice ('the standards') developed by broadcasters and approved by the

Authority.[3] These grounds will be discussed in more detail below. Complainants may pursue other legal remedies at the same time as a complaint to the Authority. If a complaint is upheld, section 13 gives the Authority the power to require the broadcaster to publish a statement relating to the complaint (typically an explanation and apology), and to require the broadcaster to cease broadcasting, or to broadcast without advertising, for up to twenty-four hours. Orders seldom issue even if a complaint is upheld, as the Authority frequently considers that upholding a complaint is itself a sufficient sanction.

The Broadcasting Amendment Act 1993 stripped the Broadcasting Standards Authority of jurisdiction over almost all advertisements on television and radio. The new focus is on self-regulation by media and advertising groups, with recourse to the Advertising Standards Complaints Board ('Complaints Board') where there are alleged breaches of the Codes. Unlike the Authority, the Complaints Board is private and has four industry appointed representatives and four public representatives. The Authority retains jurisdiction only where neither the broadcaster nor the advertiser recognise the jurisdiction of the Complaints Board. Grounds for complaint are set forth in the Advertising Code of Ethics and in Codes for specific categories of advertising. These Codes have been developed in consultation with industry, consumer groups, and government departments where appropriate. Complainants must waive any other legal remedy before the Complaints Board will adjudicate. If a complaint is upheld, media members of the Advertising Standards Authority, the Complaints Board's parent organization, undertake not to broadcast that advertisement.

For a number of reasons, complaints to the Authority and the Complaints Board will not be effective in eradicating broadcast sexism. I will explore these reasons below in the context of three different types of complaint.

(a) Underrepresentation of women

A frequent criticism is that women are underrepresented on television. Two examples from genres which offend particularly, sport and game shows, illustrate this contention. The Female

Images and Representation in Sport Taskforce (FIRST) made a complaint based on their examination of the sports news presented on 3 National News and One Network News on 1 September 1992. Notwithstanding the fact that the provincial netball championships were taking place that week, men's sport was given more coverage.[4] Four of the six items of sports news presented on One Network News, representing 80 percent of the total coverage, referred to men's sport. 3 National News was considerably more balanced. Men's sport was the subject of five of the eight items covered and took 38 percent of the total air time. Two stories dealt with mixed sport for 34 percent of the air time, and one item concerned female sport for 28 percent of the total air time.

The format of game shows also supports the argument that when women are shown on television, it is more likely to be in a supporting role. Criticising the total absence of female game show hosts on New Zealand television, Broadcasting Minister Maurice Williamson said that young viewers are learning that a woman's role is subservience. '"She must smile at the male compere, speak only when spoken to by him, obey orders by fetching participants, drape herself next to a prize and scurry offstage to ensure she doesn't attract attention once the game has started. . . . Viewers are enrolled into the belief a woman's role is to keep quiet, look good and obey orders."'[5] The fact that a single game show had this format would not matter much if other game shows showed women in more active and responsible roles to provide balance. Unfortunately, there are no balancing portrayals. Dramatic and comedy television present a similar, although less extreme, picture. It is when the totality of broadcast offerings is examined that the underrepresentation of women becomes most apparent.

This creates problems for a regulatory process, which typically is designed to deal with complaints about individual programmes rather than the overall situation. There is no ground for complaint under the Act, the standards, or any advertising code that women (or any other group) are underrepresented. There is no requirement that there be female characters on even one dramatic programme or game, for example. The sole mechanism for encouraging a variety of programmes catering to different

audience members is through the Broadcasting Commission (NZ on Air), which can allocate a portion of its limited funding to support such programmes.

The situation with respect to news and sports coverage is only slightly different. Under the Act, broadcasters are given the authority over programming decisions, i.e. decisions about what to broadcast. Complaints that a broadcaster failed to broadcast desirable programmes are not permissible under the Act. To succeed, a complaint must focus on what was actually broadcast. FIRST based part of its complaint on the television programme standard that requires news to 'be presented accurately, objectively and impartially',[6] arguing that the 'bias in favour of men's sports stories, and the limited coverage of women's sports stories does not accurately represent the actual situation in New Zealand considering population, sports participation rates, audience appeal or the availability of topical, newsworthy stories available for selection and presentation according to journalistic convention'.[7] A complaint that what *was* broadcast was biased and inaccurate because of omitted material could succeed in theory, but the omitted material will have to be truly vital before the Authority is likely to act. The Authority considered the FIRST complaint to include an element of programming, over which it lacks jurisdiction, as well as an element of standards, and concluded that it would be 'inappropriate to determine this complaint'.[8]

(b) Use of women's sexuality

Another common type of complaint focuses on the emphasis given to women's sexuality. Section 4 of the Code for the Portrayal of People in Advertising prohibits employing 'sexual appeal in a manner which is exploitive and degrading of any individual or group of people in society to promote the sale of products or services. In particular, women shall not be portrayed in a manner which uses sexual appeal simply to draw attention to an unrelated product'. The Authority, which has only recently lost its jurisdiction over broadcast advertising, has upheld several complaints about the use of women's sexuality in advertising. An advertisement for Bluebird Lite potato chips which showed frequent

closeups of a young woman's jeans-clad buttocks and a male hand reaching out towards them while the woman ate potato chips was held to be an impermissible use of women's sex appeal in Decision 3/90.[9] A complaint against the Galaxy cheese advertisement which showed images of a woman caressing her black-stockinged leg, a man kissing her neck, a man's bare chest, and her dress being slipped off to reveal a black bra was upheld in Decision 34/91.[10] An advertisement for Pioneer stereos showed a bikini-clad woman dancing to music, then using a remote control to produce a loud blast of noise, at which point a group of gorillas (or men, in another version) fell out of a nearby tree. The complaint in response to this advertisement was likewise upheld.[11]

Unsuccessful complaints under this standard include the Orthoxical advertisement showing a woman looking at a Playgirl magazine centrefold showing a naked male torso with the genitals covered by a black dot (held to be permissible because of the brevity of the sequence);[12] a sock advertisement showing a man wearing nothing but socks walking away from the camera (considered to be novel and light-hearted by the Authority);[13] and an advertisement which showed Vaseline Intensive Care Lotion being smoothed over a naked female torso (because the shots were brief and did not reveal breasts or genitalia).[14] Early indications are that the Complaints Board may be less likely than the Authority to uphold complaints alleging improper use of women's sexuality. A majority of the Complaints Board ruled that a print advertisement in which trim milk poured out in the shape of a naked woman's body was artistic and did not use sex appeal to draw attention to an unrelated product.[15] A magazine advertisement for a buoyancy device showing an attractive woman wearing only the vest and holding an oar in front of her genitals was not considered to be exploitive or degrading by a majority of the Complaints Board given that the advertisement was targeted at women and that the semi-nudity used was not excessive.[16]

Use of women's sexuality in advertising to sell products is prohibited, but the use of women's sexuality to entertain is permissible under the present Act and standards. There is no direct counterpart to the Code for the Portrayal of People in Advertising's restriction on the use of sexual appeal in general broadcasting standards. Perhaps advertising is held to more stringent

standards because advertising, being commercial speech, raises less important issues of freedom of expression than news and other programming. It may be that the industry felt that government would step in and legislate if its self-regulation were not exacting.

The standard most likely to be raised in a complaint about use of women's sexuality in non-advertisements is television programme standard G2. G2 requires broadcasters to 'take into consideration currently accepted norms of decency and taste in language and behaviour, bearing in mind the context in which any language or behaviour occurs'. The focus is on such 'standards of propriety as the Authority considers to be in accord with generally accepted attitudes, values and expectations in New Zealand society'.[17] Complaints upheld under this standard have typically involved coarse language and toilet humour,[18] but it could extend to offensive use of sexual appeal. TVNZ itself upheld a complaint against 'The Big Doll House', described as a 'sexploitation film about a brutal warder and the bimbos in cages that he torments',[19] but because of the emphasis on community standards, programmes like *Benny Hill* which use women as dehumanised decorations are not likely to be challenged successfully.

(c) Reinforcement of negative stereotypes about women

Television is also sexist in using themes which may reinforce negative stereotypes about women. Examples often raised in discussions about stereotypical presentations include, for example, that women are shown as catty and competitive towards each other. The classic New Zealand example of this is the tampon advertisement with the slogan 'safer than your best friend'. The idea that women are delicate and loving of luxury underlies most bath and beauty product advertisements. It has been suggested that such stereotypes harm women by suggesting that they are unfit for dirty and physically challenging jobs (even while, paradoxically, they are represented as well-suited to changing nappies and washing floors and toilets). Children do not escape this stereotyping: the Fab 2 detergent advertisement, for example, expressly states that little girls need fabric softener for their delicate skin and that little boys need strong cleansers because they get

dirty. Another example is broadcasting's depiction of working women. Using *Thirtysomething, Baby Boom,* and *Day by Day* as examples — all programmes which have aired in New Zealand — Susan Faludi argues that working women often are shown as either man-hungry, baby-desperate, and eager to retreat into the home, or as unsympathetically cold, ambitious and masculine, and that working mothers often are shown as sacrificing the welfare of their children in order to work.[20] Some of these messages are more harmful than others,[21] and, as with all stereotypes, they are accurate depictions of *some* women, but they are not accurate generalisations about *all* women.

In my opinion, one of the worst stereotypes validated by broadcast television is the belief that women are and should be subservient to men. Commercials show women lavishing care on their male partners and children, such as the woman who makes sure her partner's towels are soft in the 'my wife's Cuddly' advertisement, with its play on words comparing her fabric softener with her person. (Perhaps the overt references to the wife were written in to soften the otherwise controversial theme that men appreciate softness in towels.) The mother who gets her son to eat Sultana Bran by not letting on that it's nutritious is another example. Men doing domestic work are either shown as single (e.g. the Cold Water Surf advertisement showing a man talking about laundering rugby gear and business shirts), or inept. In the bread advertisement, for example, the man tries to serve breakfast to his partner who has just finished exercising, but he gets it wrong and she has to whine for her Molenburg. And the man needs his partner's intervention to prevent a laundry mishap in the Persil Micro advertisement. Where men are shown doing the laundry, it is usually because their wives demand it, not because it is an accepted part of their domestic role. Drive gives two examples: the woman who won't wash the smelly fishing shirt, and the man who uses a chilly bin and his ute as an impromptu laundrette. On the only commercial I've seen where a man mops the floor, the woman's manner is that of a cruel dominatrix (Ajax).

Men's dignity also suffers in many story lines. They can be shown as hen-pecked husbands (a stereotype which inevitably involves a negative view of the woman who has 'reduced' him to

this state), for example, or as more interested in career than family. But research has failed to identify equivalent consistent, negative themes for men.[22] For every depiction of an ambitious man who neglects his children, for example, there is usually an example of a loving and caring dad who finds time amidst his busy schedule. There are few solo mother counterparts to the happy, caring and coping solo fathers who combine parenting with careers on programmes such as *Full House, My Two Dads, Hey Dad* and *My Girl.* It is the consistency of some of the negative themes, I suggest, which separates treatment of men and women on broadcast television.

Negative stereotypes may be reinforced in advertising or in programmes. The Code for the Portrayal of People in Advertising is again much more restrictive than the television programme standards. It provides that individuals and groups should not be portrayed in a manner which is likely to expose them to exploitation, contempt, denigration or ridicule, and that advertisements should not encourage belief in inaccurate or outdated stereotypes. Only stereotypes which 'simplify the process of creating recognition of both the product offered and the intended consumer' are permissible, as is humorous and satirical treatment of people and groups that does not encourage intolerance, prejudice and bigotry.

There have been only a small number of complaints made to date about stereotyping in advertisements. The Authority's approach has usually been to disagree with the complainant's interpretation (for example, the New York cab driver looking for Steinlager,[23] and the advertisement where the man in the pub asserts that he hasn't been served genuine Jim Beam[24]). None of the advertisements discussed earlier has been challenged, and so it is difficult to predict how they would be assessed.

In contrast to the broad language of the advertising Code, the television programme standards are quite narrow. Stereotyping is not mentioned expressly. Complaints to the Broadcasting Standards Authority about reinforcement of negative stereotypes about women in programming depend largely on television standard G13, which requires broadcasters to 'avoid portraying people in a way which is likely to encourage denigration of or discrimination against any section of the community on account of sex . This

requirement is not intended to prevent the broadcast of material which is: i) factual, or ii) the expression of genuinely-held opinion in a news or current affairs programme, or iii) in the legitimate context of a humorous, satirical or dramatic work'. Successful complaints are extremely rare because of the limits of this standard and the narrow way it has been interpreted by the Authority. The standard emphasises effects. For a complaint to be upheld, the challenged material must encourage (and not merely perpetuate) denigration or discrimination, which has been defined as shunning or differential treatment of an entire class of people. Offensive material which does not influence viewers' behaviour does not breach this standard. Even if this much is established, with evidence, an exception will be made if the material is fact, genuinely-held opinion, or in the context of a humorous, satirical and dramatic work which is not otherwise in bad taste.

One of the few complaints to be upheld under a version of standard G13 (it has been reworded from time to time) dealt with repeated programme references to a 'Chinaman' connected with pearl fishing in Rarotonga.[25] There is some question whether the Authority was being consistent in upholding this complaint. 'Chinaman' is offensive, but would the ordinary decent folk in the community really come to change their response to the class of all Asians because of *Frontline*'s repeated use of the word to describe one man? Other rulings from the Authority have underlined the strength of the effect necessary to breach the standard.

There would be several difficulties in applying this standard to broadcast sexist stereotypes. Validation of most stereotypes will not be considered to be sufficiently serious to amount to denigration or discrimination. The contentions that women are catty with each other, bad drivers, and bad at sports and mathematics might be 'outdated stereotypes' under the advertising Code, but — despite feminist arguments about the effects of these images — it is notoriously difficult to prove that they are likely to lead to women being shunned, avoided, or treated significantly differently from men. Another limiting aspect of the Authority's interpretation of this standard is that the material must result in denigration or discrimination of the class as a whole. If a stereotype is only applied to certain women (e.g. the

contention that career women are aggressive and masculine), encouraging it cannot amount to impermissible denigration or discrimination.

Continually showing women in domestic roles cannot amount to a violation of standard G13. In *Decision 19/91*, the Authority considered a Telecom advertisement with a montage of two or three shots of Maori men shown as labourers and Pakeha men portrayed in other employment roles. The complainant alleged that the advertisement showed Maori people in negative, stereotyped roles as good at physical work only while Pakeha men were shown in leading roles such as police officer, mayor and supervisor. The factual question of whether such an inference arises can be debated, but the Authority instead concluded that in light of the meaning of denigration and the standard by which it is to be judged, this sequence cannot amount to a portrayal of the Maori encouraging denigration.[26] No specific reasoning was given for this interpretation. This approach, which is consistent with the Act, will forestall most if not all complaints regarding similar distortions in the representation of women.

Another limiting feature of this standard is the breadth of the exceptions made for fact, genuinely-held opinion, and legitimate humorous, satirical and dramatic work. The majority of objectionable programmes will fall into one of these categories. The Authority has defined 'legitimate' in this context as meaning in conformity with other broadcasting standards, i.e. not in poor taste.[27] Thus even content which encourages denigration or discrimination will not violate programme standards if it is in a humorous, satirical or dramatic show which is otherwise in good taste. (Of course, if it is in bad taste, a complaint can be upheld under standard G2 and recourse need not be had to G13. But as mentioned earlier, G2's good taste requirement seldom has been successfully applied to sexist material.)

The current scheme of complaints to the Authority and the Complaints Board can be effective in certain areas (especially in curtailing the use of women's sexual appeal to advertise unrelated products), but has very little effect in others. Should more stringent standards be put into effect? I would argue that broadcast sexism should be confronted, but that legal regulation is not be the best way to combat this problem. The next section examines

the consequences of increased legal control of broadcasting, and explores a number of alternatives.

Alternatives to the Present System

Broadcasting currently contains a lot of sexist material. The present system restricts broadcasters, but in a way which still permits them considerable freedom of expression, a right recognised in section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The Government's approach has been to encourage diversity with the introduction of more channels, pay television options, and the funding of programmes through NZ on Air, and allow individual choice by viewers. Industry has been permitted to self-regulate in the case of advertising. The legislation sets down a minimum number of requirements to ensure that broadcasters act responsibly, and establishes the Authority for oversight. Most of the grounds for complaint come from the programme standards, and these were developed in association with the industry. Resolving complaints is part of the broadcasters' responsibilities, and the Authority and Complaints Board only become involved when the broadcaster's response is challenged (or a privacy complaint is laid). Programming decisions are made exclusively by the broadcasters.

To deal comprehensively with the problem of sexist television, regulation would have to be stepped up massively and include control over programming. In my opinion, such an extensive censorship approach would intrude too greatly on freedom of expression. The present system gives broadcasters the option of developing unique identities. They can cater to particular segments of the potential audience, interpret the news as well as merely reporting it, and put across an editorial viewpoint. For the government to step in and regulate programming decisions would be to remove editorial freedom and undermine the unique character of each broadcaster. Such regulation might turn broadcasters into the equivalent of public bulletin boards rather than commentators on events they consider to be newsworthy.

Parliament would not have had such high regard for the rights of broadcasters if they were not also consistent with regard for the freedom of the individual. Diversity is held to allow viewers to

select what (and whether) they wish to watch. A great deal of autonomy is given to citizens in a democracy. It would be incongruous to place trust in the public to elect a government but to decide that they were unable to judge for themselves what to watch on television. If people can discern the truth of statements made by competing political parties at election time, I would argue that they can detect and evaluate sexist material on television should they wish to do so. Government censorship of the media is more consistent with authoritarian and totalitarian regimes than with New Zealand's system of government.

I believe that censorship is a poor way to deal with the problem. A censorship function, once firmly in place, might change in time to reflect popular support for other crusades than the fight against sexism, for example the promotion of 'family values'. Dan Quayle, American Vice President at the time, considered the fictional character Murphy Brown's decision to have a baby outside of wedlock irresponsible (not, of course, that he wanted her to have an abortion) and that his criticism of it was appropriate content for a political campaign speech. It is reassuring to know that in the United States, the First Amendment to the Constitution prohibited him either from ordering *Murphy Brown* off the air or from requiring broadcasters to screen programmes about his concept of an appropriate family to balance it. Should there be a political shift against feminist interests, censorship machinery would become a threat. The power of the government, coupled with government control of broadcasting content, would combine to make it very difficult for a contrary viewpoint to be aired.

The prospect of government censorship being used against feminist concerns seems unlikely to many people, but history shows that it often has been used in precisely this way. Although much less common today, there is still evidence of a desire to silence feminist speakers. Karen Finley is an American performance artist. Her challenging and provocative work includes 'I'm an Ass Man' which is a send-up of a man about to rape a woman. Acting the part of the man, Finley describes in words reminiscent of pornography how sexually exciting the man feels his victim's vulnerability to be, and how she is to be favoured with the best sexual experience, 'the best rape' of her life. About to

mount her, he discovers that she is menstruating and falls to pieces, running away and expressing horror at the blood on his hand.[28] This brilliant piece must be seen to be appreciated fully. It characterises the rapist — his total and unthinking disregard for the woman, his insanely inflated ego, and his pathetic terror at the sight of blood from a natural body function — and makes him an object of scorn and ridicule. Finley is one of four artists who were unanimously recommended for National Endowment of the Arts grants by the NEA's peer-group performance arts panel, but its recommendations were rejected by the NEA chairman in June 1990 because of 'political realities'.[29] She fared even worse while performing in London: the Institute of Contemporary Art was threatened with the loss of millions of pounds sterling of funding if they allowed her to perform, and members of Scotland Yard threatened her with deportation and said that they could not guarantee her safety.[30] These attacks on Finley did not amount to government censorship, but official statements alleging personal danger, and threatened or actual revocation of her funding and that of her sponsors, clearly display a widespread desire to silence her.

 If more stringent legal regulation is not the answer, what can be done? There are many non-legal approaches. The Authority itself favours commercial and social response in preference to becoming involved with programming decisions. Discussing the FIRST complaint on the underrepresentation of women's sports on One Network News, the Authority noted that the Act 'provides the Authority with neither effective power nor a clear mandate to deal with the complaint. Despite the statutory lacuna, the Authority does not intend to suggest an amendment which would affect the Act's philosophy. Rather, it believes that it is an issue to which a commercial or social response on the broadcasters' part is more appropriate than a regulatory one by the legislature'.[31] Some options are explored in the next section.

Non-legal Approaches to Combating Broadcast Sexism

There are a number of ways in which sexist broadcasting can be confronted without resort to restrictions through law and the regulatory process.

(a) Protect the susceptible

There are at least two ways in which younger viewers, who may be more susceptible to influence from broadcasting, can be protected, but both depend on very local action. A first obvious step for individuals is to monitor and limit the viewing of children under your control. Even shows designed for young children like *Playschool* and *Sesame Street*, while far superior to many other offerings, nevertheless contain elements which many parents may regard as sexist. Laurene Krasny Brown has pointed out that parents can encourage discussion about televised material to help their children interpret what they watch, and identify biased information and stereotyping.[32]

Another way to offer some protection to children (including those whose parents are unable to regulate viewing) is to teach them critical viewing skills. Strictly censoring the broadcast media will ultimately do a disservice to children by lulling them into a false belief that everything seen on television is accurate and responsible. Engendering a healthy scepticism of the media is more useful. Young viewers can be educated to make them more intelligent consumers of television. Dorr, Graves and Phelps developed a critical viewing curriculum for children. Four critical evaluation skills were taught in order to '(a) decrease children's belief that TV programs are real, (b) increase children's tendencies to compare what they see on TV with other information sources, (c) decrease television's credibility by teaching children about economic and production aspects of television, and (d) teach children to evaluate television content by making use of the outlined skills'.[33]

(b) Discourage the production of sexist programmes and advertisements

A second option is to discourage the production of sexist programmes and advertisements. There are a number of ways by which this might be accomplished. Ratings are important: if sufficient people refuse to watch offensive programmes, change will occur. Make your views known to the broadcasters. They air programmes which they think will be popular with the public and therefore profitable. Public input can help ensure that broadcasters will continue to shift their portrayals until the medium is a more accurate reflection of society.

Sex discrimination in the industry needs to be challenged. An increase in the number of women employed as writers and programming decision makers will be likely to result in more diverse viewing options. The Equal Opportunities Tribunal has had prior occasion to comment upon evidence that women have been at a disadvantage in the Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand[34] (so far TVNZ and TV3 have escaped scrutiny). The Human Rights Act 1993 forbids sex discrimination, but it can be difficult to enforce. During the public discussion over the role of women on game shows, Television New Zealand's director of production Don Reynolds defended *Sale of the Century*'s male compere as part of a proven format, and as consistent with the way in which it was done worldwide.[35] It would have been admitting unlawful discrimination to state that there was a requirement (or preference) for a man, however, and although Mr Reynolds said he would be interested in having women presenters, he noted that game shows were not a genre known for experimenting and he did not see such a change happening easily.[36] Section 41 of the Act permits the Broadcasting Commission to deny funding if it considers that the prospective recipient is not operating an appropriate equal employment opportunities plan in circumstances where it would be practicable to do so. Unfortunately, many of the programmes shown in New Zealand were produced overseas, outside the reach of New Zealand's discrimination laws.

As in the television industry, most of those responsible for the 'creative' side of advertising are men.[37] In time, women may come to fill more of these jobs, and this could assist a trend to less stereotyped depictions of women in advertising. But such a change, while welcome, would only be part of the solution: the top advertising agencies conduct research on the community's response to prospective advertising campaigns in order to take popular opinion into account. If we want to see change, it is incumbent upon us to refuse to purchase products with offensive advertising, no matter how desirable the product may otherwise be.

Drawing more public attention to the problem is another way to discourage sexist content. One way to do so is to advocate formation of a task force like the one created in Canada in 1979. The Canadian Task Force on Sex-Role Stereotyping in the Broadcast Media was the impetus for the Canadian Broadcasting

Corporation and the Canadian advertising industry to take more vigorous action to avoid sex stereotyping.[38] On-going content analyses will provide the hard data by which to measure progress.

(c) Encourage production of programmes and advertisements with positive depictions of women

In the absence of compulsion, production and televising of programming with positive depictions of women is going to depend on public opinion. Broadcasters want to air programmes which will be commercially successful, so we must demonstrate that the public wants such programming and lobby for voluntary change. The Broadcasting Commission can serve an important role by fulfilling its mandate to ensure that a range of broadcasts is available to provide for the interests of women and children. If more of these positive programmes are introduced, they may be effective in developing and supporting non-sexist attitudes in viewers.[39]

Broadcasting currently contains a lot of sexist material. But, I would argue, we must combat these repugnant expressions with words, not with laws. Viewer education and withdrawal of support are other useful tools. In my opinion, the law is a poor weapon in the fight against sexism. Television is not going to change overnight in the absence of massive government regulation of broadcasting. Nevertheless, the attempt to force change entirely through government control is no solution, and it creates a further risk that the censorship weapon will be turned against other causes in the future. The present system emphasises diversity in broadcasting and viewer freedom of choice, instead of government control. This focus, coupled with attempts to influence broadcasters and advertisers to reduce sexist material on television voluntarily is, I would argue, more respecting of rights and therefore a superior alternative.

* * *

Selene Mize is a lecturer in law at the University of Otago, where she teaches a course on Media Law.

Notes

1. Roger Silverstone, *The Message of Television: Myth and Narrative in Contemporary Culture* (Heinemann Educational, London, 1981) p. 4.
2. Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, *Images of Women: Report of the Task Force on Sex-Role Stereotyping in the Broadcast Media* (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, Hull, 1982) pp. 3–4.
3. See Broadcasting Standards Authority, *Codes of Broadcasting Practice for Radio and Television* (Broadcasting Standards Authority, Wellington, 1992). There is also provision under s 21(1)(f) of the Act for the Authority to develop and issue its own codes where appropriate.
4. See *Decision 29/93*, Broadcasting Standards Authority, 29 March 1993 (TVNZ) and *Decision 30/93*, Broadcasting Standards Authority, 29 March 1993 (TV 3).
5. 'Female Hosts Soon?' *Otago Daily Times*, 2 October 1992, p. 20.
6. This is now standard G14 following a periodic revision of the Code.
7. *Decision 30/93*, p. i.
8. *Decision 29/93*, p. 5. An identical decision was reached in the connected case.
9. [1990] NZAR 172.
10. Broadcasting Standards Authority, 9 August 1991. However the Authority did not uphold the complaint against a connected Galaxy cheese advertisement depicting a man and woman talking about their respective sexual experiences on the ground that it relied little upon the woman's sexual appeal. ibid., p. 5.
11. *Decision 68/92*, Broadcasting Standards Authority, 28 September 1992.
12. *Decision 49/91*, Broadcasting Standards Authority, 7 November 1991.
13. *Decision 54/93*, Broadcasting Standards Authority, 3 May 1993.
14. *Decision 29/92*, Broadcasting Standards Authority, 4 June 1992.
15. *Decision on Complaints 92/113 and 92/114*, Advertising Standards Complaints Board, 22 July 1992.
16. *Decision on Complaint 92/196*, Advertising Standards Complaints Board, 26 January 1993.
17. *Decision 2/90*, Broadcasting Standards Authority, 19 January 1990, p. 4 (*Nightworkers* documentary).
18. See for example *Decision 54/91*, Broadcasting Standards Authority, 18 November 1991 (reference to the Bible as toilet paper); *Decision 84/92*, Broadcasting Standards Authority, 5 November 1992 (a Rowan Atkinson sketch in which a teacher unwittingly makes obscene references).
19. *Decision 5/91*, Broadcasting Standards Authority, 15 March 1991.

20. See for example Susan Faludi, *Backlash: The Undeclared War Against Women* (Mackays, Chatham, 1992) pp. 176, 187–202.
21. The available research provides some support for the hypothesis that sexism on television has a negative impact on at least some viewers. For a more detailed discussion of the research, see Selene Mize, 'Sexist Messages on Television', *Women's Law Conference Papers* (Conference Publishing, Auckland, 1993) pp. 297, 300–303.
22. ibid.
23. *Decision 59/92*, Broadcasting Standards Authority, 14 September 1992 (Steinlager advertisement in New York City, allegedly showing typical macho hooligan behaviour).
24. *Decision 32/93*, Broadcasting Standards Authority, 1 April 1993 (Jim Beam advertisement with allegedly exaggerated stereotypically masculine image).
25. *Decision 8/92*, Broadcasting Standards Authority, 2 March 1992.
26. *Decision 19/91*, p. 11.
27. See for example *Decision 54/92*.
28. See Edward de Grazia, *Girls Lean Back Everywhere: The Law of Obscenity and the Assault on Genius* (Vintage, New York, 1992) p. 670.
29. de Grazia, pp. 660–64.
30. de Grazia, pp. 670–71.
31. *Decision 30/93*, p. 6.
32. Laurene Krasny Brown, *Taking Advantage of Media: A Manual for Parents and Teachers* (1986), discussed in Barrie Gunter and Jill McAleer, *Children and Television: The One Eyed Monster?* (Routledge, London, 1990) pp. 140–41.
33. A. Dorr, S.B. Graves and E. Phelps, 'Television Literacy for Young Children', *Journal of Communication*, 30:3 (1980) pp. 71–83, discussed in Robert Liebert and Joyce Sprafkin, *The Early Window: Effects of Television on Children and Youth* (Pergamon, New York, 3rd ed. 1988) pp. 226–27; Gunter and McAleer, pp. 147–50.
34. *Parr v Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand* (1987) 1 NZELC 95,560 at 95,570.
35. 'Thank you, Steve. You can go now', *New Zealand Herald* (NZH), 26 September 1992, p. 1.
36. ibid.
37. Saatchi and Saatchi, New Zealand's largest advertising agency, is dominated by men for example. See Jan Corbett, 'Positive & Positive', *Metro*, (June 1993) p. 52.
38. Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, pp. 59–64.
39. See, for example, Liebert and Sprafkin, pp. 236–37.

FS FEMINIST STUDIES

Volume 20, 1994

Feminism and Power

Anna Yeatman

Feminism takes its place as one of the central emancipatory movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As an emancipatory movement which seeks to end a particular kind of power relationship it is deeply connected with issues of how power should be conceived and understood. In particular it is connected with questions concerning which models of power relations could work to foster democratically oriented social change. It turns out that a great deal depends on how an emancipatory movement conceives power. This is where its vision for change is located, and the adequacy of this vision depends on the adequacy of this conception of power.

I would like to draw attention at the outset to two specific challenges for democratically oriented change at this time. The first one concerns the crisis of legitimacy for a paternalistic state. There can be no doubt that the current ideological success of free market models is in good part owed to a democratic reaction against top-down, bureaucratic and paternalistic modes of state intervention. This crisis of legitimacy for a paternalistic state bears on precisely what model of power we think may be most congruent with democratic values. 'Power over' is widely viewed at this time as an inappropriate way of regulating the relationship of individuals to social life, even when this power over is directed by a benevolent and protective interest of the state in individual welfare. Instead, self-regulation where the individual is made responsible for their relationship to social life, is seen as the more appropriate model of power. As we shall see shortly, self-regulation is not incongruent with, and may even depend on, certain types of state-based 'power over', even while it is antipathetic to paternalistic types of state power over.

Historically, feminism can be located as a central challenge to patriarchal-patrimonial models of power, for which a master's authority over his household is the archetype.[1] These models identify power with the prerogative of the lord, master, household head and employer to demand obedience from their subordinates in return for protection.[2] What the lord, master, household head and employer have in common is the prerogative of *dominium*, namely the right to rule and control all that come within their jurisdiction of command, a jurisdiction which in modern times is identified either with the territorial and public jurisdiction of a state or with the jurisdiction of privately-held and -oriented property. The rationale for this rule and command resides in the pursuit of what is taken to be the interest of all who come under the specific jurisdiction: thus the good of the state is identified with that of its subjects, the good of the firm with that of its employees. The elision between the patrimonial-patriarchal construal of this interest and the interest of those who are subjected to patrimonial-patriarchal dominion is precisely what is at issue in the challenges to this model by feminism, socialism and liberalism.

Both feminism and socialism dispute the equation of the patriarch/employer's interest with that of women and workers respectively. In so doing they withdraw legitimacy from the patrimonial-patriarchal model of power altogether, and seem to gesture toward some kind of alternative model where the interests of less powerful individuals and groups are to be accorded an independent place within the processes of governance. Here, however, they encounter a fundamental ambiguity in their vision of an alternative model. Are they seeking to universalise the status of *dominium*? If they are, then, paradoxically, they are both retaining the patriarchal/patrimonial model as well as indicating the impossibility of its universal realisation — if everyone is a lord then no one is a lord because there is no one to subordinate. Or are they seeking to find an alternative model beyond *dominium*, and what might that be?

Liberalism is what we call the attempt to universalise *dominium* on behalf of the modern class of private propertied individuals, the middle class. Assertion of freedom of contract is made by this class against the persisting elements of patrimonial and patriarchal authority either at the level of the monarchical

state or at the level of more localised authority. The contractualist ideology of liberalism, at the same time, articulates a counter model of power where social relations are mediated not by 'power over' but by 'power to', namely the capacities of freely choosing individuals. On this model, self-regulation becomes the cornerstone and dynamic of the system of social relationships. Accordingly, the market assumes a normative place in this picture as being the only appropriate arena for contractual relationships between private propertied individuals. The only legitimate role of the state as an organised and centralised vehicle of power over is on behalf of ensuring the orderly workings of a free market where these individuals can pursue their transactions secure in the knowledge that the state will bring effective sanctions against force and fraud.

It is the specific contribution of feminism to demonstrate that the liberal conception of freedom of contract is patrimonial and patriarchal in character, that it extends only to the patriarchal heads of households thereby leaving women and children outside its reach. In this feminism works its own specific angle in showing the impossibility of universalising *dominium*, and thereby suggests the importance of keeping distinct the two components of the liberal project: the universalising of *dominium* which requires as we have seen a reinstatement of patrimonial/patriarchal authority; and, the development of self-regulatory modes of social relationship. Contractual freedom, in short, does not have to be tied to status as an owner of private property, and, it follows, the market is not the only or even the most important arena for self-regulatory modes of social relationship. The further implication of this direction of reasoning is that the state's power over may be exercised in a number of different ways congruent with the eliciting and facilitation of different kinds and arenas of self-regulation.

We glimpse something of these differences in the following examples. With regard to the education of children in ways which foster the development of capacities for self-government, the state operates through a professionalised system of schooling. With regard to the eliciting and facilitation of various forms of localised project management, the state develops models of devolved authority which permit considerable budgetary and policy discretion to these local units, organisations, or communities

within state-based guidelines and systems of monitoring and accountability. Or, with regard to experimentation in social change, the state permits and may even resource social movements to develop social learning in ways which can be fed back into the macro, state-centric system of policy making.[3] In all these instances, state power over is directed towards enhancing, even interpellating or calling into being, various forms of self-regulation. This is no longer the liberal state which acts only to ensure social recognition for already constituted freely contracting, private property owners. This is a state oriented to the *constitution* of the powers and capacities of self-regulating subjects.[4] Here it is clear that the self-regulating subject is no longer the atomised, private property owner but is, instead, a socially-oriented self whose capacities for self-government are deployed by the various, more or less complex, organisations in which it operates.

If feminism and socialism have been the two central movements of challenge to the persistence of patriarchal-patrimonial power in the modern marriage and employment contracts respectively, their's has been an ambivalent relationship to the state's interventionist repertoire. To the extent that they have wanted freedom to operate as social movements, they have required the state to develop a respect for the place of social movements in social life. To the extent that they have wanted the state to intervene on women's or workers' behalf against the prerogatives of domestic patriarchs and employers, feminism and socialism have required the state to assume coercive features in restricting these prerogatives, and paternalistic features in acting on behalf of the interests of the weaker or more vulnerable party in the relationship.

This assumption of a paternalistic mode of intervention has been the more elaborated in the case of feminism. This is because, as Carole Pateman argues, 'the sexual contract' positions women as subject to the corporate patriarchal dominion of men as a collective fratriarchy, which is given organised existence and form in the modern state.[5] The effect of this is to make state interventions on behalf of women take the form of their protection by a patriarchal state. Workers, on the other hand, have historically been symbolically identified as masculine, and thus as potential claimants on inclusion within the fratriarchal social contract.

This is certainly how nineteenth-century workers' movements symbolically oriented their identity. The success of these claims is registered in the various ways the state institutionalised a masculine family wage prior to the very recent era of equal pay and equal opportunity. The fratriarchal character of the modern state places feminism in a difficult position. If it refuses to deploy 'good' state paternalism against 'bad' domestic patriarchs, it may forfeit an important security for the lives and welfare of many women. However, if it accepts state paternalism, feminism works against its own interest in requiring the state to move beyond patriarchy and to foster non-market-oriented forms of self regulation.

It is important to understand the distinction between paternalistic modes of state intervention, and those which interpellate and foster self-regulated modes of social relationship. In the latter case, state intervention has to work in ways which are both congruent with and actively constitute individual capacities for self-government. When the state intervenes to empower individuals for self-government, this is still an exercise of 'power over' but its object is very different from that of paternalistic protection. Where state-centred paternalistic protection works to reproduce the very condition of vulnerability which requires protection, state-centred empowerment works to reduce this vulnerability both by enhancing individuals' capacities for self-government and withdrawing legitimacy from paternalistic domination.

Paternalistic domination entails paternalistic protection because in this frame of reference the independence of the individual is derived from his patriarchalist responsibility for the welfare of other individuals. The identity of the former covers that of the latter as in the old legal doctrine of coverture in the case of wives. When power over is oriented to enabling the independence of the subject, it may assume protective features but these do not crystallise as 'protection' since they are always residual in relation to processes which nurture the independence of this subject. For a clear distinction between power over *qua* domination and what he calls 'transformative' power relationships, namely where power over is oriented to the supercession of the relationship through empowering its subject, I am indebted to Wartenberg.[6]

Feminism has contributed immeasurably if contradictorily

to the crisis of legitimation for the paternalistic state. In this it has been abetted by the various postcolonial movements and their contestation of the inherently paternalistic cast of colonialism. In each case, the refusal of a dependent subordinate status for women and erstwhile colonials tables the problem of finding some model for governance other than that of *dominium*. No longer can a hierarchical, binary way of managing difference by subsuming those who are cast as different under the dominion of a master subject work. Difference now has to be substantively worked with in the business of governance. Thus, the assimilationist ethic of a modern colonialist relationship is no longer legitimate. Postcolonial democracy demands that the political community in question, for example the Australian political community, be so constructed as to be multicultural and multiracial. This is a type of democratic jurisdiction where the principle of equal treatment before the law is able to take up the potential significance of cultural, social and embodied difference for ensuring the delivery of such equal treatment. Postcolonial democratic challenges demand a capacity to work with developing and transforming modern universalistic values — equality, freedom, democracy — so that the universalism they connote is not of a homogenising kind, but one that can accomodate difference.[7]

These challenges work also with a model of power that is oriented to self-government rather than to power over. For example, it is standard good practice in multicultural program delivery to design the program and its methods of delivery around the expressed needs of the users, both actual and potential. In this way, these users enter a politics of needs formation, where in dialogue with policy makers, program managers, and service deliverers, they help shape the program as it is delivered in their particular neck of the woods. When program delivery is understood in this way it becomes an emergent strategy, in constant process of being shaped and reinterpreted in respect of the needs and interests of all these stakeholders. This is a very different conception of power than that which accords the policy makers and professionals the status of professionals who know what is best for their clients, and who proceed to design the program accordingly.

It is apparent that these two types of democratic challenge are basically distinct aspects of the same fundamental challenge,

namely a challenge to paternalistic models of power in favour of an alternative model of power which enhances the capacities of individuals or self-identified groups to govern themselves. Self-government is to be understood to refer to the capacity of these individuals or self-identified groups to practise a self-regulating relationship to their various entanglements in social life.

If this is the kind of broad emancipatory direction for change at this point of transition into the twenty-first century, we may ask what role feminism may play in contributing to this direction of change. Above I have suggested that feminism is already structured in its relationship to power by ambivalence: by an ambivalence regarding the state's exercise of coercive power with the objective of restricting domestic patriarchal power, and by an ambivalence regarding the state's exercise of paternalistic protection of women and children against abusive domestic patriarchs. The ambivalence arises from the contrary interest of feminism in developing a model of power which requires a capacity for self-government in those whom the state subjects, and thereby requires the state to exercise its power in ways which are congruent with this capacity. Here I have interpreted these ambivalences as three distinct strands within feminist concepts of power. The three distinct feminist conceptions of power that I identify are: 1. feminism and power as protection; 2. feminism and power as coercion; 3. feminism and power as capacity.

Feminism And Power As Protection

It is a paradoxical fact of history that women's liberation from patriarchal despotic authority in individual households has come at the hands of the patriarchal state. The rights of women — for example, the rights of married women to own property, to sue and be sued, to have custody of their children, etc. — were all conferred by the state, and were rhetorically understood to be rights which empowered women against the despotic excesses of their husbands. In general, women's accession to the rights of the modern individual is a process understood to have been dependent on the state's positive conferral of these rights on women. This is in direct contrast to the origins myth of men's rights as modern individuals. In the case of men, the state is

held not to confer rights but to recognise rights already held, 'natural' rights.[8]

This prominence of the state in the construction of women as right-bearing subjects bears scrutiny. It suggests that women's right-bearing status may be a qualified one, namely that it exists only to the extent that it is reconcilable with the idea of state-sponsored patriarchal protection of women.

Protection is an undemocratic concept. It is used to legitimise domination over groups who are constituted as weak, unable for some reason to take care of themselves, and thus in need of protection. These groups historically have included: women, children, and peoples regarded by a colonising modern western state as primitive or undeveloped. The idea of power operating here is power over, but 'power over' is justified in the name of protection. This is a concept of power, then, that accords domination the privileges and obligations of benevolent despotism.

Protection may be an undemocratic concept but it is exceedingly alive and well in contemporary conceptions of power. This is particularly true of a prominent tendency in feminism, a tendency we may term feminist protectionism.

Feminist protectionism is exemplified in the social purity reforming feminism of the nineteenth century. The ethos of this type of reform required the state to enter into various relationships of social control in order to either protect women and children from the inability of men to control their own appetites, or to restrict the extent to which men could satisfy these appetites. Thus, prostitutes who were victims of circumstances were to be saved, and the licensing of public entertainments such as music halls was to be premised on strict licensing controls and surveillance oriented to keeping them free of indecency and vice.[9] For social purity reformers, the goal of protecting innocent women and children from vice and corruption justified the dubious means of extending the legitimacy of state repression and surveillance. The history of social work — a feminised profession — is inescapably bound up with the development of the state's protective embrace of all those elements and classes in society viewed as needing control and surveillance for the good of those amongst them who were and are regarded as redeemable.

Contemporary feminism still looks to the state as protector. This is most evident in the feminist discourse of domestic violence. In most instances the policy orientation of this discourse is to the development of state-based methods of social control in order to extend more effective protection of women and children against men type-cast as violent and sexually rapacious. It is this which explains the readiness of femocrats in Australian State/Territory welfare governmental agencies to not only participate in but in many cases lead contemporary child protection programs.

It will be clear that protectionist feminism actually works to reproduce the bureaucratic and assimilationist paternalism of the state which is under contemporary democratic challenge. Child protection strategies, for example, both extend the net of state surveillance and social control, and ensure its focus is concentrated on those who are type cast as the most likely villains: poor, working class men, or when the discourse operates in a highly racialised context, poor minority men and women (Maori and Pacific Islanders, in the New Zealand context).

Protectionist feminism sustains a patriarchal concept of 'power over'. It deploys the state as the good father against the bad fathers and the bad men. This is a split view of the father, which identifies good fathering with patriarchal protection. Feminism thereby confirms the protector's status and role, and contributes its share in reproducing the morality of paternalism. This permits feminism to play out a dependency role in regard to the state, a role which legitimises a paternalistic, bureaucratic expression of state authority. It also permits feminism an uncritical relationship to its own ethic of maternalism. On this ethic, women's goodness is identified with maternalism, no less an undemocratic relationship to others than paternalism.

Several assumptions appear to operate in this approach to power. First, women are assumed to both lie outside power and to be powerless. Therefore, they need the powerful to protect them against those who threaten them. This is a non-political relationship to power. Women do not have to take responsibility for themselves as both implicated in patriarchal domination and as subjects with the capacity for positive, self-governing action.

The second assumption here is that power is benign, and in this sense not power at all, if it is directed by benevolent, protective

motives. Goodness is attested to by the effort made to control evil. Such effort is all. Good people thereby do not have to be responsible for the consequences of their actions, and thus do not have to be politically accountable for them. This is a recipe for allowing the ends to justify the means. For example, in child protection programs, child welfare effort and resources tend to be used up in the policing stages of the operation. Children are taken into care with very little effort of will or attention being given to what happens to them next. State-sponsored efforts to rescue these children mean that many of them experience serial foster placements in a context where there is no guarantee that foster parents are non-abusive adults. The simple binary of good and evil ensures that parental domination is affirmed by the assumption that good parents are those who use their domination over children to protect rather than abuse them. The more complex politics of democratising adult authority over children is evaded.[10]

It is assumed also that those who are weak become powerful only as they are 'empowered' by the strong arm of the patriarchal state. The etymology of the term 'empowerment' suggests we treat it with suspicion. From the *Oxford English* Dictionnary, the meanings of 'empower' are: 1. to invest legally or formally with power or authority; to license; 2. to impart or bestow power to an end or for a purpose; to enable, permit; 3. to gain or assume power *over* (obsolete). 'Empowerment' is the act of empowering or the state of being empowered. In this context, it is worth recalling that on the natural law approach to rights, men do not need to be empowered by the state. They represent a masculinist and democratic version of an old idea: aristocrats by nature.

Empowerment is an idea we may have good reason to wish to retain. However, we need to note that historically this term is used of those who are positioned as powerless, who are to be 'empowered' by or through the benign, paternalistic agency of the state. This being the case we may wonder whether this term reproduces the relationship of tutelage between powerful protector and those who, being powerless, are seen to need help. Against this, it may be argued that 'empowering' — just as 'enabling' and 'capacitating' — are all terms which have legal connotations, but that the authority which they invoke can work in democratic rather than paternalistic ways. In short, these terms are suggestive

of the contested terrain of state intervention itself. They are what William Connolly calls contested concepts.[11] Or, at least, they are so potentially, for it is not clear that we have experienced either elaborated or explicit debate and discussion concerning how empowering (empowerment), enabling (enablement) and capacitating (capacitation) can be developed as relationships which foster self-regulation rather than protection.

It makes historical sense that feminism has looked to the patriarchal state as the protector of women. Women *were* and *are* placed as victims in relation to men's unconstrained violence and rapine. Protectionism, however, reproduces the very problem it purports to address. Women are better served if they work on a democratic model of power which challenges protectionist conceptions of power and where politics is the vehicle through which individuals become powerful in the sense of self-governing.

Feminism and Power as Coercion

Feminism like all other emancipatory social movements tends to collapse power into domination.[12] Power is identified with 'power over' in all the coercive and non-benign senses of 'power over'. On this approach to power, the emancipatory movement sees itself as representing those who are dominated and exploited by some kind of ruling class: the bourgeoisie, the colonialists, men, etc.. The focus for change thereby becomes this movement's efforts to throw off this relationship of domination and exploitation by various means: ideological contestation of this relationship; mobilisation of mass resistance; revolutionary struggle. Since power is equated with force, counter-power has to be a counter-force. This being the case, the emancipatory movements including feminism tend to pursue an undemocratic and often non-political practice of counter-force.

This point is an important one to elaborate. When the dominant exploiter class's power is equated with the various forms of force (economic, physical, moral, ideological), it follows that established democratic procedure and process cannot be accorded face value. Instead the achievements of modern democracy are construed as the false appearance of a systemically coercive set of relations which is the 'base' or truth of this society. Even if an

emancipatory movement declares its interest in promoting a more democratic society, this interest is rendered null and void by its inability to accord reality to such democratic achievements as have been made. For example, the rule of law, freedoms of speech and assembly, representative government. Moreover, since the oppressor class is homogenised as a class committed to the domination of others, all men or all members of the bourgeoisie or all colonialists, 'at bottom', are accorded only an interested and instrumental relationship to their professions of modern democratic values. Because power is conflated with domination it is assumed that the powerful have no interest in democratic process, but manipulate a pseudo-democratic process to serve their own ends of domination. It follows that all professions of democratic values by the powerful have to be treated cynically. This means that the emancipatory movement needs to make no effort to work with the powerful in the development of these values. It makes very little sense to work to develop a politics with those whom one assumes are oriented fundamentally to power as domination.[13]

Historically, emancipatory movements have contributed enormously to the terms of critique of relationships of domination. In this way they have contributed to a democratic project, for they show how different groups are constituted as marginal by being wronged by the established modes of governance. These constructions of wrong establish directions for particular projects of democratisation. Without a positive relationship to a democratic politics, however, emancipatory movements have failed to contribute to the development of modern democratic institutions and values. This has been a major historical weakness, and one which has imposed little constraint on their internal political practices. For example, feminist consciousness raising is not intrinsically democratic, and, indeed, it can be made over to particular kinds of moral blackmail and personal tyranny.

There is no doubt that the powerful — those we may term the aristocracies of history — combine power and domination in their relationship to power. That is, they combine their own distinctive historical project of self-government with the domination of others. These, however, are separable aspects of their relationship to power. To separate means that we can come to appreciate

the historical achievements in regard to self-government that different of these aristocracies have made. We can ask what their constructions of freedom of action may offer to us now. We can recognise as Nietzsche called it their 'triumphant self-affirmation'.[14] This is a very much more complex critical evaluative relationship to the aristocracies of power than emancipatory movements have permitted themselves.

The historical weakness of emancipatory movements in regard to positive conceptions of power, including those which are associated with democratic procedures and politics, is indicated in their worldlessness, and their tendency to practise a politics of *ressentiment*.[15] I borrow the term worldlessness from Hannah Arendt who used it to characterise the relationship of the court and financier Jews to the absolute monarchies and subsequent development of the nation-state.[16] When a movement understands itself as representing those who are powerless, the victims of the powerful, it neither permits itself responsibility for nor engagement in the affairs of the world. It is thereby able to maintain an innocence of worldly affairs, and in particular an innocence in regard to power. It does not have to confront the truth that power inheres in all relationships and that any interpretation of reality is itself a manifestation of power. A truth which indicates that those who are relatively powerless are nonetheless still participative in power.

Worldlessness shields those who construct themselves as passive and innocent victims of world history from any responsibility for their fate. It also permits them to locate their resistance to their relatively powerless status in a hatred of those to whom they attribute all power, and, it follows, all evil. This is the politics of *ressentiment* which Nietzsche so insightfully analyses.[17] This is a negative politics. All that is identified with the world of the powerful is rejected as participating in the oppressor's evil. Thus, feminism tends to identify all that is worldly with the evil of patriarchy, and thereby to reject all values that are associated with the 'triumphant self-affirmation' of the powerful class, men.[18] These values include those of reason, competitive performance, heroism, dispassionate judgment, ambition.

This is a politics of rancor, 'the rancor of beings who, deprived of the direct outlet of action, compensate by an imaginary

vengeance'.[19] A feminism oriented by rancor and *ressentiment* casts women as good, men as evil. It is thereby committed to discovering what good there is in the ethical domain of women's distinctive ways of relating and doing things. This is a creative project which extends critical insight into the mix of power and domination that characterises men's distinctive ways of relating and doing things. But this creativity is blocked from becoming a positive project of transformation of the world. All that is permitted a feminism oriented by rancor is a separatist retreat from the world. As Nietzsche puts it, 'all its action is reaction'.[20]

This is a feminism inevitably committed to substituting an identity politics for a more inclusive and transformative politics. An identity politics follows from the binary opposition of the good and the powerless to the evil and the powerful. Neither of these terms is permitted to participate in the attributes of the other; differences between individuals are ironed out and they are homogenised on behalf of one of these terms or the other; their identity is made to appear coherently expressive of who they are (good or evil); and, finally, their identity is treated as though it is a given rather than being subject to transformation through historico-political practice.

The identity of the oppressed subject is accorded utopian value because it is viewed as lying beyond and outside domination. As we have seen, the confusion of power with domination means that the emancipatory movement is unable to take over and reinterpret the attributes of the powerful, self-governing subject on behalf of those whom it represents. Instead it ends up celebrating as virtues all those aspects of the identity of the oppressed which are associated with strategic self-preservation in a condition of weakness: acuity of perception of the other's feelings; the masking of assertive and direct modes of leadership in those of indirect suggestion and persuasion; the assertion of power through goodness where this works to occlude the subject's interest in power and makes it appear that all they are doing is operating on behalf of the needs of others.

This is a politics of reaction oriented more to the preservation of the identity of the oppressed subject than it is to a project of social transformation where the objective is one of contesting domination by encouraging all individuals and groups to assume

a positive relationship to power. Such encouragement of a positive relationship to power would challenge the attribution of identity to individuals and the correlative requirement that their identity is the expression of a given condition as a member of a group.[21] Instead individuals would be encouraged to explore their capacities, to discover the contingencies and multiplicity of identity, and celebrate those moments of transformative practice when their sense of self completely changes.

Feminism and Power as Capacity

Protectionist and negative conceptions of power have not been the only ways of conceiving power within feminism. As we have seen they make good sense in reflecting the conditions of strategic survival for women as a relatively powerless group. An emancipatory movement such as feminism, however, also develops a politics of inclusion in respect of what are seen to be the privileges of the powerful, in particular their privilege of action. There has been a long and sophisticated feminist politics of advocacy for the inclusion of women within modern democratic freedoms.

This is a reactive politics to the extent that inclusion is sought within the established conception of democratic freedoms. For as feminists have come to recognise, these established freedoms reflect the ways in which the powerful and dominant class have conceived freedom. Thus, we discover a thoroughgoing conflation of the very idea of self-governance with private propertied status as master of a household and of all who lie within the household.[22] The consequence of this is that when feminism works for the right of women to be included within the established model of self-governance ('freedom'), they are effectively working for women to become like men in this sense of patriarchal private propertied householder status. As we know, precisely because of the terms of the gender division of labour that is entailed in patriarchal mastery of households, the vast majority of women are positioned in ways which mean they cannot become like men in this sense.[23] Only a small minority of women can.

One response to the discovery of the patriarchally inflected models of self-governance is, as we have seen, to reject them

altogether in favour of an equally reactive but separatist orientation to the virtue of women. Another response is evident in an emerging feminist response which permits itself an active and experimental relationship to established and not-yet-established models of self-governance. This response is evident in the poststructuralist feminist literature which disrupts the binaries of power/power-lessness, masculinity/femininity, good/evil, and so on.[24] Judith Butler's work for example brings out the performative aspects of who we are as sexed and gendered beings: gender is not some-thing we are but something we *do*.[25] When we do rather than express gender, our action contributes to a micropolitics of contested gender relations. In small ways we may inflect our performance of gender relations with irony and, thus, critical distance. In other ways we select within a repertoire of ways of doing gender where we may dramatise our contestation of what we see as conservative and oppressive ways of doing gender.

What work such as this does is develop a conception of power as action and capacity. It indicates that even when we appear to be passively reacting to domination, this is a species of action, a particular kind of assertion of power, albeit one that denies it is power. When a conception of power as action and capacity is operative, we come to understand Foucault's point that a discursive formation interpellates us not as passive subjects of power but as specific kinds of agency or capacity. Thus women as subjects within a patriarchally oppressive order are interpellated as particular kinds of agents. It is because they are agents that they are ethical. Thus women as intelligent and practical strategists of survival within a patriarchal gender order develop not just an ethics of ressentiment but an ethics of caring, however mixed up together these become.

When we approach those who suffer oppression as agents within their oppression, we are embarked inevitably on an inquiry into how their agency works to comply with and repro-duce this oppression. Such an inquiry indicates women, like other oppressed groups, are located within power, not outside it. It attributes to women a capacity for action, and discerns this capacity in their agency of reaction. This approach indicates that women are more powerful than their protectionist or reactive conceptions of power allow them to think they are. It brings out

how their power as actors to *do* rather than *be* gendered subjects permits them considerable scope for a micro-politics of challenge, contestation and disruption within the interactive field of men and women doing gender.

Power, Policy And Politics

An orientation to power as capacity, enables us to break out of identity politics. We no longer require men and women to represent two homogenenous poles of a binary oppressor and oppressed relationship. This permits us two further steps.

First, an orientation to power as capacity means that we can distinguish between power and domination. Allowing that these become confused together in patriarchal modes of governance, when we as feminists make this distinction we are suggesting that patriarchs can make this distinction too.

Second, when we approach power as capacity, we suggest that gender is not something which women and men are but something they do. More accurately, we suggest that these subjects *are* respectively men and women *because* they *do* their identities. Here we necessarily commit ourselves to the idea that not all men will do their gender in the same way, and not all women will do theirs in the same way. Specifically we allow for the individualised aspects of gendered agency which arise from the performative nature of agency. To perform is to transform how things get done, are perceived, are understood. The dynamics of transformation change the selfhood of the agent concerned. It is this change which individualises the self.

Thus, if gender is not simply expressed but requires to be performed in order to be expressed, it follows that there are individualised differences within women, individualised differences within men — both as groups and as individuals. That is, neither the group (men, woman) nor the individual (this man, this woman) are coherent identities.

This performative approach to gender allows us to see that men are ethical beings who confuse the ethics of patriarchal domination with the ethics of a masculine self-governance, but now they do this confusion in an interlocutory relationship to the challenges of feminism. In responding to these challenges, men

begin to make the distinction between masculine and non-masculine modes of self-governance. This provides an opening for not simply an interlocutory but a cooperative ethical relationship to feminist challenges.

It is clear that when an emancipatory movement contests the established ways of governance — *policy* [26] — it does so by showing how these exclude and marginalise the group in question. The argument as to how policy wrongs a particular group is conducted in the name of equality. The very process of contesting this wrong equalises the status of those who have been marginalised by and those who are included within established policy. This equalising process is true of the *politics* of contestation, a politics which involves an interlocutory and performative relationship of confrontation, negotiation, and dialogue between the established players and the emancipatory movement.

Within this politics of contestation there is a lot of room to move precisely because of its interlocutory and performative characteristics. As the emancipatory movement challenges established policy, it calls into being an entirely different interactive dynamics of selfhood than prevails outside this politics. The emancipatory subject is called into being as someone who lies in-between legitimate participation in governance (policy) and exclusion from governance (policy). This is someone who is quite different from the marginalised self outside politics, a selfhood perforcedly defined in terms of intelligent strategies of adaptation and survival. The governing subject is called into being as someone who is capable of doing something other than conservatively resist the emancipatory movement's demand for inclusion, as someone who can work with the emancipatory movement to rectify the wrong concerned.

In this context there are many possibilities for emancipatory and governing subjects working together to change established policy so that it becomes more inclusive and democratic. Particular men who for reasons of their contingencies of selfhood are especially responsive to feminist emancipatory contestation become important colleagues for feminists within this process of change.

Politics is the domain of action. As we have seen it is not neatly contained within the space of what is usually conceived as

public, political and governmental. It happens in kitchens, classrooms, bedrooms, doctor's offices, case-work meetings, managerialist auditing practices and so on. It is true that we don't do in the sense of perform who we are all the time. Much of how we proceed in life is oriented by our needs not to act, to be oriented by habit for example, or to shelter the contingencies of our individuality within the communal embrace of group identity. At these times we subordinate the performative aspects of our agency to their expression, thereby according them a temporary status as givens. Politics, however, is the sphere of ethical change. Democratic developments and transformations are not possible without ethical change.

Contemporary demands for a self-regulated relationship to social life have extended the domain of the political beyond what have been thought to be its traditional boundaries. The conjugal bed is not always the site of politics but it can be, and when has become so it is because women's demands for a self-regulated relationship to conjugal sex has politically disrupted their husbands' patriarchal insistence on his conjugal rights.

It is clear that self-regulated modes of governance are ways of constructing the social relationships of power so that they are democratic in orientation. They depend precisely on a relational approach. This is why market-based individual freedoms may be a condition of self-regulated modes of governance but, beyond this, have nothing to do with extending the conditions for self-regulated modes of governance. Market freedom encourages individuals to pursue their power understood as capacity in an atomistic and self-interested way. This is not susceptible of a democratic *politics.*

In identifying these three distinct strands within feminist conceptions of power, my intention is not to suggest that it could be otherwise. The historical inevitability of each of these strands is clear. Their coexistence is uneasy and contradictory. Different feminisms effect this coexistence in different ways, but it would be impossible to find a feminism that did not evince all three strands to more or less extent.

At the same time, I am suggesting that feminist conceptions of power as protection and power as coercion are made increasingly problematic within a political environment shaped by contemporary

values of self-regulation. For example, the contemporary state has adopted an equal opportunity approach to income support in so far as it now requires women on welfare to participate in labour market programs regardless of whether they are mothers of small children or not.[27] This is a market-oriented version of self-regulation which withdraws paternalistic protection from women, and thereby challenges the patriarchal division between a master and his dependents. Feminism, of course, legitimised this extension of the tyranny of market freedom to women workers under conditions where the employment contract is still governed by the employer's prerogative. This being the case, feminism cannot argue for a reinstatement of women as economic dependents of either individual patriarchs or of the state as a corporate patriarch. In order to intervene to show that this kind of equal opportunity approach to welfare disadvantages women on welfare, feminism will have to work with rather than against the self-regulatory features of this situation.

This is not an easy challenge for feminism given its complex and contradictory relationship to power. However, it is arguable that feminism has developed a reflexive relationship to its own history and contradictions, and that this means that it has already moved beyond a naive and reactive relationship to power. It has become too conscious of its own complex and contradictory historical agency to engage in a politics driven by *ressentiment,* and by a desire for protection from what are taken to be benign, all-powerful forces beyond itself. At the least, this reflexive relationship permits a more thoroughgoing and useful conception of the different meanings and uses of power.

* * *

Notes

1. For the terms patriarchal and patrimonial as they are used here, see Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Bedminster, New York, 1968) Vol. 3, pp. 1006–1070.

2. For an extended critique of this relationship see Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Polity, Cambridge, 1988).

3. For this very interesting perspective on the interaction of contemporary social movements with the state, see Alberto Melucci, 'Social Movements and the Democratization of Everyday Life', in John Keane (ed.), *Civil Society and the State* (Verso, London, 1988) pp. 245–261.

4. For more insight into this perspective see Mitchell Dean, '"A Social Structure of Many Souls": Moral Regulation, Government And Self-Formation', *Canadian Journal of Sociology* (forthcoming).

5. See Pateman.

6. Thomas Wartenberg, 'The Concept of Power in Feminist Theory', *Praxis International*, 8 (1988) pp. 301–317.

7. For further references on the contemporary politics of difference, see Iris Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1990); Sneja Gunew and Anna Yeatman (eds.), *Feminism and the Politics of Difference* (Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, 1993).

8. See Anna Yeatman, 'Beyond Natural Right: The Conditions For Universal Citizenship', in Anna Yeatman, *Postmodern Revisionings of the Political* (Routledge, New York/London, 1993) Ch. 5.

9. See for an account of the late-Victorian National Vigilance Association's activities in London, Lucy Bland, 'Feminist Vigilantes of late-Victorian England', in Carol Smart (ed.), *Regulating Womanhood: Historical Essays on Marriage, Motherhood and Sexuality* (Routledge, New York and London, 1992).

10. For elaboration of some of this argument, see Anna Yeatman, 'State-Centric Child Protection Discourse: Democratizing of the Child-Parent Relation?', *Australian Journal of Political Science* (forthcoming).

11. William Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse* (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2nd ed., 1983).

12. For the distinction between power and domination, see Paul Patton, 'Politics and the Concept of Power in Hobbes and Nietzsche', in Paul Patton (ed.), *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory* (Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards / Routledge, New York and London, 1993) pp. 144–162.

13. For elaboration of this argument see Anna Yeatman, 'Voice and Representation in the Politics of Difference', in Gunew and Yeatman (eds.), pp. 228–246.

14. Friedrich Nietzsche, 'The Genealogy of Morals', in *The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals* (Doubleday Anchor, *New* York, 1956) p. 170.

15. See also Marion Tapper, '*Ressentiment* and Power: Some Reflections on Feminist Practices', in Patton (ed.), pp. 130–144.

16. Ron Feldman (ed.), *Hannah Arendt: The Jew as Pariah* (Grove Press, New York, 1978) pp. 24–25.

17. Nietzsche.

18. ibid., p. 170.

19. ibid., p. 170.

20. ibid., p. 171.

21. On this point see Bonnie Honig, 'Towards an Agonistic Feminism: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Identity', in Judith Butler and Joan Scott (eds.), *Feminists Theorize the Political* (Routledge, New York/London, 1993) pp. 215–239.

22. See Anna Yeatman, 'Beyond Natural Right'.

23. For the working of what Pateman calls 'the sexual contract' in work organisations, see Cynthia Cockburn, *In the Way of Women: Men's Resistance to Sex Equality in Organisations* (Macmillan, London, 1991).

24. For example, Judith Butler and Joan Scott (eds.), *Feminists Theorize the Political* (Routledge, New York/London, 1992).

25. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (Routledge, New York, 1990); and for example, Butler and Scott (eds.).

26. For this meaning of policy see Jacques Ranciere, 'Politics, Identification and Subjectivization', *October*, 61 (1992) pp. 58–65.

27. See Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, 'A Genealogy of *Dependency*: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State', *Signs* 19:2 (forthcoming 1994), for a genealogy of the processes by which legitimate dependency has been withdrawn for all groups with the exception of children.

Blighted Camellias: Si(gh)ting Women In New Zealand Art: Review Essay

Judith Collard

Mediatrix: New Works by Seven Women Artists
Priscilla Pitts, Director
Artspace, Auckland, 1993.

White Camellias: A Century of Women's Artmaking in Canterbury
Curated by Penelope Jackson and Lara Strongman
Robert McDougall Art Gallery, Christchurch, 1993.

Women on Women: Art in Dunedin since 1893
Curated by Linda Tyler
Dunedin Public Art Gallery, 1993.

Alter/Image: Feminism And Representation In New Zealand Art 1973–1993
Curated and edited by Christina Barton and Deborah Lawler-Dormer
City Gallery, Wellington and Auckland City Art Gallery, 1993.

1993 was an interesting year for anyone interested in the visual arts. Whatever our reservations about our moment in the sun — and I for one didn't find the heat that intense — it did mean that a lot of attention was directed at the achievements of women in a variety of areas. For art galleries, both public and commercial, a 'women's show' was probably the most obvious and logical way to celebrate the suffrage centenary, particularly when this meant drawing upon established collections. The result was a plethora of 'women's' exhibitions around the country and a variety of publications associated with the theme of women and art.

That the 'Suffrage art exhibition' was considered inevitable is a tribute as much to the impact of feminist reappraisals of New

Zealand art history as to the undeniable strength of women's art practice here.[1] The year provided us with the opportunity to both celebrate past achievements and to continue the feminist challenge. Given the expansion and diversity of feminist discourses on the arts and the impact these have had on art production and interpretation, I approached the task of critiquing some of the Suffrage catalogues with high expectations — particularly as I was unable to see every exhibition. As I was ambivalent about the Suffrage Centenary events as a whole, I was interested in how the writers would represent the significance of women's suffrage in the various catalogues, given the celebration's political nature. The exhibitions and the catalogues themselves were wide-ranging in both content and approach, reflecting the variety of curatorial stances taken. They ranged between the conservative historical survey, with an emphasis on biography, to the more hip post-modernist artspeak. All but one of the catalogues discussed here had some form of historical slant, the exception being *Mediatrix* at Artspace in Auckland.

The function of the catalogue is a peculiar one. In part it acts as an historical document recording in written form what is essentially a visually-based event. It is customary therefore to include details about the works presented in the exhibition, including the artist's name, the title, the medium used and often the work's physical size. In addition, it is not uncommon to incorporate information about the artists represented: training; previous exhibitions; prizes won; and where the artist's work has been collected. All this information establishes a genealogy for the artist and her work, and offers the viewer a way of approaching a particular piece. Over the last twenty years or so, the catalogue's role has become more complex than this, as the place of the exhibition as a way of engaging in contemporary debates or as a means of presenting previously undervalued work is increasingly acknowledged. This is certainly the case with the work of women artists. Major exhibitions have not only educated us about who existed, but their catalogues have also been used as vehicles to publish research on such artists as Evelyn Page or, more recently, Lois White.[2] Such texts have gained a significance beyond the immediacy of the exhibition itself and have continued to fulfil an important role in the ongoing scholarly debate. Sometimes too,

the catalogue is used as a vehicle to engage more directly in contemporary debates.

All the catalogues I discuss here perform at least one of these roles. They act as a record, as a resource, as part of a continuing discussion on the construction of the artist in New Zealand. All are presented as a way of entering into the world of the exhibition and engaging with it. The attention given to each and the substantial nature of their publication does suggest that the curators did consider the texts to have a significance after the exhibitions themselves had finished. It is not always clear, however, who the texts were directed to, as they seemed to focus on a lot of different readers, from the scholar, to the non-specialist, interested reader.

In contrast to the other catalogues discussed here, *Mediatrix: New Works by Seven Women Artists* rejected historical perspectives and celebrated the centenary with new works produced specifically for the show. The artists who participated were Mary-Louise Browne, Denise Kum, Julia Morison, Marie Shannon, Deborah Smith, Aromea Tahiwi and Barbara Tuck. Its director, Priscilla Pitts, wrote in her preface that the gallery exists to support and promote new developments in the arts and that they wanted to present a collection of works by innovative and challenging artists.[3] The types of work shown consisted of mixed media installations, painting, weaving and video.

The catalogue consists of an introductory essay by Bridget Orr and a collection of short pieces by other writers on each of the artists. The result, while reflecting the influence of postmodernist feminist challenges to the arts, has no sense of an over-arching curatorial policy or connectedness. Whether this disruptiveness is intentional is not made clear in the text. Orr's essay 'From Intercession to Intervention: Women in the Middle' plays with the exhibition's title 'Mediatrix' to review different interpretations of the relationship between women as artists and the practice of representation. Orr recites the ideas of Catherine Clement (the madwoman and the witch as prototypes of female resistance to the oppressive norms of phallocentric culture), Kristeva's exploration of the 'psycho-sexual dynamics governing aesthetic production', and acknowledges the importance of ethnicity in discussions of identity, by bringing in postcolonial critics such as

Trinh T. Minh-ha and Irihapeti Ramsden. She links these theorists
with the work of individual New Zealand and international artists
who most closely reflect their ideas, such as Merylyn Tweedie and
Cindy Sherman, and concludes by looking at how the artists in
the exhibition negotiate the position of artist as mediatrix.
Ironically, having briefly summed up her version of trends
expressed in the art she discusses, she concludes that 'The mediatrix
defies definition'.[4] Orr's essay is undeniably clever, neatly negoti-
ating between the complex ideas found in these writers. It might
have been a useful introduction to them had it not been for the
difficult language that she uses that does presuppose an already
informed readership. There is little sense of an engagement with
these ideas, let alone an indication of their implications for
discussions of New Zealand women artists nor, regrettably, how
they might challenge the concept of a 'suffrage' exhibition.

How this exhibition did respond to the context and occa-
sion of the Women's Suffrage Centenary, as claimed by Pitts,[5] is
also unclear. The brief essays on each artist by a mixture of crit-
ics, curators, academics and writers (including Anne Kennedy,
Maureen Lander, Lara Strongman, Bridget Sutherland, Sarah
Treadwell, Gloria Zelenka and Elizabeth Knox) do not elucidate
this point. The responses move between interpretative art criti-
cism, locating the work within the context of the artist's *oeuvre*,
and more lyrical responses. Thus, while artists such as Denise
Kum, Marie Shannon and Julie Morison have the themes of their
work articulated in 'straight', yet elliptical art criticism, Anne
Kennedy's response to Deborah Smith's work is a fantastical
piece of prose writing. Aromea Tahiwi's work 'Te Maro Wahine'
is located within Maori fibre traditions by Maureen Lander. The
piece, with its accompanying explanation by the artist, is made
accessible in a way that highlights the elusiveness of much
contemporary art practice and writing. This rejection of contem-
porary criticism sits oddly with the rest of the work found in the
catalogue, making the collection an intriguingly mismatched
combination which either exhilarates or irritates, depending on
the reader's state of mind.

Two South Island exhibitions, *White Camellias: a Century of
Women's Artmaking in Canterbury*, and *Women on Women: Art in
Dunedin since 1893* took a more historical and regional approach

to the idea of a 'suffrage' exhibition. Both groups began their shows with women who practised in the late nineteenth century, with an emphasis upon those working in the 1890s. The Dunedin exhibition included Frances Wimperis (1840–1925) and her sister Jenny (1844 – 1927), while the Christchurch show began with Margaret Stoddart (1865 – 1934) and Edith Strutton (1867 – 1939). Both exhibitions were structured around the chronological representation of 100 years of women as art practitioners, but the arrangements and results were very different.

The exhibition in the Robert McDougall Art Gallery contained works by 48 women. The arrangement seemed bizarre to me — the order was based on the artists' dates of birth. In places this created some interesting juxtapositions, such as the proximity of such very different artists as Ivy Fife, Olivia Spencer Bower[6] and Louise Henderson. The overall effect of this is to give the impression of an homogenised procession. The problems of such eclecticism are multiplied by the failure to either contextualise the work or to point up any individual artist's significance. This means that the viewer gains no real perspective of the position of women in the arts in Canterbury and gives the impression that their status throughout the last one hundred years was unchanging. It also downplays the important and different roles such women as Rita Angus, Doris Lusk or, in particular, Ngaio Marsh played. (Judging by the paucity of the work exhibited by the latter artist, her inclusion probably reflects her involvement in 'the Group' and writing than her abilities as a painter.) Similarly, little of the excitement and dynamism arising from the impact of the Women's Movement is reflected in the art shown, nor in the accompanying catalogue.[7] This undoubtedly reflects the conservatism of the Robert McDougall collection. The examples given of the work of Jane Zusters or Allie Eagle clearly indicate the lack of support given to women artists by many of our galleries.

While the idea of including amateur as well as professional artists is an interesting one, the reasons for choosing the works included is not discussed here. That any artist who was even vaguely connected with the Canterbury region is included in this selection gives the exhibition an almost comic comprehensiveness. When looking over the selection, it is interesting to speculate about the prerequisites for inclusion as a 'Canterbury' artist. For

example, Dora Meeson (1869 – 1955) was born in Australia and died in Britain. She spent six years in New Zealand (1889 – 1895) before moving to Britain. Clearly to be admitted here you must at least visit Christchurch. The art chosen is by pakeha women; the exclusion of Maori women's art is briefly discussed in the introduction and in Pamela Gerrish Nunn's essay.[8] Again, this is justified by the history of the collection, which was developed at a time when Maori artworks were still seen as more suited to museums because they were considered to be of ethnological rather than artistic interest. However, since this idea no longer has currency, the ongoing exclusion of work by Maori women makes this exhibition seem unbalanced. To be fair, Maori women's art was not a dominant theme in any other 'Suffrage' show, despite the year's designation as the International Year of Indigenous Peoples.

The McDougall Gallery's catalogue consists of three essays: Pamela Gerrish Nunn on 'Of Ladies, Women and Artists' which discusses the evolving role of women artists in New Zealand; Jillian Cassidy's 'Canterbury Women Printmakers'; and Julie King's 'Finding a Place: Women Artists and the Canterbury Landscape'; with a 'Selective Catalogue' compiled by the curators. The essays do provide a useful introduction to the art of the region, although the sweeping range across time means that little space is given to such moments as the appearance of the Group or the emergence of feminist-inspired art. The essays are further hampered by the lack of accompanying visual material. Some of this can be found in the Selective Catalogue notes, which are, unfortunately, difficult to use as the illustrations are unnumbered (and thus cannot be referenced within the essays) and are arranged, like the exhibition, according to the artist's birthdate.

In terms of the production of the catalogue and the arrangement of the exhibition, the Christchurch show was very disappointing. It was enlightening to see so much art on display and to realise how substantial was the role of women artmakers in Canterbury, but the display and contents of the exhibition clearly needed more thought.

In *Women on Women*, Linda Tyler focused on four moments in Dunedin's history: the 1890s, the 1940s, the 1970s, with the 1990s being represented by artists' projects produced for the

exhibition by Donna Demente-Ogilvy, Di ffrench, Jacqueline Fraser, Nicola Jackson and Joe L'Estrange. This allowed Tyler to select works representing most of the known figures associated with Otago and Dunedin in particular, while also giving greater coherence to the exhibition.

In her organisation of the exhibition itself and in the accompanying essay, Tyler discusses the production of art in the region, placing emphasis on the emergence of the Otago art schools and societies. In the first section, 'Parlour and Paintbox: Early Dunedin Women Artists', her extensive use of Frances Hodgkin's letters[9] gives the chapter a vivacity missing in later sections. In 'Home and Away: Mid-Century Modernists and Visiting Artists', Tyler paints a more positive picture than I suspect was really the case, although what she presents reflects the lack of scholarship on this period. Again she focuses on the importance of the art school, drawing on interviews with Doris Lusk.[10] She also draws attention to other influential aspects of the Dunedin cultural scene, such as the more conservative Otago Art Society and the impact of the Dunedin organisation Modern Books, part of the Cooperative Book Movement, which helped spread information about international art movements. '"Fellows" and Feminists: The Women's Art Movement and Frances Hodgkins Artists-In-Residence' is probably the weakest section. This is partly due to Dunedin's marginal position in terms of art production at this time, although the Dunedin Women's Collective were very active on the political front. It also reflects the lack of support locally for women artists; the Art Gallery has only recently purchased work by Marilyn Webb, forcing Tyler to borrow from the Hocken Collection. This section is enlivened, however, by examples of work by the Frances Hodgkins Fellows. The final section, 'Artists Projects' was probably the most vibrant part of the exhibition, although this is not well reflected in the text which simply consists of brief biographies and critical analyses of these artists' work.

Tyler's catalogue draws heavily on previously published work and she has clearly benefitted from seeing other 'suffrage' shows. As an accessible introduction to issues around New Zealand women's art it is very successful; however, I do think that she does simplify and downplay these issues. The occasional appearance of more sophisticated feminist theory sits oddly with the more 'historical'

approach she generally takes in the catalogue. It is hard to see whether these theoretical moments have any real impact on either the contents of the catalogue or the exhibition itself.

Despite the political nature of the centenary we were celebrating in 1993, the impact of feminism on the arts, received little attention in most of the celebratory exhibitions discussed. One exhibition, however, made this its focus — *Alter/image: Feminism and Representation in New Zealand Art 1973 – 1993*, a joint exhibition for the City Gallery, Wellington and the Auckland City Art Gallery. The exhibition covers twenty years of work by women artists who knowingly operated in that 'remarkable contemporary site' where theory and practice meet.[11] The curators claim a deliberately a-historical approach to bring out the shared concerns of women artists who have learned from and worked with feminist theory.[12] Barton and Lawler-Dormer's essay, with its overview of the impact of feminism in the visual arts, and its discussion of strategies taken by New Zealand artists, is probably one of the more useful introductions to recent New Zealand feminist art available thus far. It surveys different approaches taken by artists in the exhibition and discusses intelligently the impact of feminist theorists on local art practices. It briefly identifies and outlines such important themes as: the recovery of alternative histories and particular experiences; the recognition of the ideological basis of representation; the politics of space and the gender-specific nature of looking; the colonisation of the body and the interactivity of gender, sexuality and identity.[13] These form the basis for their selection of artists and work in the exhibition.

The essays in the catalogue cover the areas of performance art, film, experimental video, the impact of politics on art making and individual artists' approaches to these areas. Lita Barrie, appropriately, is as confrontational as she was in her two germinal articles published in *Antic* in 1986 and 1987, where she called on New Zealand feminist art to promote French feminist theoretical approaches.[14] In 'The female impersonator in suburbia' she writes provocatively:

> I have to admit that I am more interested in the feminine than feminism. The mythology of the feminine fascinates me more than the sociology of feminism.[15]

Barrie's assessment of New Zealand feminist art and society as drab and Victorian continues the controversial mode of her earlier writings, but I wonder whether the art found in the Wellington-Auckland exhibition contradicts this view. Cushla Parekowhai's article 'Puea o te Ao: Rise to the Surface of the world: Merata Mita and *Mana waka*' has definitely aroused my interest in seeking out this film about Princess Te Puea Herangi and the building of three great waka taua commissioned to commemorate the centenary of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1940.

One aspect of the catalogue that will be of continuing value is the listings of works by 38 film and video makers with artists' statements and the comprehensive resource section at the end of the catalogue which contains biographies, exhibition histories and selected bibliographies. Those of us who teach or study feminist art history will have cause to be grateful for this project. Probably my only negative criticism of this catalogue is in the presentation of the images themselves. It is annoying that the work was not always reproduced in its entirety. The use of two page spreads also meant that what was shown was often lost in the binding.

If you were able to travel to all the exhibitions that appeared during Suffrage year, I am sure that you would have gained an interesting insight into the significant role that women have always played in the visual arts in this country. That the results are occasionally frustrating or disappointing for me probably reflects my high expectations. The absence, or minor role, of Maori art in most of the exhibitions and catalogues is a source of some concern, as it seems to reflect a reluctance to critique western views of art and art production. Probably one of the peculiarities of these exhibitions was the curious lack of the excitement and energy that I have always associated with feminist art. The art exhibition was clearly seen as a 'nice' and 'safe' way to spend one's Suffrage grant. It is unfortunate that none of the exhibitions attempted to subvert this attitude.

* * *

Judith Collard is a lecturer in Art History and Theory at the University of Otago, Dunedin.

Notes

1. For example Anne Kirker, *New Zealand Women Artists: A Survey of 150 years* (2nd Edition, Craftsman House, Tortola, 1993); Elizabeth Eastmond and Merimeri Penfold, *Women and the Arts in New Zealand: Forty Works: 1936 – 1986* (Penguin, Auckland, 1986). Kirker also acknowledges the pioneering essay by Janet Paul, 'Women Artists in New Zealand', in Phillida Bunkle and Beryl Hughes (eds.), *Women in New Zealand Society* (Allen and Unwin, Wellington, 1980).
2. Ann Sutherland Harris and Linda Nochlin, *Women Artists 1550 – 1950* (Los Angeles County Museum of Art and Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1979); Janet Paul and Neil Roberts, *Evelyn Page: Seven Decades* (Robert McDougall Art Gallery, Christchurch, 1986); Nicola Green, *By the Waters of Babylon: The Art of A. Lois White* (Auckland City Art Gallery, Auckland, 1993).
3. Priscilla Pitts, 'Preface', in *Mediatrix*, p. 19.
4. Bridget Orr, in *Mediatrix*, p.24.
5. Pitts, p. 19.
6. Bower is recorded in the catalogue as having been born in 1905 and, precociously, commencing her part time study at the Canterbury College School of Art in 1900.
7. See for example, Kate Woodall, 'The Importance of Christchurch in the Women's Art Movement in New Zealand', *Art New Zealand*, 68 (1993) pp. 110–111.
8. Penelope Jackson and Lara Strongman, 'Introduction', p. 4 and Pamela Gerrish Nunn, 'Of Ladies, Women and Artists,' p. 10, in *White Camellias*.
9. See Linda Gill (ed.), *Letters of Frances Hodgkins* (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1993).
10. See Lisa Beaven, *Doris Lusk: Attitudes to the Land* (Unpublished MA Thesis, Art History, University of Canterbury, 1988).
11. Julie Ewington, 'Past the Post: Postmodernism and Postfeminism', *Antic*, 1 (1986) pp. 5–21.
12. Christina Barton and Deborah Lawler-Dormer, 'Unruly Practices': An Introduction to 'A Different View: 20 New Zealand Women Artists 1973–1993', in *Alter/image*, p. 7.
13. ibid., p. 8.
14. See Lita Barrie, 'Remissions — Toward a Deconstruction of Phallic Univocality', *Antic*, 1 (1986) pp. 87 – 103 and 'Further Toward a Deconstruction of Phallic Univocality — Deferrals', *Antic*, 2 (1987) pp. 18–47.
15. Lita Barrie, 'The Female Impersonator In Suburbia', in *Alter/image*, p. 26.

Acting The Model:
Christine Webster's Black Carnival

Robyn Notman

From late 1991 until late 1992, I was one of the models for *Black Carnival* and the work became part of my life. *Black Carnival* is special to me for many reasons, but particularly because it stands as a creative background to a period otherwise characterised by personal pain and disappointment. As well as backgrounding

and introducing *Black Carnival*, my intention here is to reflect on my role as a model in the production of the work and provide some insight into the construction of that role.

I first met Christine Webster in 1991, when she had been living and working in Paris but had come to Dunedin to be the Frances Hodgkins Fellow. Her work in Paris centred around a group of life-size cibachrome photographs entitled *The Players.* Throughout the series, Webster had used Sarah Cease, her flat-mate in Paris, as the model. Webster often has problems finding models. She likes to use people with strong features who are sympathetic to her work and are willing to be portrayed in the way that she wants. The people she chooses often share many of her views. When Sarah agreed to model it was a breakthrough because in her Webster had discovered a new source for her imagery. Sarah is a woman in her fifties with a striking, deeply lined face. She can portray vitality as well as worldly wisdom.

Webster stages her works by setting her models in relation-ship with a selection of props. In *The Players* Sarah was fitted out to represent roles people might play in life — roles which could imply circumstances and behaviour. The roles illustrated, such as *Provider, Soldier, Rescuer, Seducer, Judge* and *Child*, could be adopted by either a male or a female. However in some works the concern is to explore the roles that the sexes play only half willingly because nature and/or society prompt them to do so.

The figures are set against a black background and starkly lit. The blackness invites us to contemplate the emotional or psychological state of the subjects. This tension or unease is enhanced by the facial and bodily expressions of the model who acts to communicate the frame of mind associated with her role.

In *Provider* the model is shown from the waist up, wearing a cotton scarf on her head and holding a large white oval meat platter vertically, so that the plate covers the breasts and body. The message is clear: people, especially women, are often required to sacrifice their own needs in order to fulfil the demands of others. The image is noble and beautiful but it is not celebratory; the model looks world-weary and the suggestion is that provider may not be a wholly positive role for the individual to play. This kind of severity and simplicity is representative of Webster's work.

In *Soldier,* the model wears a French military uniform and holds a soft object, reminiscent of a baby in swaddling clothes. Her long claw-like nails dig into the object in a manner suggesting

PROVIDER

both protectiveness and cruelty. In the role of soldier, a person is required to safeguard some people and places but to destroy others. Likewise in *Fairy*, the model appears in a gauzy pink dress, but she wears a plastic mask with a hideous expression and her wand looks pointed and menacing like a stiletto. Looking at *The Players* introduces us to the themes and methods Webster was using when she arrrived in Dunedin in 1991 and to her continuing concern with sexuality, human relationships, life circumstances, death and life's opportunities.

In her year as Frances Hodgkins Fellow, Webster produced the series *Possession and Mirth*, using a male model, Peter. The

figures are once again life-size but this time are shown full length, showing the whole body as well as the face. The series comments on the tradition of the portrayal of the male figure in art, but makes other comments at the same time. In *Rags*, for instance, we are prompted to contemplate transcendence. The body is wrapped up and posed against a velvety red background. The arms, outstretched and photographed in movement, are shown on separate strips of cibachrome. The whole form seems to push up in a rush of energy as if the spirit's departure has been captured; the immaterial is made visible.

Other works from *Possession and Mirth* such as *Vein* and *Bread* emphasise violence and torture more than release and transcendence, but the two modes are nicely balanced in the whole series; such balancing is characteristic of Webster's approach.

Webster obviously has a talent for strong composition and drama but the medium of cibachrome photography affords opportunities for the potent use of colour and texture. The props that are chosen suit the medium. Objects such as cherries may signify paradise, while their colour, red, may signify passion, danger, injury and sacrifice. Red also shows up richly in cibachrome, and is a colour Webster uses a lot. Some fabrics fit the medium well, particularly tulle and gauze, satins, plastics and some metals; these offer rich and varied textural effects. These elements form a blend of visually rich and seductive ingredients which are often enough to entice the viewer. But the imagery is not just an exploration of colour and texture; there is always more to communicate and contemplate. Multiple layers of meaning and response are offered by the artist and invited from the viewer.

Black Carnival

Black Carnival was set up as a photographic frieze, a re-working of the frescos in classical villas and Italian palazzos. The frieze in the Villa of the Mysteries at Pompeii provided a touchstone. That work seems to depict the enactment of rites of passage for women with a particular focus on the initiation of the bride in accordance with the rules of the Dionysiac cult. One might say it deals with the theme of the initiation of a girl into womanhood.

Black Carnival has a broader scope; it seems to be concerned with the movement of men as well as women through several stages in life, associating and identifying sex with rites of passage. It is explicit in the way it explores the possibilities but retains sensitivity and sympathy.

As in the two previous series, the figures are set against black but this time the work was designed so that it fitted one of the large chambers at the Dunedin Public Art Gallery. The installation was huge and impressive — forty-nine sheets of glossy cibachrome, each panel measuring 269 cm high by 127 or 105 cm wide. It covered fifty metres of wall length. It was designed to both intimidate and overawe the viewer. The figures in the work tower over the viewer who must look up to see them. The reflective surface of the cibachrome prints also means that the viewer is reflected back on herself. It provides for some questions about who is looking at whom, and what it might be like to be an observed subject in a work of art. Also it means that the the viewer becomes a fleeting participant in the carnival. For a moment, her own form appears in the picture plane: she is reflected in the image of the transvestite; or the mother and child; or the bunny girl. Perhaps these reflections are the artist's way of inviting her audience to think about the possibilities or actualities of their own positions. In the *Black Carnival* space the models and the viewers are both the objects and the subjects of one another's gaze(s). Because *Black Carnival* is an installation the viewer actually enters into the work. Being in the *Black Carnival* room is like stepping into an underground catacomb or burial chamber. The work makes the viewer feel like an intruder, a discoverer, an enquirer. One is led to ask what story is being told and who are these people?

Of course, for me there was the added factor of being a participant as a model as well. This made me feel simultaneously powerful and vulnerable, emotionally uplifted and saddened. It is hard to describe how I felt about seeing myself life-size and larger, often without clothes or in a fancy fetishistic get-up. I felt that the images of me took on a life of their own, completely independent and separate from me. When I went into *Black Carnival* it was as though I had intruded on myself or as though I'd died and come back to have a look — very disconcerting.

This was further complicated for me since I work in the Dunedin Public Art Gallery; I work in the public spaces, answering enquiries and making sure nothing gets damaged. When people entered *Black Carnival* I found myself staying out of it, because I didn't want people to recognise me. I thought some of the dramatic fiction might be ruined or people might think the gallery was playing games, teasing the public about the nature of works of art and their subjects. I didn't want to hear what people were saying in case it was unflattering or critical. The one or two comments I did hear were along the lines of '. . . she doesn't shave under her arms . . .'. I suppose such comments are interesting for what they reveal about what people notice and what they expect. Overall, not many viewers made the connection between me-the-model and me-the-worker, but the few that did were astonished. I learned that the model shares the artist's vulnerability.

Webster began to canvass possible models for *Black Carnival* shortly, if not immediately, after having the idea for the work. The ten people chosen accumulated over a considerable period of time. Christine also used herself as a model in *Black Carnival,* so eleven models were involved in the work. Some were acquaintances and friends, others complete strangers. She found Adam in her French class at University; she noticed Gavin when she was down town one day; she met Taiaroa and Niwhai in Auckland; she met Sally at a car fair and Shirley was introduced to her by friends. Webster already knew Peter and me and had worked with Peter in *Possession and Mirth.*

Early on Webster had decided I would make a good primary model. Perhaps at this stage she was thinking of the classical, statuesque elements of the work. Adam agreed to model early on and Shirley was chosen later as the female match for me; there are a number of images in which Adam and I and Shirley and I appear together. Later Sally, Gavin and Peter were used; Sally is shown only on her own; Gavin and Adam appear with each other or on their own; Peter is on his own or with me; Taiaroa and Niwhai appear on their own. Between us we cover the whole gamut of the possibilities of human sexuality and this seems to me to have been behind the artist's choice. She has focused on elements of cross-sexuality, particularly in the men but also in the women. For instance, Niwhai, Adam, Gavin, Taiaroa and

Peter have something of both sexes about them. Sally is always portrayed displaying aspects of the feminine while Shirley and I are shown displaying elements of both sexes. Shirley is shown as masculine; I play roles that are both feminine and masculine. Between us we pretend and experiment with different guises. On the basis of the images presented it is hard to tell what our sexual preferences or fancies would be. Perhaps we don't know; most of us have probably only tried a few things and haven't risked much in doing that.

In *Black Carnival* both the audience and the models are being invited to reconsider aspects of their/our sexuality by playing dress-ups or dressing down. We are enacting scenarios that take our fancy: changing costume and/or appearance; setting up little contrivances and offering them to the viewer/voyeur. The voyeurism operates on the models as well. We get to see ourselves in a work of art. Pretending and viewing is fairly safe and easy but the work's function is to prompt and intrigue, to stir people out of sexual complacency and into a reconsideration of their sexuality and its possibilities. In doing this the work plays on notions of image and identity.

Body shape and face were obviously important in determining Webster's choice of models and what roles each played. My figure is well rounded; I have full breasts and an ample stomach but my body shape is statuesque. This combination meant that Webster was keen to use me in many of the images but not all. My face has a good bone structure and is serene. The serene aspect means that I'm good at cold, remote stares which look out at the audience without inviting them in. The face can become a sort of blank on which to draw. In *Black Carnival* Webster made use of this by drawing out an androgynous aspect, rather in the way Tilda Swinton was used to portray the masculine and feminine avatars of the queen in *Orlando*.

Webster experimented using photographic shoots and assessed how they appeared on film and how they might be made to appear. What was their image and could it be useful? As a model I performed to help Webster. I always hoped that she would get something she could use. I worried that I wouldn't be good enough and that I'd pale into insignificance. How do you make a placid face look dramatic? Compared to the models

Sarah and Peter (in the previous series) I looked as bland as a blanched almond.

Webster didn't discuss her plans except to tell me which shoot I would be doing. I knew for instance, that this time I would be wearing the corset and the fake boobs and that it was sort of a show girl outfit. The outfit suggested a role — a frame of mind and an attitude — that could be displayed by action. During shoots Webster's part in giving directions varied. Sometimes she had a firm idea of what she wanted, but on other occasions things were more spontaneous and the images evolved quite freely. Sometimes the costume suggested a pose. The hard pink plastic corset, for instance, made it seem natural to put my arms out. The feeling that went with the outfit was resignation. Such a garment inhibits freedom of movement and presses the body into an unnatural shape. None of the shots were difficult, emotionally or intellectually; at most they could be physically tiring. It took me some time to get used to being photographed in the nude, but the greatest surprise was my first encounter with the full-size works. I thought some of the images, such as the contemplative bride and the two pensive women in suits, were stunningly beautiful. Webster seemed to have captured an essence, an ephemeral aspect of the subject depicted.

The roles I played in *Black Carnival* were a bride, a suited woman, a mother, a childless woman, a seated woman, Eve, Venus, a show girl, a ballerina, a woman with a mask on her face, and a woman with a mask over her pubic area. (These are not titles but ways I have used to identify the works.) I think Webster was working on the basis of body shape and configuration, and face type. The roles seemed to evolve organically as the work took shape. In the first shoot we did the woman and child and the seated woman — the 'bitch-goddess'. Webster made a lot of use of my breasts. In those first two images she uses the female breast dialectically. In the mother-and-child a maternal role is emphasised, whereas in the 'bitch-goddess' the naked breast is clearly a device to illustrate potency of a more dangerous sort. On the one hand the breasts could be an invitation to celebrate maternal forces and nurturing powers while on the other they are a source of temptation. Being tempted, the male viewer is reminded of the potential to become either ensnared (by the

'bitch-goddess') or over-awed (by women's reproductive power). Either aspect may cause him to falter from a position of carefully contrived control. For the female viewer the images may be empowering in that they celebrate and link feminine reproductive qualities and sexuality with power and control.

Some of the poses or figure groupings in *Black Carnival* are recognisable from the pages of art history. But as with the previous series, they are used ambivalently. For instance, the Venus shows the model (me) in full length facing the front. I hold a bundle of cherries in my hands and look out at the audience. But my gaze is cool and I am self contained — not the object of anyone else's desire. Next to me, and echoing my pose, is a male model, Taiaroa. He is Maori; his body is beautifully muscled and his skin is oiled, but it is hard to tell whether he is male or female because his penis is tucked out of view.

In another scene, two women in suits (Shirley and I) are depicted greeting one another in a pose reminiscent of a traditional Christian Visitation scene. The Visitation celebrates the moment when the Virgin Mary and St Elizabeth greet one another having discovered that each is pregnant — Elizabeth with St John the Baptist and Mary with Jesus. Their complex

hand positioning expresses their communion. In Webster's image the hand positions are very similar but we women don't seem to be celebrating pregnancy and we have not invited the audience to join in the communion. Instead the viewers are made to feel as though they have intruded on a private moment, exposing the women and their relationship which is exclusive, yet revealed in *Black Carnival.*

As one proceeds past the images, it is apparent that a narrative is intended. The frieze is punctuated by figures who present scenarios, gesture, and exclaim. The show girl introduces new sections, the ballerina moves us along and indicates the mood of each section, a male model in the wedding dress smiles a diabolical smile while another similarly attired looks confused and/or ashamed. More importantly there is dialogue set up between many of the images, such as that between the mother and child and the childless woman (me in a red dress with a doll). I hold the doll carelessly by the leg. My expression is sinister and rather hateful but this does not mean that I am unhappy. As the mother I hold Anna's hand; I look protective and apprehensive. The pair of us seem very naked and exposed against the dark. Anna even looks a little like a wickedly cute cherub. Images such as the contemplative bride contrast with the whore-like seated woman or 'bitch-goddess', an image which, incidentally, might be read as a sort of inverted version of the virgin enthroned. The image of Shirley and me in suits mentioned above is counterbalanced by a view of us in a composed and pensive mood. Images of a seemingly playful bunny girl (Sally) are contrasted with sexually aggressive ones. In those Sally is naked except for a hare mask which she wears on her head. Sally has upright pointed breasts. Their shape was modified by her breastfeeding a baby at the time of the shoot. Her pubic mound is also very pronounced and there is evidence of a birth scar on her abdomen. Her image is redolent of earthy paganism and animistic pre-Christianity.

The show is about dressing up and pretending and as such is a comment on how we go about presenting ourselves to others and what the possibilities are when it comes to choosing how we do this. Like all true carnivals *Black Carnival* offers the chance to celebrate, to commemorate and to be transformed — to let oneself go, lose control for a moment and take part in an occasion in

which the rules are slackened and open to inspection. Being a player in *Black Carnival* was fun. Each photo session involved the ritual of preparation and pretence. I am asked whether I was changed or affected by *Black Carnival* and my answer is: yes — I now feel as though I exist in a multiplicity of forms instead of just one. I am displayed in stances, poses, outfits which I may not often, if ever, adopt in other contexts. People have said how interesting it will be for me to go and look at *Black Carnival* in twenty, thirty, forty years time if I'm still around. What will I make of it then? How might it make me feel about myself and what will future art historians and audiences make of it and the times in which it was produced? It's worth keeping in mind that throughout the frieze there are lighter moments. As models we are smiling — amused at our predicament. We invite the audience to join us in the *Black Carnival*.

* * *

The models in *Black Carnival* are Peter Entwisle, Anna Geddes, Juanita Ketchel, Sally Lonie, Robyn Notman, Shirley Pearce, Taiaroa Royal, Gavin Shaw, Adam Stevens, Niwhai Tuapea and Christine Webster.

* * *

Works Reproduced:

p. 111: Video still of model and artist shooting *Black Carnival* from video by John Irwin.

p. 113: *Provider*, 1990, cibachrome, 183 x 81 cm, Collection of the Artist, Courtesy of the Hocken Library.

p. 114: *Rags*, 1991, cibachrome, 213.7 x 178.8 cm, Collection of the Hocken Library, Courtesy of the Artist.

pp. 117, 121, 122, 123: Sections from *Black Carnival*, 1992 – 3, cibachrome, Collection of Dunedin Public Art Gallery, Courtesy of the Artist.

Copyright of all works of art reproduced remains with the artist. .

To: Women's Studies Journal Community

From: sarah.williams@stonebow.otago.ac.nz
(Sarah Williams)
alice@csuvax1.murdoch.edu.au (Lynne Alice)
jeff@stonebow.otago.ac.nz (Jeff Home)

Subject: Re: electronic communication
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments: @ punnet (caroline.mccaw@stonebow.
otago.ac.nz)

>Sex Times Technology Equals?
Feminist Practices on the Internet

>"I relax my body. My mind starts to
caress the frequencies round me. There.
That's better. I'm one with the super-
spectrum now. I'm interfaced with the
world." — Linda Williams, character in
the comic book, *Interface*

>Welcome to the world of New Zealand based
electronic discussions! Two new discussion
lists, WSST (Women's Studies) and FMST
(Feminist Studies) are now operating by email
and are available to feminists, Women's Studies
teachers and interested others who have access
to a listserver via modem or mainframe connec-
tion. While the discussion lists are based at
Otago University, the latter, FMST, is moderated
by Lynne Alice at Massey University.

>Although you may not establish the same relationship to interfacing with a computer as Linda Williams, the pleasures and politics of "women" in relationship to the system of electronic communication known as the net is a much debated topic of contemporary feminist thought, as well as a much celebrated technology of contemporary feminist practices. Indeed, in her exploration of the technological and gendered issues embodied in communication between humans and machines, Claudia Springer begins with the words of J.G. Ballard: "Sex times technology equals the future". Springer goes on to argue: "What is really being debated in the discourses surrounding a cyborg future are contemporary disputes concerning gender and sexuality, with the future providing a clean slate, or a blank screen, onto which we can project our fascination and fears." [footnote ref: Claudia Springer, "The Pleasure of the Interface", *Screen* 32(3): 303-323]

>Not only have we adapted Ballard's prophecy in our title, but one of us put these words on the cover of a Women's Studies reader. That course on women and the (re)production of sexuality required students to create annotated bibliographies based on their explorations of information relevant to their research topics on the net (listservs, bulletin boards, gophers, electronic journals, etc.). Given the issues of cost and availability regarding women's studies materials in New Zealand, how to facilitate (and theorize) academic, community, and professional access to the net is one purpose of establishing Aotearoa/New Zealand-based electronic communication forums. (See attachment for more information on the pedagogical implications of exploring the politics of net information.)

>WSST-L is intended primarily to serve the academic and professional interests of people involved with Women's Studies as teachers, researchers, librarians, and/or program administrators. Both women and men are welcome. The list gives people an opportunity to ask questions and exchange information about teaching strategies, useful texts and films, innovative courses, current research, funding sources, building Women's Studies majors, minors, and graduate programs, relations between Women's Studies and other "minority, marginal studies" programs, problems that Women's Studies programs encounter, etc. WSST-L also welcomes announcements about relevant conferences, calls for papers, job opportunities, publications, and the like. WSST-L serves as well as a file repository for syllabi, bibliographies, feminist film reviews, and other files related to Women's Studies.

>WSST-L is NOT an all-purpose Women's Studies list: it focuses only on Women's Studies teaching, research, and program administration. It is NOT an appropriate place for most discussions of general, gender-related societal problems. (There are lots of other lists for such discussions!) Moreover, since WSST-L is intended primarily as a professional tool related to pedagogy, messages from novices and others seeking explanations or rationales for feminism or for Women's Studies do not belong on the list. The prototype for this Women's Studies list is WMST-L, a Women's Studies teaching and research list moderated by Joan Korenman and based in the United States. (A file of names and email addresses for women and gender-related listservs is available on the WSST-L.) WSST-L is an open, non-moderated list, but if human contact is required please contact

Sarah Williams at Women's Studies, Otago
University, Dunedin (sarah.williams@stonebow.
otago.ac.nz) or Jeff Home (jeff@stonebow.otago.
ac.nz).

>New Zealand's FMST-L, on the other hand, has
been designed for discussions about questions
like: "What is feminist theory?"; "What are the
connections of feminist theory to praxis?"; "Is
feminist politics different than any other
emancipatory project?"; "Is academic feminism
accountable to community based feminist
activism, and if so in what ways?". Its focus
is on contemporary feminist debates and issues
specific to Aotearoa/New Zealand, Australia and
the Pacific.

>Discussion of current feminist debates in
the US, Britain, Australia (or in fact almost
anywhere) are welcome and will be aired for
discussion and review. The list will also offer
regular reviews of feminist theoretical texts
available from publishers around the world. A
space is offered for researchers to ask for
feedback on themes and problematics in their
work and to debate their findings and conclu-
sions. FMST offers specialised, topical, 'cutting
edge' and forum-style discussions. Unlike WSST-L
this discussion list is moderated, which means
contributions are edited for length and appro-
priateness by its organiser, Lynne Alice,
Women's Studies, Massey University. Subscribers
should be prepared to participate but all
interested feminists, and feminist supporters
are welcome. An effort will be made to keep
mail to a maximum volume of around 10 postings
a week and all individual postings should not
exceed 100 lines in length.

>How to access the University of Otago List server:

>The University of Otago list server (UOTAGO) currently serves two lists to the wider internet community. More lists can be added to this list server over a period of time as needs and inspiration arise.

>To find out what lists are available at the UOTAGO list server, a potential user should send an email message to the following address:

>UOTAGO@STONEBOW.OTAGO.AC.NZ

>The body of message should contain the LISTS command. For example a user might send the following message:

>**From:**   Jane@Somewhere.org
>**To:**   UOTAGO@STONEBOW.OTAGO.AC.NZ

>lists

>The subject line (if any) is ignored by the UOTAGO list server, so there's no harm in leaving it out.

>Jane would receive a message like the one below as a response:

>**From:**   UOTAGO@STONEBOW.OTAGO.AC.NZ
>**To:**   Jane@Somewhere.org
>**Subject:** UOTAGO results

>>>>>lists
>UOTAGO@STONEBOW.OTAGO.AC.NZ serves the following lists:

>FMST
>WSST

>Upon receiving this, Jane may wish to find out more information about one (or more) of these lists. She should send the following request, which uses a 'info <list> command:

>**From:**   Jane@Somewhere.org
>**To:**   UOTAGO@STONEBOW.OTAGO.AC.NZ

>info FMST
>info WSST

>In return, the UOTAGO list server would respond with a full description of the list(s) that have been requested.

At the present time, two lists, WSST and FMST are available for the enhancement of your feminist politics and pleasures.

Remember the matrix (<L *mater* meaning both mother and womb) of the net is a consensual hallucination. Use your computer wisely.

*   *   *   *   *   *

X-Attachments:

Date: Fri, 8 Apr 1994 12:58:48 +1200
X-Sender: ou004553@brandywine.otago.ac.nz
          Mime-Version: 1.0
To: sarah.williams@stonebow.otago.ac.nz
From: caroline.mccaw (caroline mccaw)
Subject: @punnet

Sarah asked Caroline, a Women's Studies student at Otago, to con-
tribute to this "article" which itself began as an e-mail conversation
between Lynne and Sarah. Caroline was one of a small group of
people from Dunedin working in Wellington over the summer on
@punnet, a magazine for the duration of the arts festivals...

Dear Sarah,

<we> have our own uses for technology

@punnet was a trial. We are all witches.
Initially planned as a publication for the
duration of the 1994 Wellington Parkroyal
Fringe Festival, @punnet were performers in the
Fringe, <an information invasion> and produced
a set of four magazines (one a week for a
month) in Feb/March 1994. The magazines were
the same format as a broadsheet newspaper and
were distributed free around inner city
Wellington as well as published electronically.
The content and process (production) of the
magazine covered various elements of the
arts festivals as well as information about
information, in particular the *electronic
information revolution*. About 50% of the content
was gathered from the Net, most of the other
50% was gathered from the local community.
@punnet was financed through advertising sales -
mostly via local small business and the
International Festival of the Arts. Free Net

access was provided by the City Council and
remains free to those living in Wellington.

@punnet was a few people doing what they enjoy
for a variety of different reasons, our indi-
vidual politics vary a bit but the project
itself <I feel> pretty much represents the
collective process of our *work*. For me a
whole bunch of questions confront me when I
consider @punnet: the design process, the way
that a text (information-whatever) is consumed,
the access and authority with which information
is presented as well as all the integral
personal politics that went along with the
project itself/living in Wellington...I don't
think I can ever remove my own sets of values
from the process of *making* ... while dedicated
to confronting those broad conceptions among
people of computer USES and USERS, and seeking
to feed the "seething fungal development of
the Net", I guess what I want to assert is
that I only want to actively spend my energy
/time in a way that contributes to *other*
ways of seeing/doing/being.

*   *   *   *   *   *

@**punnet** 1.2

ACCEPTABLE USE POLICY

These documents are not commodities. They're not for sale.
They are not part of the "information economy."
You didn't have to pay any money to get them.
If you did pay anything to see this stuff, you've been ripped off.
Information *wants* to be free.
And I know where you can get a lot more.

You can copy them. Copy the hell out of them, be my guest.
You can upload them onto boards or discussion groups.
Go right ahead, enjoy yourself.

You can print them out.
You can photocopy the printouts and hand them
around as long as you don't take any money for it.

But they're not public domain. You can't copyright them.
This stuff don't "belong" to you.
A lot of it doesn't "belong" to me, either.
It belongs to the emergent realm of alternative information
economics, for whatever *that's* worth.
You don't have any right to make this stuff part of
the conventional flow of commerce.
Let them be part of the flow of knowledge: there's a difference. Don't sell them.
Just make more, and give them to
whoever might want or need them.

Now have fun.

free

Bruce Sterling ñ bruces@well.sf.ca.us

<Words- language is such an inefficient way of communicating.>

I've lost a lot of things along the way...in the last few months I've split up with my partner, I broke up with my father, I sold my computer... I don't have to tell you which was the only one i was desperate to replace. Communication is such an ....
                              incomplete
thing so far

hence I am nervous about contributing in any way to an academic journal that is so deeply rooted in the notions of value of information. While I desperately want to work with women in this system, I want to find women who want to be OUT THERE <alongside>, it's a big part of what the net is to me. decentralisation is not just cool, it's NECESSARY. . .

                *   *   *   *   *   *

Archive-name: usenet-writing-style/part1
author: ofut@hubcap.clemson.edu
(A. Jeff Offutt VI)

WORDS TO LIVE BY #1: USENET AS SOCIETY

Those who have never tried electronic com-
munication may not be aware of what a
"social skill" really is. One social skill
that must be learned, is that other people
have points of view that are not only dif-
ferent, but *threatening*, to your own. In
turn, your opinions may be threatening to
others. There is nothing wrong with this.
Your beliefs need not be hidden behind a
facade, as happens with face-to-face con-
versation. Not everybody in the world is a
bosom buddy, but you can still have a mean-
ingful conversation with them. The person
who cannot do this lacks in social skills.
- Nick Szabo

WORDS TO LIVE BY #2: USENET AS ANARCHY

Anarchy means having to put up with things
that really piss you off. - Unknown

*   *   *   *   *   *

so waddya think?

love from caroline

caroline.mccaw@stonebow.otago.ac.nz
p.o.box 5822 Moray Place, Dunedin

Sarah Williams, Lynne Alice, Jeff Home, Caroline McCaw

Computer networks *encourage the active participation of individuals rather than the passive non-participation induced by television narcosis.*

In mass media, the vast majority of participants are passive recipients of information.

In digital communications media, the vast majority of participants are active creators of information as well as recipients. This type of symmetry has previously only been found in media like the telephone. But while the telephone is almost entirely a medium for private one-to-one communication, computer network applications such as electronic mailing lists, conferences, and bulletin boards, serve as a medium of group or "many-to-many" communication.

Computer networks do not require tightly centralized administrative control. In fact, decentralization is necessary to enable rapid growth of the network itself.

Tight controls strangle growth This decentralization promotes inclusiveness, for it lowers barriers to entry for new parties wishing to join the network.

Communications A program that tells a modem how to work software

Given these characteristics, networks hold tremendous potential to enrich our collective cultural, political, and social lives and enhance democratic values everywhere.

And the Internet, and the UUCP and related networks connected to it, represents an outstanding example of a computer network with these qualities. It is an open network of networks, not a single unitary network, but an ensemble of interconnected systems which operate on the basis of multiple implementations of accepted, non-proprietary protocols, standards and interfaces.

Bounce What your e-mail does when it cannot get to its recipient – it bounces back to you – unless it goes off into the ether, never to be found again

One of its important characteristics is that new networks, host systems, and users may readily join the network

the network is open to all.

What the Net is
should care
and why you

A

(

Excerpts from *Big Dummy's guide to*

the Internet **preface by Mitchell Kapor, co-founder Electronic Frontier**

Foundation.)**Bu**

enables **new for**ms of communication

New communities are being built today. You cannot see them, except on a computer screen. You cannot visit them, except through your keyboard. Their highways are wires and optical fibers; their language a series of ones and zeroes. Yet these communities of cyberspace are as real and vibrant as any you could find on a globe or in an atlas. Those are real people on the other sides of those monitors. And freed from physical limitations, these people are developing new types of cohesive and effective communities - ones which are defined more by common interest and purpose than by an accident of geography, ones on which what really counts is what you say and think and feel, not how you look or talk or how old you are.

t how exactly does community grow out of a computer network? It does so because the network

The most obvious example of these new digital communications media is electronic mail, but there are many others. We should begin to think of mailing lists, newsgroups, file and document archives, etc. as just the first generation of new forms of information and communications media. The digital media of computer networks, by virtue of their design and the enabling technology upon which they ride, are fundamentally different from the now dominant mass media of television, radio, newspapers and magazines. Digital communications media are inherently capable of being more interactive, more participatory, more egalitarian, more decentralized, and less hierarchical.

As such, the types of social relations and communities which can be built on these media share these characteristics.

Book Reviews

Heading Nowhere in a Navy Blue Suit and Other Tales from the Feminist Revolution
Sue Kedgley & Mary Varnham (eds.)
Daphne Brasell Associates, Wellington, 1993. $34.95

You can go a long way with a good title and this is definitely a good title. However, like the book, I am not quite sure what it is actually about. I am reminded of that recruitment poster: 'What did you do during the war, Daddy?' — except instead of a little boy on his father's knee there is a little girl asking her mother: 'What did you do in the feminist revolution, Mummy?'. *Heading Nowhere in a Navy Blue Suit* appears to have been designed as an answer to that question, although not as directly as *Changing Our Lives* which documents the feminist experiences of many 'second wavers'.[1] Authors in that collection wrote of a path from commitment to burnout and frustration as the younger generation failed to take up the cause. I think *Heading Nowhere in a Navy Blue Suit*, on the whole, has a better appreciation and analysis of the changed economic and social conditions inhabited by young women in the 1990s, perhaps because it is more of a social history of aspects of feminism, than a collection of autobiographies.

Dale Spender's introduction suggests that the purpose of the book is to capture the history of the women's liberation movement for posterity and to provide an account free from male distortion. To set, as she says, 'the record of the past two decades straight' (p. 5). This is given a slightly different twist by Kedgley and Varnham in their forward, as they ask where the feminist movement is headed and what it has achieved? This then is the loosely defined purpose of *Heading Nowhere in a Navy Blue Suit*, and the more autobiographically oriented contributions in particular could have benefited from adhering more closely to this aim.

The contributions by Szasy, Davies and Awatere Huata come into this category. In 'Opening My Mouth', Mira Szasy writes about her isolation as a Maori woman of her generation speaking out against inequalities amongst Maori. Sonja Davies describes her experiences in Parliament in 'The Corridors of Powerlessness' (the anecdote about Rob Muldoon poking his tongue out at Sonja is my favourite), and Donna Awatere Huata discusses her involvement in the feminist movement and Nga Tamatoa in 'Walking on Eggs'.

Szasy's experiences are interesting and well organised, but there is more description here than analysis. Davies' essay, makes clearer connections between her personal experiences, wider political issues and an analysis of the political system. Awatere Huata offers some interesting comments on whether women and Maori who enter the system are 'heading nowhere' or have a contribution to make towards change. 'Walking on Eggs', like Davies' contribution, more successfully blends the personal and political into a readable essay. All three are nice stories but lack sufficient direction.

Although still anchored in the personal, the focus of the essays written by Allison Webber, Fiona Kidman and Pat Rosier is not their own experience, but the experience of particular groups of women to which they are aligned. Webber's essay, 'All the Prejudice That's Fit to Print' is a rambling tale of trying to survive in a bastion of male culture — the media. She outlines the pockets of feminist resistance, which makes an interesting, but uncritical, 'Who's Who?' of women in the New Zealand media.

Fiona Kidman rattles through a series of authors and events in women's writing — who published what, when, and who won the prizes — interspersed with accounts of male writers' disrespect for their female colleagues. Meanwhile, Mary Varnham frankly discusses attitudes to sex amongst New Zealand women during the second wave of feminism. Her extensive use of quotes from women interviewed is nice in terms of hearing their voices, but the extracts are strung together staccato-style so that they are jerky and irritating to read.

Pat Rosier uses a similar format in 'Lesbians In Front, Up Front, Out Front', which is a catalogue of events and a speaking

of names. Given the invisibility of lesbian women in history/her-story, this emphasis on the power of naming makes sense. However, Rosier's style, which resembles the stringing together of a series of newspaper headlines, limits the usefulness of this piece. Kidman's style is also troublesome. It has all the flow of a numerated list, as if she is engaged in a desperate attempt to remember and record names. A litany of successes is all very well, but there's a touch of the melodramatic towards the end, which left me feeling that I should consider the repression of women's writing as a case of misunderstood genius, rather than a conse-quence of patriarchal gatekeeping as Kidman suggests earlier in the piece.

All three contributors seem intent on including as much as possible. Rosier and Varnham in the attempt do not create a 'kaleidoscope', but a splash of words on paper. I found the lack of focal points distracting. Webber, for her part, heads nowhere much, apart from towards the less than stunning conclusion that gains have been made but equality for women in the media is still a long way off. Webber, Kidman, Varnham and Rosier's essays all contain too much descriptive content leaving insufficient room for analysis.

Other authors in the collection set themselves questions to answer which usually result in a more concise essay. In 'How the Level Playing Field Levelled Women', Phillida Bunkle discusses the devastating impact of new right philosophies on women in New Zealand. In setting herself some 'Hairy Questions', Charmaine Poutney seems to locate the organising foci for her essay within the field of women in education and her own devel-opment as a feminist educator. She asks what the values of the next generation of women are and where they are headed. Anne Else and Rosslyn Noonan ask themselves what they have achieved in their 20 years of active feminism and provide us with an account of the gains made by women alongside a general overview of the 'unfinished business' of feminism.

Yet these essays still try to do too much. Bunkle in trying to offer a solution to the evils caused by new right policies ends up making an inappropriately placed election speech as the Alliance candidate for Onslow. Poutney goes off in all sorts of directions, but by returning at the end of her essay to her original questions

manages to make some attempt to summarise diverse strands. Else and Noonan's essay is rather more contained; it sits well at the end of the book as a summary of where women are heading and the hurdles that need to be overcome. Else and Noonan emphasise the need to turn away from new right policies, but I find their unsubstantiated statement that New Zealanders have been more accepting of feminism than of new right arguments a bit difficult to swallow.

Sue Kedgley's contribution, which lends its title to the book, is one of the best in the volume at giving the impression that it is heading somewhere. She argues that the feminist movement has been unsuccessful in changing management styles. Her conclusion is that women have either opted out of corporate life or, as Germaine Greer warned, merely gained 'free entry into the world of the ulcer and the coronary'. Although I find much of what Kedgley says intelligent and important, her assumption that there is a kind of 'natural' alternative management style which all women share seems a little simplistic.

My personal favourite is Sandra Coney's essay, 'Why the Women's Movement Ran Out of Steam'. Coney also has a clear direction to her essay. Once again the title helps. Coney argues that there is no longer a broad women's movement, but only fragmented issue-oriented groups such as Rape Crisis. She offers some explanations for why the women's movement ran out of steam in the 1980s. Generally, Coney laments the lack of debate over effective tactics and organisation and blames the 'ideological and structural base of the movement' (p. 63). In particular, she claims that ideas borrowed from overseas which emphasised the benfits of the absence of leadership and structure made it difficult for the movement to debate and to progress. While I agree with much that Coney has to say, I am not convinced that a lack of leadership was one of the most crucial faults for feminism as a movement, or that separatism should be regarded as a 'retreat from the real world' (p. 71). Coney does not articulate what sort of 'leadership' may have been appropriate for the feminist movement and seems to valorise notions of objectivity and reality. I think, one of the reasons younger women have problems relating to feminism is that they do not have this same confidence in 'Truth'. They do not see the world as divided

into 'goodies' and 'baddies' and lack faith in the idea that examining the 'causes' of inequalities (if they recognise any) means that anything can be done about it. There is not the hope bred of prosperity that helped fuel feminism in the 1960s and 1970s.

Overall, I found *Heading Nowhere in a Navy Blue Suit* enjoyable to read, despite its waffly character. Mostly it has a more optimistic tone than *Changing Our Lives*, possibly because the contributors are more satisfied with their personal successes, or possibly because everyone has been trying to sound optimistic for suffrage year. I think if read alongside Alison Jones and Camille Guy's 'Radical Feminism in New Zealand',[2] it offers some insights into why feminism seems to have temporarily headed into a bit of a dead end. It will make a good general reference book for women's studies students and others wanting to know more about the feminist revolution.

Notes

1. Maud Cahill and Christine Dann (eds.), *Changing Our Lives: Women Working in the Women's Liberation Movement 1970 – 1990* (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1991).
2. Alison Jones and Camille Guy, 'Radical Feminism in New Zealand: From Piha to Newtown', in Rosemary Du Plessis et al. (eds.), *Feminist Voices: Women's Studies Texts for Aotearoa/New Zealand* (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992) pp. 300–16.

Mary Holmes, Sociology, University of Auckland.

Women Together: A History of Women's Organisations in New Zealand – Nga Ropu Wahine o te Motu
Anne Else (ed.)
Daphne Brasell Associates/Historical Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1993. $59.95

Women Together is a very substantial and beautifully presented book containing short histories of 132 organisations, complemented by over 150 photos and other illustrations. From the brilliant cover picture, to the clear indexing and excellent referencing of published and unpublished sources, this work takes its place alongside

many other valuable books published in conjunction with the centennial of women's suffrage.

Organised into thirteen sections focusing on particular themes such as welfare, religion, employment and health, each section begins with an introductory essay that both chronicles the emergence of the organisations mentioned and provides the reader with an insight into the social context of the time. These essays, because they establish links and forge connections between the organisations covered, bring a sense of cohesiveness to *Women Together*. In addition, they enable the reader to gain an appreciation of the changes in how women experienced, thought about, and organised around the issues that affected them. Hence, the essays effectively contribute to a greater under-standing of what it meant for the women involved to organise in the ways they did, at the times they did.

However, the quality of these introductory essays is uneven: most tend to be descriptive, with only a handful providing more explicit feminist analyses. A good example of the latter approach is Geraldine McDonald's essay, 'Organisations Concerned with Early Childhood Care and Education', in which she discusses the kindergarten, playcentre and childcare movements in the context of their differing attitudes toward the role of mothers and the care of young children. In noting that care of children by servants and other family members has not received the same public con-demnation as the care provided by many of these organisations, McDonald makes the observation that 'where a child is cared for has been a more powerful factor in the acceptance of various forms of care than who actually carries out that care' (p. 332).

Occasionally there seem to be quantum leaps within sections. For example, a focus on women's unemployment committees of the 1930s is followed directly by the more avowedly feminist organisations of the mid-1970s and early 1980s. Similarly, the section on education begins with two organisations of the early 1920s followed by groups which emerge as a result of the 'second-wave' of feminism in the mid-1960s and 1970s. While this is a conse-quence of the book's focus on the organised activities of women rather than the activism of individual women, it can leave the reader with the impression that women have not engaged in organised activity for substantial periods of New Zealand's colonial

history. Despite this, the book is best appreciated by reading one section at a time and referring back to the introductory essays to contextualise how the aspirations and goals of the various groups have changed over time.

It is important to remember that *Women Together* does not attempt to provide an anthology of all 'feminist organisations' in Aotearoa/New Zealand, or to rate the various groups and clubs in terms of their degree of feminist activism. Rather, it aims to present a history of women organising in this country. In her introduction, Anne Else makes it clear that while 'women's organisations' were initially defined, for the purposes of the book, as voluntary organisations formed by and for women, with an all female membership, many of the organisations included in the book have departed from these criteria in some way. This is both a strength and a cause of frustration. While such an approach avoids many of the problems associated with attempts to define what counts as a 'feminist organisation' it often results in a rather unsettling tendency to measure the various groups against one another, whether in terms of their aims and objectives, or of their successes or shortcomings.

Rosemarie Smith's essay on 'Rural Organisations' extends discussion of this issue by noting that rural women belonged to many organisations, few of which could be termed specifically rural. However, the organisations covered in this section are limited to those whose membership is comprised solely of rural women. So although the book is divided according to the interests of particular groups of women (Maori, ethnic groups, lesbians), it's important to remember that the activities of groups within these categories are not necessarily representative of the organised concerns of these groupings of women. This points to the double-edged effects of structuring the book on a model of inclusiveness; although such an approach increases the visibility of particular groups of women, it unfortunately tends to make these same groups less visible in the 'general' sections. This risk could have been avoided by including a list at the end of each section, to allow cross-referencing between related organisations through all sections of the book.

The selection of themes, while predictable, has permitted coverage of a wide range of concerns and issues. According to

the editor, Tangata Whenua are given precedence by allocating the first section of the book to Maori women's organisations; presumably a different logic was applied when it was decided to place 'Lesbian Organising' last.

While most entries make available information about women's experience which helps to redress the invisibility and devaluation of women in our history, some also question how we have conceptualised these women. An excellent example of this is the piece on 'Women's Unemployment Committees 1931 – 1939'. The formation of these committees in response to women's material needs, at a time when the official focus of the government was on unemployed males, challenges the notion that throughout our past all women were, or wished to be, economically dependent on men. As a result of the action of these committees the government initiated training and employment schemes for women. Although Women's Unemployment Committees were not particularly successful in finding employment for women, Margaret Tennant and Kate Flintoff point out that they made an important contribution to the history of feminism in New Zealand because they gave women immediate practical assistance and brought the discriminatory basis of the unemployment relief provided by the state to the public's attention, thus holding the government responsible for its (in)action.

A personal favourite is 'The Guides at Whakarewarewa'. Tania Rei and Rea Rangiheuea, by emphasising the entrepreneurial skills of the guides, and by placing guiding within the traditional puhi and kaitiaki role of wahine Maori, have produced an account which undermines the diet of stereotyped myths within the coloniser's versions of history which were fed me as a child.

In terms of its stated aims — to give a comprehensive history of the extent, variety and importance of women's organisations and activities in New Zealand over the last 150 years and to provide a resource and inspiration for further work — *Women Together* is an unqualified success. These descriptive short histories are well complemented by the documents in Charlotte Macdonald's history of feminist writing in New Zealand, *The Vote, the Pill, and the Demon Drink*,[1] Margaret Lovell-Smith's *The Woman Question*,[2] and Pat Rosier's sampler from *Broadsheet Been Around*

for Quite A While [3]. *Women Together* furnishes many fascinating insights and provides us with the resource to be more than half awake to what has taken place in the lives of our sisters, mothers, aunts and grandmothers.

Notes:

1. Charlotte Macdonald (Selection & Introduction), *The, Vote, The Pill and the Demon Drink: A History of Feminist Writing in New Zealand, 1869–1993* (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1993).
2. Margaret Lovell-Smith (Selection), *The Woman Question: Writings by Women Who Won the Vote* (New Women's Press, Auckland, 1992).
3. Pat Rosier (Selection & Introduction), *Been Around for Quite A While: Twenty Years of Broadsheet Magazine* (New Women's Press, Auckland, 1992).

Jenny Coleman, Feminist Studies, University of Canterbury

Educating Feminists: Life Histories and Pedagogy.
Sue Middleton
Teachers College Press, New York and London, 1993. US$17.95

It's Different for Daughters: A History of the Curriculum for Girls in New Zealand Schools 1900–1975.
Ruth Fry
Wellington, New Zealand Council for Educational Research, Reprinted 1993. $25.20

These two books are of particular relevance to educators interested in historical and contemporary issues for women in the New Zealand educational context. While the authors are influenced by different bodies of theory, and consequently approach history in a different manner, both books make previously published work more accessible to students, and others who seek to reflect and act on the role that education plays in the production of a gendered society. They make a significant contribution to the growing body of New Zealand literature that investigates the way in which our educational system has been shaped and differentiated by gender.

Sue Middleton argues that her book is an attempt to move away from the 'eye-of-God' objective position that has dominated

Western academia. In so doing, she interjects into her writing personal elements of her life as a feminist, academic, lecturer, researcher, mother and wife. She also attempts to include the 'voices' of those she teaches and researches. In following this agenda, her work draws on the place that the use of the personal has acquired in the writings of other contemporary feminist educators.[1] Like these postmodernist-inspired writers Middleton attempts to explore and critique her own history, pedagogy, and research methodology through her personal experience and 'everyday practicalities'. Unlike these writers, however, Middleton places the concept of 'life-history' at the centre of her pedagogy and research methods. For her it is the vehicle that allows the voices of those she teaches and researches to be heard in this personal history of her work.

The book begins and concludes with chapters reflecting on the author's personal views of her current academic and personal environment. Sandwiched between these are five chapters that move from a contemplation of the use of life-history in Middleton's pedagogy and teaching of the sociology of education, to its use in various aspects of her research. The research Middleton draws upon explores a range of projects and topics. The chapters reflect upon, and link, her personal educational experience as a pupil in the 1950s and a university lecturer in the 1980s and 1990s, to feminist educational issues. The theme of pedagogy and experience is expanded on in chapter seven where Middleton draws upon student assessments of her own course to provide yet another perspective on her development as a feminist teacher. A chapter is devoted to an analysis of the impact of recent educational policy initiatives through 'life-history interviews' and a 'feminist reading of the various discourses' that constitute these accounts. Middleton's discussion of the censorship issues she had to confront while serving on the New Zealand Indecent Publications Tribunal is one of the most interesting and revealing aspects of *Educating Feminists*.

The chapters that reflect on Middleton's teaching practice and research are largely drawn from previously published material. Apart from the introductory and concluding chapters which were written specifically for this book, this material will be familiar to many educationalists and students who have investigated the

issues associated with gender and education in New Zealand. The life history material on feminist teachers is drawn from her doctoral thesis, and is covered in *Women in Aotearoa* and other publications.[2] Middleton's analysis of school charters, as an example of her work in the area of feminist theories in sociology, was published in *Women in Aotearoa 2.*[3] Other chapters that focus on pedagogical issues have also appeared in New Zealand and overseas publications. Middleton uses her reflections on personal experiences and development to link a wide range of research, issues and ideas.

She endorses the need to cross the boundaries erected between the rational and the personal, and between self knowledge and public knowledge. This is both revealing and risky, as Maxine Green points out in the foreword (p. vii). Middleton's vivid personal accounts and her attempt to include the voices of those who often remain silent brings new and exciting possibilities into view. While this approach opens new doors for those interested in pedagogy and educational research, it also confronts feminist educators with new problems.

As a trained teacher and classroom-based researcher who now, like Middleton, teaches 'gender issues in education' in an academic setting, I found the risk that she took to give critical attention to her pedagogical practice the most exhilarating dimension of *Educating Feminists*. The revealing discussion of the development of her course and interaction with students, alongside the inclusion of the students' own impressions through course evaluations, should challenge all academics, not simply those involved in university based women's studies and education departments, to reflect upon their teaching practices and to consider their students' points of view. In foregrounding the pedagogical dilemmas she faces in her teaching practice she invites those of us engaged in educational research to not only objectively research others in their educational settings, but also to turn our gaze on our own teaching practices and institutional structures.

Her use of 'life-history' throughout the book, and the integration of this into her teaching also raises interesting possibilities for students and educators to explore the relationship between personal and abstract theoretical perspectives, and provides space for those who might otherwise remain unheard. However,

it also raises new problems. If our aim is to make women visible, how do women academics and researchers avoid our voices and our 'life histories' crowding out the voices of others? Middleton is aware of this issue and does attempt to address it by including the statements of the researched to a greater extent than we often see in educational research. In addition to the extensive use of life histories, the book includes material garnered from comments made by other women and her students. Despite these attempts to include the 'voices' of marginalised others the impression I gained from reading *Feminist Educators* was that Middleton's voice was still the most audible, and above all carried with it the authority of the academic researcher. As she acknowledges, it is Sue Middleton, the researcher and academic, who operates her word processor to orchestrate and manipulate the voices of other women (p. 148).

This book illustrates an interesting predicament for feminists who attempt to embrace the postmodernist trend towards the personal within their work. I am forced to ask if it is possible to abandon rationality without it being replaced by the egotistical limits of our own thinking and viewpoint? Is there not a danger that such personal accounts merely replace the 'great man' biographies, that were so prominent in my undergraduate history courses, with a proliferation of published volumes on the thoughts of prominent women academics? If personal perspectives are taken to their extreme, and we are left with a plurality of viewpoints where is the room for an academic analysis that pursues the truth?

I am not alone in asking these questions. Susan David Bernstein highlights the dilemmas associated with feminist academics who write in their own voice.[4] She argues that those who attempt to use the 'intrusive I', in what she calls 'confessional feminism', must impose self-vigilance on the process of self-positioning. Without such 'vigilance' in feminist theorising, whose central aim is the restructuring of knowledge and authority, the use of the 'autobiographical' and the 'personal' merely serves to institute yet another privileged and legitimate 'truth'. Bernstein's arguments serve as a warning against allowing the experiences of middle-class, female academics to become representations of the 'self-evident' and the 'real world'. If we use 'anecdotal individualism'

in such a fashion we may simply be resituating the location of authority and knowledge rather than overturning positivist conventions:

> . . . first person theorizing has been crucial in feminist epistemologies that seek to broaden and contextualize the location and construction of knowledge. However, as confessional acts become more prevalent across academic writing, so do they cease to confront the structuring of authority and knowledge; the transgression of conventions instead becomes the latest convention.[5]

Maggie Maclure in a recent paper warns against the 'mundane autobiography' that can result from the uncritical use of autobiography and life-history as the latest convention and 'sacred' text.[6] She argues that interview accounts can be 'as mundane and as pragmatic as any other kind of self-talk'. Moreover, such accounts, like the so-called 'positivist' research they seek to replace, can be used for purely pragmatic ends 'to establish allegiances, to justify moral positions and defend educational ideals'.[7]

Middleton does not adequately address the dilemmas inherent in her attempt to interweave the subjective and the personal with feminist theory. I found this disappointing as a greater recognition of the limitations of her personal discourse and positioning would have added to her attempts to be reflective about feminist teaching and pedagogy. Above all a reflexive, rather than a reflective, 'I' can, as Davies warns, lead to an uncomplicated notion of experience, so that personal disclosure becomes an 'obligatory gesture to impress feminists with a remarkably united "different voice"'.[8]

Middleton's reworking of her doctoral 'life-history interviews' and other previously published research material raises further questions. This book to a large extent appears to rely on research material that was gathered under a methodology that requires researchers to 'begin outside themselves' thereby suppressing the personal, as Middleton herself notes. Yet Middleton's central aim is to make clear the context of her analysis and her position as a researcher. In order for this aim to have credibility and significance it should also serve as the motivation for undertaking

new research endeavours rather than justifying the reworking of previous research projects. Nevertheless, Middleton's exploration of collaborative and autobiographical research will undoubtedly inspire feminist educators to employ similar methods, perhaps to an even greater extent than Middleton does here.

The difficulties that confront Middleton's use of postmodernist approaches are also reproduced within the technical dimensions of this book. In utilising a variety of theoretical influences and material from Bernstein to Foucault, Middleton's analysis appears fragmented and difficult to follow in places. This juxtaposition did allow a wide coverage but the themes they referred to often appeared to be skimmed over, rather than developed in greater depth, and left the reader grappling for links and coherence. To ask for such coherence may contradict the particular theoretical perspective that Middleton is attempting to develop; however its absence is confusing and could be off-putting for some students using this book as a text.

Middleton's uptake of the personal and her attempt to apply postmodernist themes to New Zealand educational contexts makes *Educating Feminists* a valuable book for researchers, students of education, and practising teachers to read. Middleton's promotion of the currently approved standpoint deserves more than an uncritical acceptance. In taking the risk of writing an account inspired by postmodernism and by urging us to consider multiple viewpoints, Sue Middleton's work highlights the benefits and insights gained through reflection, at the same time as it exposes the problem of relativism inherent within postmodernist inquiry.

Ruth Fry's book *It's Different For Daughters* follows a more traditional approach to the historical experiences of women in education. Unlike *Educating Feminists* it is not shaped by recent developments in feminist theory. As outlined in the preface, the aim is to present a 'history' of women's education in New Zealand. Fry's historical narrative explores the differences in curriculum content and experiences between girls and boys from 1877 to 1975 by drawing on a wide range of primary sources. This provides the reader with insights into how the curriculum and educational experiences of girls have differed from those of the boys, but leaves the significance of these differences unexplored.

It's Different for Daughters is divided into two parts. The six chapters in Part One examine the issue of the provision of education for girls through a discussion structured around such themes as the classical curriculum versus the commercial and 'domestic' curriculum; rural and urban settings; and the moral perceptions associated with a woman's role in society. While attention is given to both the primary and secondary curriculum, the latter is covered in more depth than the earlier years of schooling. The second part of the book focuses on separate subject areas of the curriculum and the schooling of Maori girls. Among the areas covered here are 'home-related' subjects, physical exercise and 'aesthetics'. The book concludes with a discussion of girls' experiences in extra-curricula concerns such as discipline, school uniforms and vocational guidance.

This 1993 version of *It's Different for Daughters* is a reprint of the original book first published in 1985, not a second edition. The content remains unchanged as does the foreword, author's preface and bibliography. It remains a very useful reference book and continues to be one of the few works published in New Zealand that records the historical development of a gendered curriculum in any depth. Fry's account of girls' schooling and their experience of the curriculum is well documented. The use of a variety of sources, from official documents to personal accounts and biographies, adds interest to the book and gives the reader an insight into the individual experiences of girls and an understanding of the broader themes and policy development of the period. The pictures and diagrams provide a welcome visual representation of the themes explored in the text.

While *It's Different for Daughters* is still the only book to cover the history of girls' schooling in any depth, I would have liked to have seen the release of a second edition rather than a reprint of the original. An updating of the chapters to incorporate recent research in this area and an additional chapter outlining developments since 1975, by providing a better link to the current curriculum issues and reforms, would have increased the utility of this book as a course text and could have helped attract a wider range of readers.

The possible approaches to historical, pedagogical and curriculum issues associated with women in New Zealand education

can, as these two books illustrate, range from the more tradition-
al historical narrative to the postmodernist inspired analyses of
'life-histories' and the personal. Such diversity provides those
who are interested in issues associated with women's education
in New Zealand with a foundation for future development and
exciting debate. Given the current enthusiasm amongst women
students and former teaching colleagues in such topics, my fer-
vent hope is that we will not have to wait long for new research
that builds on the contributions that Middleton and Fry make in
these two books.

Notes:

1. See for example Alison Jones, 'Writing Feminist Educational
   Research: Am "I" in the Text?', in Sue Middleton & Alison Jones
   (eds.), *Women and Education in Aotearoa 2* (Bridget Williams Books,
   Wellington, 1992) pp. 18 – 31; Dianne Snow, 'The Self as Text:
   Autobiography and Pedagogy in the History of Education', (Paper
   presented at ANZES Conference. Wollongong, Australia, 1991);
   Madeleine Grumet, *Bitter Milk: Women and Teaching.* (Amherst:
   University of Massachusetts Press, 1988).
2. Sue Middleton (ed.), *Women and Education in Aotearoa* (Allen &
   Unwin with Port Nicholson Press, Wellington, 1988).
3. Sue Middleton and Alison Jones (eds.), *Women and Education in
   Aotearoa 2* (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1992).
4. Susan David Bernstein, 'Confessing Feminist Theory: What´s "I"
   Got to Do with It?', *Hypatia*, 7:2 (1992) pp. 121–123.
5. ibid., p. 121.
6. Maggie Maclure, 'Mundane Autobiography: Some Thoughts on
   Self-talk in Research Contexts', British Journal of Sociology of
   Education, 14: 4 (1993) pp. 373–384.
7. ibid., p. 373.
8. Cited in Bernstein, p. 122.

Janet Soler, Education, University of Otago

Other Books Received

Bernard Arcand, *The Jaguar and the Anteater: Pornography Degree
   Zero,* translated by Wayne Grady (Verso, London, 1993).
   Aus. $ 55.00

Helena Catt and Elizabeth McLeay (eds.), *Women and Politics in New Zealand* (Political Science with Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1993).

Sandra Coney (ed.), *Unfinished Business: What Happened to the Cartwright Report?* (Women's Health Action with The Federation of Women's Health Councils, Auckland, 1993). $29.95.

Judith Davey, *From Birth to Death III* (Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 1993). $30.00.

Alison Dench (ed.),*Walking Backwards Into the Future* (Women's Electoral Lobby, Hamilton, 1993). $19.95.

Beryl Fletcher, *Iron Mouth* (Daphne Brasell, Wellington, 1993). $32.95.

Sneja Gunew and Anna Yeatman (eds.), *Feminism and the Politics of Difference* (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1993). $34.95.

Radha Kumar, *The History of Doing: An Illustrated Account of Movements for Women's Rights and Feminism in India, 1800 – 1900* (Verso, London, 1993). Aus. $ 39.95.

Halina Ogonoswska-Coates, *I'm Still Elva Inside* (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1993). $24.95.

Paul Patton (ed.), *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory* (Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1993). Aus $ 24.95.

Diana E. H. Russell (ed.), *Making Violence Sexy: Feminist Views on Pornography* (Open University Press, Bukingham, England, 1993. Aus. $ 32.95.

Claudia Scott (ed.), *Women and Taxation* (Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University, Wellington, 1993). $25.00.

Dorothy Thompson, *Outsiders: Class, Gender, Nation* (Verso, London, 1993). Aus. $ 34.95.

Women's Studies in New Zealand:
A List of Current Research

Alice, Lynne Sociology and Women's Studies, Massey University, Palmerston North. Feminist deployments of semiotics, discourse analysis and psychoanalysis in sexuality and identity issues; AIDS and theories of representation.

Coleman, Jenny 220 Riccarton Rd, Christchurch 4. I am working on my PhD in Feminist Studies at the University of Canterbury. My thesis is on historical and contemporary feminist identity and subjectivity in Aotearoa/New Zealand. My current research interests are in the intersections of feminist poststructural analysis, feminist epistemologies, feminist subjectivity, issues of agency, and the construction of multiple identities, and how these theoretical issues impact on the politics of daily practices.

D'Cruz, Doreen English Department, Massey University, Palmerston North. Constructions of female sexuality in feminist narratives; intersections between feminism and postcoloniality.

Dominy, Michèle D. Department of Anthropology and Gender Studies Program, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504 USA. Feminist anthropology; symbolic constructions of gender, sexuality and colonialism; gender constructions and political strategies in New Zealand women's networks; feminist separatism in New Zealand. Current research focuses on the meanings of kinship and land as historically and culturally situated as well as gendered and generationally specific for New Zealand high country settler descendant families.

Dunsford, Deborah Department of History, University of Auckland. MA thesis on working conditions and experience

of hospital nurses in New Zealand (1901–1950) with special reference to Auckland.

Harris, Jocelyn English Department, University of Otago, Dunedin. Current research interests include seventeenth and eighteenth century women writers; Samuel Richardson; Jane Austen; intertextuality and the woman writer (Woolf, Atwood, Brontës); Mary Shelley; contemporary women's novel; feminist theory.

Hayward, Bronwyn Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism, Lincoln University, P.O. Box 84, Canterbury. The rights and opportunities for public participation in public policy making.

Jones, Deborah Department of Management Communication, School of Management Studies, University of Waikato, Hamilton. Feminist theory/communication theory; gender and ethnicity; discourse theory and analysis; feminism and Foucault; government policy, especially EEO and 'biculturalism'.

Kuiper, Alison Christchurch Polytechnic, P.O. Box 22 – 095, Christchurch 1. Interests and research in the areas of women's education and employment (paid and unpaid). Currently working on the provision of re-training for women.

Oliver, Pam Psychology Department, University of Waikato, Private Bag, Hamilton. Social justice; gender and power; justice psychology; feminist research and teaching methods; women's development; language and power; psychology and law; community development; bicultural development; networking.

Simpson, Claire Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism, P.O. Box 84, Lincoln University, Canterbury. Women's cycling in late nineteenth-century New Zealand (PhD topic); Women Outdoors Recreation Study — interviews with Maori and Pakeha women on the meaning of outdoor recreation for them, and identifying barriers and constraints; history of women and recreation in New Zealand.

Star, Lynne Media Studies, Massey University, Palmerston North. Masculinity, 'macho', and practices of maleness; feminist film theory; popular culture.

Yeatman, Anna Department of Sociology, Macquarie University, Sydney. Feminist theory; rethinking the political; citizenship and contemporary dynamics of change; management for change in universities and the public sector.

CALL FOR PAPERS

WOMEN'S STUDIES ASSOCIATION

CONFERENCE

26–28 August 1994

Victoria University of Wellington
Wellington

He tono ki nga kaikorero
Call for papers

The organisers of the 1994 WSA Conference invite all women interested in giving a paper, presenting work in progress, running a workshop, or organising a panel discussion on any women's studies topic to send a title and brief outline, with name(s), contact address and phone, to:

Conference Papers 1994
WSA (Wellington)
PO Box 5043
Wellington
OR: Fax Anne Else (04) 475-9958

We really need to hear from you as soon as possible!

Conference registration forms will be available in May from the same address, or from Women's Studies Departments.

CALL FOR PAPERS

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND LAW IN HISTORY SOCIETY

CONFERENCE

1–3 July 1994

Wellington

The conference themes are:

Law and colonial societies
Law and labour
Law and the family

Presentations are welcome on these themes or other aspects of law and history. Anyone wishing to give a paper, workshop, panel/roundtable discussion or a discussion of work in progress should send an abstract by **30 April 1994** to:

Bronwyn Dalley
Conference Convenor
Historical Branch
Department of Internal Affairs
PO Box 805
Wellington
NEW ZEALAND
Fax: (04) 499-1943

FEMINIST LAW BULLETIN

The Feminist Law Bulletin aims to inform, raise awareness, and develop a wider understanding of the impact of the law on women.

WHY SUBSCRIBE?

FEMINIST LAW BULLETIN:

Identifies when feminist issues arise in policy, legislative proposals, and the practice of the law;

Provides an opportunity for limited exploration and discussion of some of these issues;

Enables a general readership to gain an introduction to feminist analysis of the law.

By subscribing to the bi-monthly Bulletin community organisations will be better prepared to make informed and comprehensive comment and submissions. Policy makers will have ready access to a feminist analysis of proposals. Lawyers will be assisted in their development of a feminist legal analysis.

FEMINIST LAW BULLETIN SUBSCRIPTION

NAME/ORGANISATION: ....

POSTAL ADDRESS: ....

....

I enclose my cheque/please invoice me for 6 bi-monthly issues:
     $ 25 for individuals/community groups
     $ 50 for government agencies/institutions
     SEND TO: **FEMINIST LAW BULLETIN**
     PO Box 5071 Lambton Quay Wellington

NEW ZEALAND
SOCIOLOGY

A refereed journal for the dissemination and promotion of research and thought that has, as its objective, the clarification and development of theoretically informed research in sociology and related disciplines, with a predominant, though not exclusive concern with New Zealand.

RECENT ARTICLES INCLUDE:

Caygill: *The Moral Career of the Psychiatric Nurse*

Denton: *Class Theory and Class Analysis*

Gidlow &
Spoonley: *The Funding of Social Science Research in NZ*

Issues: 1 Volume per year, 2 issues per Volume.

Subscriptions:		
	Student rate	NZ $15.00 per Volume
	Individual rate	NZ $22.00 per Volume
	Institutional rate	NZ $40.00 per Volume
	Surcharge for overseas postage	NZ $ 7.00 per Volume
	Airmail deliver	P.O.A.

For further information please contact:

Patricia Barnett
New Zealand Sociology
Sociology Department
Massey University
Palmerston North
New Zealand

International Association For Feminist Economics

A non-profit organisation advancing feminist inquiry of economic issues and educating economists and others on feminist points of view on the economy.

IAFFE Purposes:

- To foster dialogue and resource sharing among economists, from all over the world, who take feminist viewpoints;
- To advance feminist inquiry into economic issues affecting the lives of women, men, and children;
- To aid in expanding opportunities for women and especially women from underrepresented groups, within economics;
- To encourage the inclusion of feminist perspectives in the economics classroom.

IAFFE Activities:

- Organisation of an annual conference to present current research, plan future research, and interact with economists and advocates with similar interests;
- Maintenance of an electronic mail network to provide quick and low-cost communication among subscribers interested in feminist economics;
- Compilation of bibliographies, course syllabi and a list of working papers on feminist economics.

Membership Fees:

$10 per year:	students/unemployed/full-time unpaid workers/low income
$20 per year:	income less than $40 000 per year
$25 per year:	income between $40 000–50 000 per year
$30 per year:	income over $50 000 per year

If you are an academic, teacher, policy maker, trade unionist or other community member committed to the advancement of a feminist perspective in economics, or interested in what such a perspective may offer, then your membership and participation is welcomed.

Contact:
New Zealand Coordinator
Prue Hyman, Economics
Victoria University of Wellington
PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand

ARCHIVES OF WOMEN'S ORGANISATIONS:
A Register of Collections held at New Zealand Archives Institutions, Libraries, Museums and Historical Societies.

The contribution to New Zealand history of women's voluntary organisations has often been unacknowledged and hidden. Rich sources exist however, for researchers wishing to find out more about the impact of these organisations on the lives of their members, and on New Zealand society as a whole.

Archives of Women's Organisations is a register containing 325 entries from 57 archives Institutions, Libraries, Museums and Historical Societies throughout New Zealand. The information is not available through any other single source.

Each entry gives details about the archives of a women's organisation, including the size of the collection, a brief historical note about the organisation or individual who created the collection, a summary of the type of records and information contained, and any access restrictions.

The register has been published by the Alexander Turnbull Library in association with the *Preserving Ourstory* project. *Preserving Ourstory* is a Women's Studies Association project, undertaken by Ellen Ellis with a grant from the Heritage Fund and support from the Historical Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs.

Price: $27.00 (incl GST)
ORDER FORM - ARCHIVES OF WOMEN'S ORGANISATIONS

Name ....Date ....

Address..

Signature..............................Phone....................Fax ....

Return your order to: Subscriptions Officer
Publications Unit
National Library of New Zealand
PO Box 1467, WELLINGTON

INTERNATIONAL NETWORK ON FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS

This network, launched October 1992 in Amsterdam at the Inaugural Congress of the International Association of Bioethics, already has close to 100 members from 14 countries.

Our aims and scope include development of a more inclusive theory of bioethics encompassing the standpoints and experiences of women and other marginalized social groups, re-examination of the principles and legitimizing functions of the prevailing discourse, and creation of new strategies and methodologies.

The coordinators are Helen "Becky" Holmes and Anne Donchin. If you would like to join us, contact:

>   Anne Donchin
>   Department of Philosophy
>   Indiana University, 425 University Blvd
>   Indianapolis, IN 46202-5140 U.S.A.
>   Phone: 317-274-8926 FAX: 317-274-2347
>
>   **OR**
>
>   Helen Bequaert Holmes
>   Center for Genetics, Ethics & Women
>   24 Berkshire Terrace
>   Amherst, MA 01002 U.S.A.
>   Phone: & Fax: 413-549-1226

Call For Papers/Information for Authors

The *Women's Studies Journal* welcomes contributions from a wide range of feminist positions and disciplinary backgrounds. It has a primary, but not exclusive, focus on women's studies in New Zealand. We encourage papers which address women's experience, explore gender as a category of analysis and further feminist theory and debate.

Topics For Future Issues

We would especially like to publish papers which deal with:

Feminisms in Postcolonial New Zealand and Australia?

What are the relationships between postcolonialism and feminism and how do these relationships mark the specificity of 'New Zealand and Australia'? To what extent is post-colonialism an event, a programme, a discourse which bears on the politics of feminism, and contemporary feminists' articulations of locality?

Note: This issue is now planned for March 1995, not September 1994 as previously advertised.

Women and Immigration

Women and the 'Restucturing' of the State in New Zealand

New Zealand Culture: Film, Popular Culture, Literature, Art

Ecofeminism

Deadlines for Manuscripts: May 1 and October 1 1994

Manuscripts will be sent out for anonymous reviewing with the aim of providing the author with feedback and constructive suggestions (see statement below).

Enquiries about the Journal and contributions only should be sent to: Women's Studies Journal
Women's Studies, University of Otago
P.O. Box 56, Dunedin

Please send two double-spaced hard copies, with generous margins. A separate title page should include the title and the author's name and address. Since contributions will not be returned authors should retain a copy of their work. A style sheet is available on request.

Notice From the Editorial Collective: Review Policy

Recently the collective has caused some confusion about our policy on dealing with manuscripts submitted to the journal. This arose because late last year we decided to change our policy and not make comments on all papers received, but only on those we were interested in publishing.

Our decision not to provide comments stemmed partly from difficulty finding reviewers for all the papers we receive. This is such a small academic community and reviewers have very heavy work loads already. Because of this, many times in the last year we found ourselves reluctant to send articles to reviewers if their quality or content was such that we had no intention of publishing them.

This led to a sort of two-tiered system, where some articles were returned without review, since reviewing them was a waste of everybody's time. Initially, we sent back comments (usually extensive) about why the article was unsuitable. However, in the last few months, the collective had found it harder and harder to have time to do this adequately. It seemed to us that no comments were better than a) inadequate ones or b) some authors getting far more attention than others depending on the expertise and interests of the collective.

In hindsight, this change was ill-considered, a result of extreme stress all round and a particularly overloaded system in the journal. We have since decided to streamline our systems so that each author is given due attention. We agree this is important to the journal's success and to its role in the academic community. Our policy is outlined below.

Current WSJ Policy on dealing with submitted material

All articles received will be read by a core group with expertise in the subject area, which will decide whether the paper is likely to be suitable for publication. Those considered likely to be suitable will be sent out for anonymous peer review and reviewers' comments will be conveyed to the author. Sometimes the author may be required to revise the paper first. In the case of those which are considered unsuitable the core group will indicate to the author exactly why the paper is not considered suitable. This

means authors retain the right of reply to comments made and the reasons for not publishing are in the open.

We welcome feedback on all journal procedures. Someone has suggested an editorial board and we would like to consider this during 1994. What do you think?

Women's Studies Association (NZ) (Inc.)

The Association is a feminist organisation formed to promote radical social change through the medium of women's studies. We believe that a feminist perspective necessarily acknowledges oppression on the grounds of race, sexuality and class as well as sex. We acknowledge the Maori people as the tangata whenua of Aotearoa. This means we have a particular responsibility to address their oppression among our work and activities.

Full membership of the Association is open to all women. Other individuals may become associate members.

Annual subscription (includes GST):

- full membership (women) $20.00
- associate membership (newsletter only) $20.00
- corporate membership (institutions) $24.00
- low/no income $12.00

Cheques and enquiries to: P.O. Box 5067, Auckland, New Zealand.

Annual Conference: The Association holds an annual conference where members present the latest feminist research and discussion papers, and workshops explore issues important to women. The *Conference Papers* are published annually. Members receive a discount for the conference and the *Conference Papers*.

Newsletter: A quarterly newsletter containing local and overseas news, book reviews, conference reports etc. is sent to all members.